Hazard Recognition, Assessment, and Control

After reading this chapter, you will be able to:

• ➤ Understand the principles of hazard recognition and the process for identifying hazards in a workplace.
• ➤ Identify the ways to assess the seriousness of a hazard.
• ➤ Discuss the assumptions built into a “risk” approach to controlling hazards.
• ➤ Describe the different types of hazard controls and their relative merits and shortcomings.
• ➤ Consider the challenges in identifying hazards in non-standard work environments.

On November 22, 2017, 33-year-old Troy Lucyk was loading material onto a gravel crusher at a recently established gravel pit in Ceylon, Saskatchewan, when a chute became clogged with sand. Lucyk jumped out of his loader to assist a co-worker in unclogging the chute. He positioned himself below the chute, standing on a frame overtop a pulley that was still operating. He lost his footing, and his leg fell into the pulley and became entangled. His co-workers were unsuccessful in disentangling him from the machinery. He died shortly afterward because of extreme blood loss. His employer, BLS Asphalt Inc., was eventually convicted of two offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations and fined $350,000.1

The key to preventing workplace injuries and fatalities is to identify hazards and control them. In the case of Troy Lucyk, the process of Hazard Recognition, Assessment, and Control (HRAC) would have identified the risks posed by the unguarded pulley system, the decision not to stop operation of the pulley (made to prevent costly downtime), and the need to manually unclog the chute. It might also have raised questions about the adequacy of the training provided to Lucyk and the OHS complexities of operating a newly installed crusher in an outdoor environment.

This chapter examines how workers and employers identify, prioritize, and control workplace hazards. As we saw in Chapter 1, a workplace hazard is anything that might harm, damage, or adversely affect any person or thing under certain conditions at work. It can be an object, process, context, person, or set of circumstances which has the potential to create injury or ill health. While this definition may seem vague, it is intentionally vague in order to ensure that anything that could potentially harm a worker is included. Hazard recognition (which is sometimes called hazard identification) is the systematic task of identifying all hazards present, or potentially present, in a workplace. It is the first step of any HRAC process. The second step is hazard assessment (which is sometimes called hazard analysis or risk assessment). In a hazard assessment, workers and employers determine which of the hazards needs to be addressed most urgently. Finally, the hazard control process sees preventive and corrective measures implemented to eliminate or mitigate the effect of the hazard(s). In controlling hazards, the employer makes changes to the work environment, work process, or workplace rules to eliminate or reduce exposure to the hazards. Figure 3.1 illustrates this process.

The core purpose of HRAC is to methodically identify and control workplace hazards. Some hazards are easier to identify than others. For example, it is easy to see that an extension cord lying across a busy hallway may cause someone to trip. It is more difficult to determine if a cleaning agent is toxic or if a machine is producing too much noise. Even more challenging is identifying factors that are increasing stress among workers or are the precursors of harassment. Similarly, some hazards are also easier to control than others. Eliminating the hazard posed by the extension cord is a quick and easy fix. Other hazards may be much more expensive to control or may reflect a core aspect of the production process. Some controls may be complex, requiring multi-faceted solutions. Further complicating the HRAC process are the conflicting interests between workers and employers around hazards discussed in Chapter 1. Employers and workers might disagree over what constitutes a hazard, how serious the hazard is, and what the most appropriate control should be. As set out in Box 3.1, even the language around HRAC can be both contested and confusing.

As set out in Figure 3.1, the HRAC process starts with comprehensively identifying all the hazards in a workplace. As noted in Chapter 1, there are five broad categories of hazards:

