9

Au Revoir Becomes Adieu

Few people could have been entirely surprised by the AFL-CIO decision to withdraw from membership in the ICFTU, yet the announcement still left the organization in turmoil. It wasn’t a clear-cut break; the federation intended to continue its membership in ORIT, the hemispheric regional body for Latin America and the Caribbean, with which the AFL-CIO had a separate historical relationship. The matter couldn’t be left in this unsatisfactory state, and other national centres felt obliged to retrieve the situation, especially with new leadership at the helm in the TUC and DGB. George Woodcock had made his final contribution to ICFTU policy discussion in February 1969 and was now replaced by the avuncular figure of Victor Feather, highly experienced as a “backroom boy” at the TUC and with whom George Meany already had a warm rapport. Ludwig Rosenberg, who had contributed significantly to the American decision to withdraw, was also in his final few months as DGB chairman. His place at meetings was increasingly taken by his eventual successor, Heinz-Oskar Vetter, who was little known in the wider German labour movement, let alone internationally.1 The AFL-CIO had its own interest in engaging in further talks, all the more so when it discovered that it could exert at least as much leverage outside the ICFTU as it did when a full member.

The result was that over the next eighteen months the principal leaders of the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO engaged in a delicate and protracted dialogue-cum-negotiation that involved four face-to-face sessions and saw the ICFTU deliberating the issue on more than half a dozen occasions at meetings of its executive board, finance, and general purposes committee, and “negotiating team”—with the “good offices” of labour attachés in Brussels, Bonn, Washington, and London on regular call throughout. The ICFTU looked to entice the AFL-CIO back into the fold and fondly imagined it might even be able to help restore unity to the American labour movement. For its part, the AFL-CIO had three objectives. It was determined to establish Harm Buiter’s personal responsibility for the recent breakdown in trust. It was bent on ensuring that the UAW would have no chance of being admitted to ICFTU membership as an independent body, now or in the future. Thirdly, it aimed to discover whether, following the recent salutary shock to its system, the ICFTU was capable of substantial reform of policy and practice. Bit by bit, the AFL-CIO secured its objective on the first two points—George Meany all but ended Buiter’s trade union career and comprehensively outmanoeuvred Walter Reuther and the UAW over their aim to affiliate to the ICFTU. But over the ICFTU’s attitude toward contacts with communists the dialogue finally ran into the sand, leaving the AFL-CIO outside the free trade union movement’s largest grouping of labour organizations.

At Odds over the Americans’ Departure

The ICFTU executive board meeting in March 1969 considered a response to the AFL-CIO’s announced withdrawal. It decided to write to George Meany, appealing to the AFL-CIO to reconsider its position while reaffirming the ICFTU’s recognition of the federation as the unchallenged representative of the majority of American workers. But it made no reference to the UAW, and in AFL-CIO eyes this amounted to a dilution of its previous position, which had at least stated that the autoworkers could only be recognized as speaking for a minority of trade unionists. As the TUC’s Vic Feather argued, it would clearly be unacceptable to the federation.

The ICFTU was divided over the issue. A few—most notably the TUC and Force ouvrière—were ready to make almost any concession to induce the AFL-CIO to return. By contrast, Georges Debunne of the Belgian FGTB reckoned that the latest letter to Meany lacked dignity with its “appeal” to the AFL-CIO. Along with Arne Geijer of the Swedish LO, Debunne was willing to risk closing the door permanently to the AFL-CIO in the interests of securing the affiliation of the UAW. The belief was that the UAW would help revitalize the ICFTU while at the same time securing the financial viability of the organization, which now faced the prospect of a 17 percent loss of fee income as a consequence of the AFL-CIO’s departure. The Reuthers encouraged this thinking, insisting that the UAW’s Free World Labour Defence Fund had “more than sufficient resources . . . to guarantee the surmounting of any such emergency.”2

Supporters of the UAW were heartened by the ICFTU’s latest communication. Valerio Agostinone, UIL’s international director, wrote to Victor Reuther: “UIL is satisfied the compromise leaves prospects for UAW unaffected.” There was a new feistiness in the DGB following Rosenberg’s earlier vacillation over whether or not to throw his weight behind the UAW application. The mood now favoured a reconsideration of the autoworkers’ case, an attitude shared by the Dutch, Belgians, Canadians, and the handful of Japanese affiliates belonging to Sōhyō. A DGB statement drafted by international secretary Otto Kersten for the benefit of labour attachés rejected as baseless all the charges used by the AFL-CIO to justify disaffiliation. His advice to Victor Reuther was that the UAW should submit a new application so as to thwart the manoeuvres of any “constitutional technicians” who might argue that the original application had lapsed or ceased to be valid. Walter Reuther duly followed the advice and resubmitted the UAW application. Kersten also urged Reuther to make sure that he was on hand in Brussels on the opening day of the congress scheduled for July in order to present his case.3