1. Physical hazards typically (but not always) entail a transfer of energy from an object, such as a box falling off a shelf, which results in an injury. These are the most widely recognized hazards and include contact with equipment or other objects, working at heights, and slipping. This category also includes noise, vibration, temperature, electricity, atmospheric conditions, and radiation. All of these hazards can create harm in certain contexts.
2. Ergonomic hazards occur as a result of the interaction of work design and the human body, such as work-station design, tool shape, repetitive work, requirements to sit/stand for long periods, and manual handling of materials. Ergonomic hazards are often viewed as a subset of physical hazards. For the purposes of hazard assessment, it is useful to consider them separately because they are often overshadowed by more obvious physical hazards. We examine both physical and ergonomic hazards in more detail in Chapter 4.
3. Chemical hazards cause harm to human tissue or interfere with normal physiological functioning. The short-term effects of chemical hazards can include burns and disorientation. Longer-term effects of chemical hazards include cancer and lead poisoning. While some chemical substances are inherently harmful, ordinarily safe substances can be rendered hazardous by specific conditions. For example, oxygen is essential to human life, but in high doses can be harmful. We examine chemical hazards in Chapter 5.
4. Biological hazards are organisms—such as bacteria, molds, fungi—or the products of organisms (e.g., tissue, blood, feces) that harm human health. We examine biological hazards in Chapter 6.
5. Psycho-social hazards are social, environmental, and psychological factors that can affect human health and safety. These hazards include harassment and violence but also incorporate issues of stress, mental fatigue, and mental illness. We examine psycho-social hazards in Chapter 7.

In Chapter 8, we will also look at how the structure of work and the employment relationship can pose a hazard to workers’ health. Recognizing hazards of each type requires different methods and approaches. Analyzing the hazards in each category separately allows us to consider the specific issues associated with that type of hazard.

There are many ways to identify hazards in a workplace. There are many companies and consultants offering commercial hazard assessment packages to employers for a fee. The pre-prepared packages can help establish a framework upon which to build. There are also free resources available from reliable organizations, such as the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the United States, which allow the hazard assessment process to be tailored to specific workplaces. A common feature of robust hazard recognition systems is that they examine the workplace from multiple perspectives to ensure that all hazards are identified. Box 3.2 outlines the necessary information that every hazard assessment form must contain.

It is useful to start the hazard assessment process by considering the nature of the work and workplace. The context of work affects the type of hazards in the workplace. For example, recognizing that work takes place at a remote workplace—such as a tree-planting operation or oil-field drilling site—raises issues of emergency response times, travel hazards, and working alone. Similarly, if workers are hired on a part-time or temporary basis, this may affect communication and training. Vulnerable workers—such as newcomers to Canada or youths—may be reluctant to identify hazards for fear of losing their jobs. These examples demonstrate that hazards do not merely reside in the task of working but also in the wider context of the employment relationship. One of the common omissions in hazard recognition is ignoring the underlying factors that lead to the creation of hazards. A narrower scope of recognition fits the employer’s interests in limiting safety to proximate causes but it can undermine the effectiveness of the HRAC process.

There are a variety of hazard-identification techniques, and these are often used in combination to create a fuller picture of a workplace’s hazards:

• Inspecting the workplace: Physically observing the workplace and how work is performed within it is a powerful step in identifying hazards. The inspection should not be limited to considering physical objects, such as machines, tools, equipment, and structures, but should also include observing processes, systems, and work procedures.
• Talking with workers: Passive observation can miss many important aspects of how work is performed. Getting the perspective of the people conducting the work will reveal other insights. This can be done informally through discussions or through more formal means such as surveys or interviews.
• Job inventory: Acquiring job descriptions and specifications can also reveal hazards. Mapping out the flow of work to create a task analysis allows for a systematic examination of how a job is supposed to be conducted. It is important to compare this data with worker interviews to identify instances where work practices differ from formal procedures.
• Records and data: Reviewing records of previous workplace incidents, safety reports, and other documentation can yield useful information about the hazards in a workplace.
• Measuring and testing: Sometimes, to discover if something is a hazard, you will need to measure or test it. This is particularly true for noise, chemical hazards, and biological hazards.
• Research: Knowing something is present in the workplace may be insufficient to determine if it is a hazard. You may need to conduct research on a substance, material, design, or environment to assess its potential for harm.

When identifying a hazard, it is useful to note the kinds of injury or ill health that the hazard will result in and the mechanism by which the hazard will harm the worker. This reflects that, in order to control a hazard, we have to understand how it harms the worker.

The hazard identification process must be carefully documented. Hazard identification forms should break the identified hazards into their main types as well as by work area, job, or process performed. There are many generic forms available online. It will be necessary to adapt these to reflect the nature of the work and the workforce. Box 3.3 offers an example of a hazard recognition process.

It is important to remember that hazard recognition is not simply a technical task of cataloguing potential dangers. The process of hazard recognition is situated at the core of the conflict over what is defined as a workplace hazard. As such, the assumptions that are adopted and the interests that are served can have a profound impact. If we return to the carpal tunnel syndrome example from Chapter 1, assumptions about the nature of women’s work caused a failure to recognize hazards to which women were being exposed to, and as a result those hazards went uncontrolled for longer than was necessary.

Once hazards have been identified, it is necessary to prioritize which hazards will be controlled first. Much like hazard recognition, hazard assessment is not just a technical practice. Through prioritizing, certain hazards will be brought to the forefront, and will therefore be more likely to be controlled, while others will be pushed into the background and likely receive little or no attention. It is important to be mindful of who benefits and who is harmed by the prioritization decisions.

Risk assessment is a common tool used by those determining the priorities in hazard assessment. Risk is the likelihood that a specific hazard will result in injury or ill health. A risk assessment quantifies the likelihood of injury or ill health by assessing the probability, consequences, and exposure posed by each hazard:

• Probability is the likelihood that the hazard will result in an incident.
• Consequences refers to the severity of injury or ill health that will result from an incident.
• Exposure refers to how often or regularly workers come in contact with the hazard.

Figure 3.2 gives an example of a simplified tool for assessing the probability, consequences, and exposure associated with a specific hazard. Assessors use the description (e.g., rare, possible, probable, or likely). Each descriptor is then assigned a numerical value (e.g., 1, 2, 3, or 4).

Figure 3.2 Simplified Risk Assessment Tool

Once the probability, consequences, and exposure of a hazard have been quantified, they can be inputted into a mathematical formula to quantify the risk:

risk = probability × consequences × exposure

The greater the final number, the greater the risk posed by the hazard. Quantifying risk allows us to compare the relative risk of several hazards. For example, workers in a gas station face all manner of hazards, including slippery surfaces, gasoline fumes, and the potential for robbery. Without looking at the assessment below, which of these three hazards should the employer control first? Most people tend to say robbery. Yet quantifying the risks suggests that robbery poses the least risk of the three hazards:

1. Slippery surfaces: Possible (2) × Significant (3) × Frequent (3) = 18
2. Exposure to gasoline fumes: Possible (2) × Significant (3) × Continuous (4) = 24
3. Robbery of cash on premises: Rare (1) × Catastrophic (4) × Continuous (4) = 16

Risk assessment tools allow the assessor to compare hazards, either overall or on a factor-by-factor basis, in order to identify which hazards should have the highest priority for control. It may be important, for example, to note that robbery poses the least risk of the three hazards but has the highest level of consequence and is a hazard to which workers are continuously exposed. These features may influence the type of control that is appropriate (see below). Box 3.5 offers a simplified assessment of some of the hazards at Repro’s Copy Shop.

There are several criticisms of this approach to risk assessment. Quantifying risk imparts a veneer of objectivity that can obscure underlying assessor bias and support decisions that have already been made (which tends to benefit the employer). Consider the copy shop risk assessment that identified toner dust as the highest risk. Despite the high risk, many shops might make little effort to control it. They might assume that exposure to it is just a requirement of the job, which workers know when they apply for work at the shop. This may also reflect the fact that the health consequences of the exposure have a long latency period and are difficult to relate to the exposure. In this way, risk assessment contributes to employers’ cost-benefit approach to hazard control.9

Risk assessors may also possess imperfect information and struggle to fully consider all possible outcomes.10 For example, risk assessment can entrench existing biases toward more acute, easier-to-solve hazards (e.g., trips and falls) and downplay risks that have longer-term consequences (e.g., repetitive strain injuries). This reproduces a long-standing bias in the OHS regime that “favours” acute injuries over ill health.