DGB publicity director Walter Fritze expressed the confident view that the ICFTU congress would admit the UAW “with more or less certainty.” In the opinion of Welt der Arbeit, the ICFTU would be strengthened by the AFL-CIO’s withdrawal, observing that the ICFTU’s “sin” was simply to have recognized Walter Reuther’s right, like any good trade unionist, to disagree with George Meany. And while Jay Lovestone complained to Georg Leber about Welt der Arbeit’s continued distorted reporting of AFL-CIO affairs, Ludwig Rosenberg was quoted in Der Spiegel as saying that the Americans’ withdrawal would not create a lot of sadness. When the DGB wrote inviting the AFL-CIO to send a representative to its congress in May, Meany sent a curt reply to Rosenberg saying it would not be possible.4

Informed that Otto Kersten had been asking around Brussels what the AFL-CIO wanted by way of reconciliation, Lovestone offered an unequivocal answer, writing to the US labour attaché in Bonn: “He [Kersten] knows very well . . . the UAW . . . must be excluded from membership. . . . Buiter . . . must be dropped. And . . . a Commission should be appointed to reorganize the entire ICFTU, its methods of work, its leadership and even its kind of leadership.”5 Whether or not the AFL-CIO rejoined, it was considered worth keeping up the pressure on the ICFTU to make these changes. And for this purpose it helped that it maintained a toehold in the organization through Morris Paladino’s position as assistant general secretary.

At the executive board meeting in March, Buiter had come under some pressure to account for his behaviour in connection with the UAW application. There was a growing recognition on the ICFTU side that he had been guilty of some serious errors of judgment. Yet the general secretary was determined to fight back, denying that he was the cause of the AFL-CIO’s decision to withdraw and arguing that he was simply the whipping boy. With the departure of the Americans, he was keen to ease Paladino out of his post, but Meany instructed his man not to resign.6 Paladino claimed to see behind Buiter’s bluster and reported that his position was becoming precarious.

H.B. now has a situation in the Secretariat . . . of his own making. He is very well aware that, should the Federation return, he will have to go, or at best, submit to an arrangement which will seriously curtail his authority. On the other hand, having failed miserably to fulfil his boast that he would have my resignation before the [board] meeting, my continuous presence and participation in ICFTU events serves as a daily reminder that he is losing face with his European friends.

Paladino suggested that the AFL-CIO test the balance of power within the ICFTU by inviting a small group over to the United States for talks, while making Buiter’s exclusion from the party a condition of receiving them. Their reaction would reveal which group in the ICFTU had the upper hand.7

Although he was out in the cold and forced to watch from the sidelines, Irving Brown understood better than Paladino the European mindset on the need to protect the general secretary. Meany had previously claimed the scalps of Oldenbroek and Becu, but he wasn’t going to have his way again. Though noting that the British and Italians in CISL were among those willing to appease the AFL-CIO, he recognized that there was no likelihood that even they would support a move to oust Buiter. Indeed, he suspected that Buiter might even be strengthened rather than weakened. Lovestone too was convinced that the AFL-CIO now faced a sterner task, advising Meany that the forces determined to admit the UAW into membership and make the rupture with the AFL-CIO irreparable were much stronger than appeared on the surface. He considered the latest ICFTU communication “a bad step backward . . . insulting in its contents and manner . . . [that] will only serve to deepen the breach. . . . As of now, I can see no sign of reconciliation.”8

Keeping the AFL-CIO Sweet

Any further attempt by the ICFTU to accommodate the AFL-CIO would require some minimal indication from the federation that it might still consider returning, but the AFL-CIO executive council was unlikely to meet to discuss relations with the ICFTU before May. On the ICFTU side there was vague talk of President Bruno Storti writing to sound out Meany on his latest position, but it remained mere talk, and Rosenberg concluded that the ICFTU had done all it could. In these circumstances, Vic Feather made it his personal business to keep channels of communication open. Through the US labour attaché in Brussels, Harry Pollack, it was suggested to Lovestone that a signal from Meany to Feather might break the logjam. Feather was duly informed that Meany would be receptive to an overture, and he now patiently embarked on a long-term initiative to keep open the door to eventual AFL-CIO reaffiliation.9