Risk assessment may also entrench biases against certain types of workers or work. For example, many doctors will diagnose lateral epicondylitis (i.e., tennis elbow) after a few hours of casual tennis play but will be reluctant to make a similar diagnosis for workers who have pulled and stripped wire 50 hours per week for six months. Both activities require forceful exertions of the wrist and elbow joints.11 The explanation for this different treatment may be as simple as the fact that doctors have first-hand experience with tennis but not manual work.

Workers who are members of traditionally undervalued groups may face similar bias. Consider the delay in recognizing carpal tunnel syndrome that we read about in Chapter 1. This delay was directly caused by a refusal to recognize the demanding nature of so-called women’s work (e.g., clerical tasks, housekeeping). This dynamic has significant potential consequences for women, Indigenous persons, youth, and visible minorities who tend to possess lower social status and who disproportionately have jobs that are less socially valued. Diminishing the effect of systemic bias against particular kinds of work or workers is one reason most jurisdictions require worker involvement in hazard assessment (see Box 3.6).

Similarly, risk assessment has a tendency to individualize risk, which means that decisions focus on the number of people potentially affected rather than the broader social goals of reducing risk overall. This focus results in individuals bearing disproportionate degrees of risk depending on their social position and how unusual their exposure is. If few people are likely to be affected, risk assessment can downgrade the importance of the hazard.12

These shortcomings are not necessarily caused by conscious choices on the part of practitioners. They are a product of certain assumptions built into the model that reproduce existing biases in the OHS regime and narrow the scope of what is considered a legitimate hazard requiring attention. It is important to recognize the shortcomings of adopting a risk assessment model and consider alternatives that allow for a broader understanding of how to assess the consequences of not controlling a hazard. At a minimum, risk assessments should be complemented by more qualitative analyses, including reports produced by workers who experience the hazards. An effective, simple approach is to have affected workers complete their own risk assessment and blend those results with others. Safety professionals should also ensure they do not blindly follow the numbers that result from quantitative risk assessment tools without considering other factors when determining appropriate priorities and controls.

More broadly, a conceptual alternative to risk assessment (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7) is the “precautionary principle,” which calls for action to be taken even if the negative consequences of inaction are not fully understood. While it is not always easy to implement in a workplace, the precautionary principle does provide an alternative lens through which to view a workplace hazard and may bring to the surface hazards that go under-prioritized in the risk assessment process.

The final step in the HRAC process is to determine and implement the most appropriate control for each hazard. Hazard control is a regulatory requirement in every Canadian jurisdiction and entails implementing measures to eliminate or reduce the potential of a hazard causing an incident. As we saw in Chapter 2, employers must exercise due diligence in the HRAC process in order to avoid prosecution for any workplace injuries under OHS law. Some forms of hazard control are more effective than others, and, consequently, the hierarchy of controls (with five levels) has been established (see Figure 3.3):

• Elimination removes the hazard from the worksite. For example, relocating work performed at a height to ground level eliminates the falling hazard. This control is most easily implemented at the design stage, thereby preventing the hazard from entering the workplace.
• Substitution entails replacing something that produces a hazard with something that does not. For example, we might replace chemical-based cleaning solvents with plant oil–based solvents. Substitution is similar to elimination but is less effective because the new object or process may introduce different hazards or fail to completely remove the original hazard. (e.g., plant oil–based cleaners might still irritate workers’ skin but less than chemical-based cleaners)
• Engineering controls are modifications to the workplace, equipment, materials, or work processes that reduce workers’ exposure to hazards. For example, installing guards on machinery, building guard rails, installing ventilation systems, or purchasing ergonomically designed workstations all isolate workers from hazards, but they do not eliminate the hazard. These controls can be incomplete, become inoperative due to lack of maintenance, or be overridden and therefore are less effective than elimination or substitution.
• Administrative controls are changes to work process, policies, training, or rules designed to reduce exposure to hazards. For example, policies restricting the time workers spend in contact with a chemical hazard, “no-go” zones that restrict workers’ movements in certain locations, mandatory training sessions, permit systems to control access to equipment or spaces, changes to schedules to prevent excessive shift work, or working-alone procedures that require regular check-in are all administrative controls. Administrative controls do not actually control a hazard. Rather, they attempt (via rules and processes) to limit workers’ exposure to the hazard.
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) is equipment worn by workers that is designed to protect them should they come into contact with a hazard. For example, helmets, goggles, gloves, and fall protection systems are forms of PPE. PPE is considered the least effective control because it does not control the hazard or restrict workers’ contact with the hazard and is heavily reliant upon human action for its effectiveness. PPE places the burden of implementation on the worker. Workers may choose not to wear or be pressured into not wearing the PPE. Further, most PPE has been historically designed for a male body, which can compromise its effectiveness when worn by women.

As noted in Chapter 2, when selecting a control, employers must justify applying controls lower on the hierarchy because they pass the reasonably practicable test. Reasonably practicable refers to precautions “that are not only possible but that are also suitable or rational, given the particular situation.”15 Employers and workers sometimes have differing views about which hazard control options are optimal. Employers are more likely to prefer options lower on the hierarchy due to their lower cost and lesser impact on the work process. Workers, on the other hand, prefer controls higher on the hierarchy because they are more effective at keeping them safe. This tension will be discussed further at the end of the chapter. Recent innovations in work structure, such as increased working-from-home during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, have created more complications regarding controls, as the workplace stretches to workers’ private spaces, as discussed in Box 3.7.

When selecting a control, it is useful to revisit your earlier analysis of the mechanism by which the hazard will harm the worker. A control is effective only if it meaningfully engages the mechanism of injury. For example, if workers might be crushed by a two-ton plate falling on them, then giving them PPE (e.g., hard hats) will not be an effective control. This is because the hard hat will not prevent the worker from being crushed by the heavy plate. In contrast, hard hats might be effective if the hazard is the risk of workers bumping their heads while working in an area of low clearance.

Often multiple controls can be combined to provide a higher degree of control. For example, receptionists may face harassment, violence, or other inappropriate behaviour from clients. A locked door that the receptionists can unlock remotely (an engineering control) can help exclude clients known to be a risk. This hazard control can be made more effective by combining it with other controls:

• Engineering: A glass barrier that separates the receptionist from visitors reduces the possibility of physical violence.
• Administrative: Policies regarding when and to whom to allow entry provides the receptionist with authority to deny an individuals entry. Policies against working alone, training on handling difficult people, and procedures for responding to perceived threats may also help control the hazard.
• PPE: In addition to the security door, the receptionist could be provided with a panic button (with appropriate response procedures) to provide a last layer of defence.

Finally, different levels of control may be appropriate at different times. For example, when first addressing a hazard it may be necessary to use PPE until a more permanent engineering control can be implemented. That said, it is important to not unduly delay the implementation of the (likely more effective) engineering control. Employers have flexibility in how they control hazards, but that flexibility should not be interpreted as permission to disregard their due-diligence obligation to implement the most effective hazard control. Box 3.8 provides an example of how to approach hazard control.

There are numerous critiques of the hierarchy of control approach:

• Hazard focused: The hierarchy focuses on the hazard, rather than on who experiences the negative consequences of a control failure, leading to a tendency to dehumanize the control process.18 For example, in the case of the receptionist experiencing harassment, the focus is on locked doors and panic buttons rather than on the receptionist’s experience working in a vulnerable situation.
• Technology over process: The hierarchy tends to focus on implementing technological controls rather than process controls, which can overlook important possibilities. For example, grocery store employers may redesign checkout stands to reduce repetitive strain from scanning items but are less likely to examine the benefits of job rotation (switching up tasks frequently).
• Traditional hazards: The hierarchy does a better job at controlling hazards long associated with safety on industrial worksites (e.g., preventing contact, falls, and exposure to industrial chemicals) but works less well in service-sector jobs (often held by women and youth) and with less recognized hazards such as stress, harassment, or repetitive strain.