The key members of the ICFTU’s finance and general purposes committee met privately in Brussels on 7 May and agreed that Storti should write to Meany to propose an informal meeting in Geneva in June during the annual ILO conference. Paladino was instructed to let Meany know that he could expect a letter from Storti. However, the ICFTU president preferred to delay until after the AFL-CIO executive council had divulged its latest thinking.10 To avoid any loss of momentum, Feather again took the initiative and contacted Meany directly, expressing the hope that he would agree to a meeting. On the following day he heard back from Meany that AFL-CIO representatives would be available to attend such an event. The AFL-CIO executive council confirmed as much a week later. Its meeting had before it a long, detailed narrative statement on the events leading up to withdrawal that was sharply critical of Buiter and the ICFTU, and to this it added a final paragraph stating the AFL-CIO’s willingness to engage in talks aimed at the restoration of “free world labour unity.” Such discussions were to be conducted “in the light of the reasons which led to our withdrawal,” the implication being that there would be a minute raking over of recent insults and slights. But at least the two sides would be talking to one another. Victor Reuther’s assumption was that the elimination of Harm Buiter would be the concession demanded by the AFL-CIO, though he still doubted that their wish would be met: “It is . . . not certain that the ICFTU would go this far toward committing hara-kiri.”11

At the same time as securing AFL-CIO agreement to engage in further dialogue, at the ICFTU’s finance and general purposes committee Feather had also won support for a proposal to notify the UAW that its application for independent affiliation would be considered at the executive board’s first meeting following the congress. It was the first step toward ensuring that nothing at the congress disturbed the proposed dialogue with the AFL-CIO. Indeed, what was emerging among figures like Feather, Storti, and Bergeron was an understanding of the need to prevent, at all costs, an open debate on the UAW application at the congress. It was part of a subtle change in the atmosphere, offering the AFL-CIO hope that continuing dialogue might produce dividends.12

The exploratory meeting between senior AFL-CIO and ICFTU representatives took place in Geneva on 17 June. Buiter had wanted a formal agenda structured to elicit from the Americans their terms for re-entry. According to Morris Paladino, the general secretary also boasted of an agreement among the Europeans that they would maintain a united front by avoiding private meetings with George Meany. But Paladino and the TUC international secretary, Alan Hargreaves, ensured that in the days beforehand Meany met with most of the people on the ICFTU side one-to-one on a private basis, including several private talks with Vic Feather. A private lunch between Meany, Feather, and the new DGB chairman, Heinz-Oskar Vetter, immediately before the start of the meeting proper confirmed an understanding that it would proceed without preconditions by either side.

Meany was accompanied by newly appointed secretary-treasurer, Lane Kirkland, and Jake Potofsky. Interestingly, Lovestone was not included in the party and was plainly upset at being omitted.13 In Geneva, supporters of the UAW cause were depleted by the absence of Arne Geijer and Georges Debunne, neither of them considering it worth devoting time to wooing George Meany. Ludwig Rosenberg, who was also broadly sympathetic to the UAW despite his wavering some months earlier, was also missing, replaced by his recently elected successor, Vetter, an unknown quantity who made no contribution in the meeting.

With the self-assurance of a veteran whose experience in international affairs far exceeded that of any of his counterparts on the ICFTU side, George Meany dominated the proceedings, speaking for an hour and a half without notes. It was all about Buiter’s mishandling of the UAW application. In substance there was nothing new; the charges had already been made in the detailed statement by the AFL-CIO executive council a month earlier. He pulled no punches, accusing Buiter of acting “as a champion of the UAW against the AFL-CIO” and waging a six-month campaign on their behalf, while failing to report crucial episodes to the ICFTU executive board. He was scathing about the official narrative account of the entire affair that Buiter had recently prepared for the ICFTU—“about as complete a falsehood as I have seen on a piece of paper.” Buiter was under instructions not to respond to such personal criticism, and it passed unchallenged. It was an exercise in allowing Meany to let off steam; the ICFTU side listened in respectful silence, hoping not to queer the pitch for a possible change of heart by the Americans. It was painfully clear that the ICFTU side were in the role of supplicants while Meany posed as the aggrieved elder statesman needing to be mollified.