A more worker-centered approach is to consider the location of the control. In this approach, the focus is on where and when the hazard is controlled in the context of where the worker is in the production process (see Figure 3.4). In this approach, hazards can be controlled at three locations:

• Control at the source addresses the hazard where it first occurs. This type of control prevents the hazard from entering the workplace via elimination, substitution, or some types of engineering controls.
• Control along the path addresses the hazard at some point between its source and when workers encounter the hazard (i.e., it prevents the hazard from reaching the worker). Some types of engineering controls (e.g., machine guards, local ventilation) control the hazard along the path.
• Control at the worker implements controls over the hazard only after it reaches the worker (e.g., vaccines). These controls are designed to prevent or reduce the consequences of the hazard, rather than control the hazard itself. PPE and administrative controls are both examples of control at the worker because they both require that the burden of the control be placed almost exclusively upon the worker.

Examining controls by considering their location relative to the worker changes how we assess whether a control is effective by emphasizing the burden placed on workers with each control option. In Chapter 6, we will examine how the location of control can be used in relation to a biological hazard.

The location approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of how different groups of workers can be differentially affected by a hazard. When attention is turned to the worker, rather than the hazard, differences between workers become more evident. For example, administrative controls are less effective for new workers, because they are less familiar with the rules and have not yet developed the skills required to work safely (see Chapter 8). Looking at how those administrative controls are located relative to the worker makes it more likely that their shortcomings for new workers will be identified. Similarly, the location approach draws more attention to the consequence of control failure and emphasizes the harm that can occur to workers when the system fails.

Workers and employers will sometimes have different views about optimal hazard control. This disagreement arises from the conflicting interests of employers and workers around health and safety. Workers want to maximize personal safety. Employers, while they may want to keep their workers safe, must keep an eye on profit and productivity.

This conflict manifests itself in each step of the process. First, workers and employers are likely to disagree over what constitutes a hazard. Employers are motivated to minimize the number of hazards identified in the workplace. This, in turn, reduces the number of hazards employers are legally obligated to control and thus the cost of hazard control. Workers—those who will bear the consequences of uncontrolled hazards—are likely to seek to identify a greater number of hazards.

While it can be hard for employers to ignore traditional hazards (e.g., a tripping hazard), chemical, biological, ergonomic, and psycho-social hazards are often less obvious and thus more easily ignored. For example, the long latency periods of many occupational diseases can make it difficult to determine that a substance is toxic. Many hazards also have unclear causation: Are stress-related symptoms exhibited by workers due to work-related cause or personal issues at home? Incidents of harassment can sometimes be regarded as personnel issues rather than safety issues.

Workers and employers may also disagree on the assessment of hazards. Employers will wish to prioritize hazards that will lead to significant lost production time. Workers may be more interested in hazards that may lead to longer-term health effects or that reduce quality of life in the medium term.

Finally, workers and employers may disagree on how to control hazards. As we saw above, there are many ways of controlling a hazard. Some are more permanent, more difficult to implement, or more costly. Employers have an interest in minimizing the cost of hazard control, and thus they tend to prefer administrative controls and PPE implemented at the level of the worker. Such controls allow the employer to report they are complying with regulations, which rarely mandate a specific control, while minimizing the disruption to productivity and profit.

Workers may see things differently. PPE can be uncomfortable because it is often designed for the most common body types, making it poorly fitted for women, smaller or larger bodies, or workers with disabilities. Some PPE has only limited effectiveness against a hazard. For example, fall protection systems prevent catastrophic injury from a fall but can still cause significant injury to the worker. When the harness and rope arrest the worker’s fall, the worker can be slammed into the side of a building or sustain injuries from the harness jerking them to a stop. This is because the PPE only prevents the worker from hitting the ground, rather than preventing the fall itself. Moreover, load bearing calculations for fall protection regulations are based on the average male, and therefore systems may not fully prevent injury in some workers (e.g., larger workers).