Having heard him out, Feather, who led the discussions for the ICFTU, hoped to steer Meany toward agreement to meet again and focus more constructively on the future. The TUC leader strained to create an atmosphere of mutual trust when he broached the idea of having a smaller ICFTU group meet him as an informal body. Meany offered to withdraw while the ICFTU side talked over the options, but Feather insisted that he stay: “I do not look at this as two sides. I view it as a family.” Storti went even further and appeared to conceive of the body as a task force to which Meany would belong rather than being the spokesman for the other side. It was left to Meany to point out politely that he couldn’t be a member of their committee.

Likewise the discussion tiptoed around whether Buiter, as the controversial figure at the centre of problem, needed to be involved in the talks. Storti was evidently doubtful and suggested that it didn’t have to be an official committee. But if the ICFTU side were fishing for Meany to say whether or not Buiter’s inclusion would be welcome, they were to be disappointed. He handed the ball back to them, observing: “I don’t think you should ask me what kind of committee you should have. I think this is up to you.” Solicitously, Meany was then asked whether he would agree to the proposal for a further meeting. “We would not object,” was his deadpan response. “I understand you say you will not object—but would you welcome it?” Feather probed unctuously, attempting to elicit a glimmer of enthusiasm. “We are ready to talk to anybody at any time,” was all Meany would say.14 For the ICFTU, Storti was keen to meet again soon, even before the following month’s ICFTU congress, but Meany indicated that he was in no rush. If the ICFTU was the more eager party it was because it faced financial difficulties. In that respect, there was every reason for the AFL-CIO to string the process out.

Paladino reported the meeting as a complete victory for Meany, telling Lovestone, “He was magnificent,” and that his performance was “devastating.” By the same token it was a humiliation for Buiter:

How he took it I don’t know, and he looked pathetic sitting there alone after the end of the meeting. . . . There is no question left that the purpose of the committee meetings will be to find a formula to “clip” HB’s wings. . . . HB is now boiling over . . . threatening that he will never accept any reduction in his authority. However, if he acts as usual, the old $ sign will make him more rational. Besides, he is not man enough to resign.

There was reason for the AFL-CIO to be pleased. It was in the driver’s seat, and the ICFTU was being forced on the defensive over the performance of its general secretary. In the process, the issue of the UAW’s possible affiliation was also slipping into the background. Lovestone now believed there was a “reasonably good chance” that unity within the ICFTU would be restored.15

However, six weeks later, on the eve of the ICFTU congress, when the executive board received a report of the Geneva meeting, there was much concern at the sharpness of Meany’s ad hominem criticism of Buiter and the fact that this had gone unanswered. It was acknowledged that Buiter had made mistakes, but most speakers gave him their backing; if his scalp was the price of the AFL-CIO’s return to the fold, it was unacceptable. Buiter remained defiant; the AFL-CIO allegations against him were a collection of “half truths and inaccuracies.” Georges Debunne, who had stayed away from Geneva, argued that after agreeing to have contact with the Americans, it was disappointing that the ICFTU had heard nothing more from the AFL-CIO than a repetition of points that had already been publicized in an official statement.

With more first-hand experience of dealing with Meany than anyone else present, Arne Geijer believed there was nothing the executive board could do to convince the AFL-CIO to come back. He was critical of the fact that the Geneva meeting had been held at all and of the decision reached there to continue such “fruitless conversations.” While the AFL-CIO was insistent in demanding full loyalty from the ICFTU, he noted that there was never any talk of the loyalty that the AFL-CIO owed to the ICFTU.16 Vic Feather, who was increasingly setting the tone, remained optimistic that the AFL-CIO’s withdrawal was not final but negotiable. He envisaged a future meeting with the AFL-CIO focusing on how to overcome the domestic rift in the American labour movement. A small committee—the “ICFTU Five”—was named to conduct these talks. Apart from Storti and Buiter, the other three—Feather, Vetter, and Andries Kloos of the Dutch NVV—were all newcomers at this level.17

The board discussed a proposed statement on the future dialogue that included an expression of complete confidence in Buiter. It became the subject of an animated debate, with the TUC refusing to endorse the statement insofar as it referred to Buiter’s handling of the UAW application: it was important to avoid wording that gave specific offence to the AFL-CIO. However, the British were in a minority, and Rosenberg, attending the executive board for the last time, stated clearly that in his shoes he would have acted exactly as Buiter had done. The resolution finally passed noted that Buiter had given a full explanation in answer to AFL-CIO allegations and that the executive board approved his efforts aimed at restoring unity within the ICFTU. The last clause affirmed “in order to eliminate any confusion . . . its full confidence in its general secretary.” In this form the resolution was adopted unanimously.18

If Vic Feather had been forced to go along with the majority in circling the wagons around Harm Buiter, he was more successful in neutralizing the issue of the UAW application. When the ICFTU congress opened in July, President Bruno Storti was formally authorized to announce at the start of proceedings that the incoming executive board would consider the UAW application after the congress; thus it would not appear on the agenda. Along with a mere two paragraphs in the general secretary’s report to the congress briefly summarizing the steps leading to the AFL-CIO’s withdrawal, this was the only reference to the momentous events of the previous months. Victor Reuther, who had visited twenty national trade union centres in twenty-five days prior to the congress to line up support and was confident of winning a comfortable majority if the application were put to a vote, was disgusted to discover that the UAW’s best chance of securing affiliation had now been closed off. He attended the first day of the congress as an observer but walked out when it was clear there would be no chance for him to make the UAW case. Complaining that the ICFTU was “completely paralyzed” by the disaffiliation of the AFL-CIO, he told a British labour correspondent: “The British TUC . . . are granting to George Meany, an organization not now holding membership in the ICFTU, veto power over who shall be considered eligible for membership.”19

George Meany remained unhappy with the congress’s noncommittal statement on the AFL-CIO withdrawal, and even more so with the executive board resolution recording confidence in Harm Buiter. It was a setback to hopes for the ICFTU–AFL-CIO dialogue, and clearly there was a need to repair the damage. Passing through London, US undersecretary of labour Phil Delaney suggested to Vic Feather that he speak with Meany to explain the circumstances under which the resolution had been drafted and so soften the impact.20 André Bergeron wrote to Lovestone apologizing for the wording while explaining that an earlier draft had been much worse and that he had only voted for the final version because the TUC representatives were ready to support it and he didn’t want to embarrass them.21 Prior to the congress, DGB chairman Vetter had also written to Meany half acknowledging that “possible maladroitness” and “mistakes in attitude” on the ICFTU side had contributed to the present situation, but he suggested that “condemning each other morally” was unhelpful in the joint exercise on which they were now embarked.22

AFL-CIO international affairs committee chairman Joe Beirne had an opportunity while in Berlin that summer to talk more with Vetter about the issue, telling him bluntly that he couldn’t see anything constructive coming from joint meetings if Buiter participated. Some way would have to be found to circumvent the general secretary. Indeed, the “status, influence and standing of Buiter in the ICFTU” was, he believed, one of the major topics the talks would have to cover. According to Beirne, Vetter was now willing to take a firmer line. The German told him that he would have no hesitation in asking for Buiter’s resignation if any of Meany’s accusations—which Buiter denied—proved to be true. Equally, Vetter attempted to put some distance between himself and Ludwig Rosenberg by telling Beirne that he did not feel personally tied to any of the “manoeuvres, manipulations or activities” of his predecessor. The new DGB leader was keen to start off on good terms with Meany, admitting that he knew very little about the international labour movement and modestly conceding that he had much to learn. “Open, frank yet quite naïve” was how Beirne summed him up for Meany.23

Beirne obtained a more authoritative account of the general attitude of the ICFTU’s European affiliates from Vic Feather when they met in London in July. As he reported to Meany:

The Europeans “desperately wanted” the AFL-CIO to return and would do almost anything to ensure that result. . . . The one thing they could not do, because it is engrained in the European tradition, was to outrightly fire Buiter after he had been just re-elected. . . . In the European view the AFL-CIO has struck out two Secretary-Generals and by tradition within their own movement a third cannot go down the same path.

Still, like Vetter, Feather believed that some way could be found to reduce the general secretary’s authority.24

Meany wrote to Feather shortly afterward to inform him that the AFL-CIO executive council had nominated their own representatives for the next round of talks. But he noted that the portents were not good in the aftermath of an interview that Buiter had recently given to the Dutch NVV journal. In it Buiter had implied that the AFL-CIO’s activities in Latin America were basically undertaken on behalf of the US government. Meany wrote: “The tone is obviously wrong and suggests the ICFTU will not have the AFL-CIO back under any conditions.”25

Striving to keep the matter low-key, Feather responded that he would have a quiet word with Buiter about the press interview. Three days later he reported back to Meany via the US labour attaché in London, saying that Buiter was understood to be in line for a high position in the Dutch government and “may well disappear on his own as an obstacle to AFL-CIO–ICFTU rapprochement.” And with that, Feather hoped to leave it. With good fortune, the problem might just take care of itself. In any event, the problem surrounding Buiter had now been extensively discussed in private, and no one was in any doubt about the need to keep him on a tight rein. Feather clearly hoped it might be possible to move on to a more constructive plane when the two sides met for talks, now scheduled to take place in New York in October 1969.26 Passing on to his brother the rumour of a possible job move by Buiter, Victor Reuther observed bitterly: “If Buiter accepts another post, the capitulation to the AFL will have become complete.”27