Money certainly plays a role in this conflict: more effective engineering controls are generally (but not always) more expensive than PPE. But the conflict is also about who will bear the greater burden of controlling (or being exposed to) hazards. PPE and administrative controls place the bulk of the burden on workers, requiring them to follow orders, wear equipment, or take active measures to protect themselves. Controlling hazards at the source puts the burden on employers to prevent exposure to hazards in the first place. Who carries the burden of safety is at the core of conflict between workers and employers regarding hazards.

Controlling hazards in workplaces is more complex and difficult than the principles laid out in a textbook. The challenge for OHS professionals is to learn how to apply those principles in real life situations, a topic we return to in Chapter 12.

Troy Lucyk died in a gravel pulley because his employer failed to identify, recognize, and control workplace hazards. Although the HRAC process doesn’t guarantee that workers will never be injured on the job, it can dramatically reduce the incidence of workplace injuries and fatalities. Following the HRAC process should have changed the work processes that Lucyk’s employer used and, in turn, likely would have saved Lucyk’s life despite the challenges posed by the changing nature of the worksite.

That said, the HRAC process is not without its shortcomings. Recognizing, assessing, and controlling hazards is not an objective process. Embedded within the process is a set of assumptions about what a hazard is, who is affected by it, and how it is best controlled. HRAC processes were designed at a time when OHS focused predominantly on industrial workplaces (occupied mostly by men) where most hazards were physical, and thus risk assessment tended to most effectively engage those types of hazard. The process is not as effective at identifying and controlling hazards in non-traditional workplaces, such as retail outlets or offices, and thus workers found in those occupations are less protected. These workers are more likely to be women, youth, and other groups who have multiple factors working against their safety (discussed further in Chapter 8). Standard HRAC methods are also less able to address long-term health issues resulting from chemical exposure, stress, harassment, and other factors, therefore all workers continue to be vulnerable to incidents arising from those hazards.

Finally, HRAC is not immune from the conflicts inherent in the employment relationship. Employers and workers each have vested interests in the outcomes of an HRAC process, and those interests will often come into conflict, which means that hazard identification and control will always be a complex and contested terrain of OHS.

Write a definition for each bold italic word in this chapter.

Go online and find a hazard assessment for a workplace. After examining the assessment, select one of the hazards that it includes and answer the following questions:

1. Does the hazard assessment include all of the information set out in Box 3.2? If not, then what is missing?
2. Does the hazard assessment provide you with enough information about the nature of the hazard and the potential mechanism of injury? What further information would be useful?
3. Does the hazard assessment include enough information for you to evaluate the degree of risk associated with the hazard? What further information would be useful?
4. After categorizing the proposed control(s) using the hierarchy of controls in Figure 3.3, do the proposed controls appear to control enough that you would feel safe performing this job?
5. Which controls might make you feel safer?

Select a work task or job with which you are familiar. Go through the first steps of the HRAC process as outlined in this chapter. Answer the following questions:

1. What are the hazards that you have identified? Which types of hazards are they?
2. Which hazards would you attempt to control first and why (use the risk assessment tool in Figure 3.2)?
3. What are some immediate controls that you would propose?
4. Which types of controls (with reference to the hierarchy of controls) have you proposed?
5. Are there more effective controls that you could implement for each hazard? Why or why not?

Briefly discuss with a partner or write 250-word responses to the following questions:

1. What are the main steps in the HRAC process? What is the underlying goal of HRAC?
2. Why is it necessary to prioritize hazards? What are the potential concerns about applying a risk analysis perspective?
3. How would employers and workers perceive the relative merits of PPE versus engineering controls?
4. How might looking at the location of hazard control affect the decisions made about which control is most appropriate?
5. Which challenges arise in hazard control for telecommuters?

Return to the HRAC process that you followed for the activity for this chapter. Provide 250-word answers to the following questions:

1. Did you identify any hazards that you were previously unaware of or are uncontrolled?
2. Did the ranking of the hazards that you developed using the risk assessment tool in Figure 3.2 surprise you?
3. Why do you think that the employer did not simply eliminate the hazards identified?
4. Do you think that the controls implemented would satisfy the workers? Why or why not?