Dialogue in New York

Vic Feather’s hope that the meeting in New York on 27 October would focus on the future was to prove in vain. Meany opened by complaining that the ICFTU statement to the congress on the American withdrawal contained nothing that got to the nub of the problem—the unacceptable behaviour of the general secretary. So once again he rehearsed at length his version of events as previously expounded in Geneva. “It all boils down to a question of integrity,” he said, noting that in Geneva he had heard nothing from Buiter. “The part he played is almost beyond belief. How can we live with this sort of situation . . . if we can’t trust the office in Brussels.”

It was finally time for Harm Buiter to defend himself before Meany. Justifying his actions, the general secretary challenged Meany’s interpretation of his motivation. In essence he argued that if Meany would only accept the truth of his claim that the May 1968 meeting in Rome where Walter Reuther first proposed “continuing affiliation” by an independent UAW was a chance meeting—a claim supported by Geijer and Storti, who were also present—the charge that he was conspiring behind the back of the AFL-CIO would lose its foundation. Yet a new admission by Buiter—elicited under questioning by Joe Beirne—that he still held the UAW cheque for $18,750 to cover dues, seventeen months after it was originally handed over and nearly a year since it was decided to take “no further action” on the application, seemed to support Meany’s allegation that he was working hard behind the scenes to ensure the success of the UAW bid.

For the first time Buiter showed a hint of contrition. Of the private and confidential letter to Meany in June 1968 that had caused such offence, he said it had never crossed his mind that the contents could be taken as an insult: “if it is, I regret it.” As an apology, it wasn’t very heartfelt. He claimed that at that time he had no idea that there was such discontent within the AFL-CIO over the likelihood of a UAW application for membership. It required Beirne to remind him that only a few weeks after Buiter’s letter to Meany, he and fellow executive board member Max Greenburg had met with the general secretary specifically to warn that his behaviour was leading to a head-on collision. They told him: “no more shenanigans.” On his abortive trip to Washington in the hope of preventing a confrontation at the November 1968 executive board meeting, Buiter admitted: “My reasoning perhaps was wrong. . . . I learned there was a possibility the applicants would try to appear before the . . . meeting. . . . I saw the spectacle of Walter Reuther in the corridor and I felt the row would start right away.” Altogether it was a most uncomfortable session for the general secretary, but it had a cathartic effect, even if the slate had yet to be wiped clean.

At length, exhaustion set in and even Meany ran out of steam, admitting, “I have nothing to add at this time.” They adjourned and reconvened the next day. The sticking point was still the AFL-CIO’s insistence that its letter eleven months earlier calling on the ICFTU to support the federation fully in the conflict with the UAW and to specifically reject the UAW application for affiliation had not been answered to its satisfaction. Feather was anxious to know if the two points in that letter were all that now divided them. Meany confirmed this. All the AFL-CIO concerns leading to withdrawal had been aired, he said. “We feel it is now up to the ICFTU executive board to take whatever necessary steps they want to take.” But what would come after that? They had discussed all the points leading immediately to the AFL-CIO withdrawal, but were these the only points needing to be agreed on before the Americans would return to the fold? The ICFTU side hoped so, though Meany’s body language suggested otherwise. As the chronicler of ICFTU fortunes, John Windmuller, noted, the AFL-CIO had begun to realize that its leverage on issues still to be resolved was greater outside than inside the ICFTU.28

In fact, as Morris Paladino noted privately, the meeting had simply identified the first steps the ICFTU needed to take to attract the AFL-CIO back into the fold. Meany had told the “ICFTU Five” that he would be prepared to meet again; but what would be on the agenda? The ICFTU team had travelled a long way to New York to give Meany another opportunity to let off steam and denounce the ICFTU general secretary, but once again they now found themselves scrabbling for the merest concession from the AFL-CIO. Feather asked what precisely the Americans might want to discuss next time. “I would not care to indicate,” said Meany evasively. “We would certainly want to talk about the whole structure of the ICFTU—its policies and plans—beyond that I don’t want to discuss.” Feather tried another angle: “I don’t want to press the point but would it follow that there was a reluctance to leave the ICFTU?” Meany simply ignored the question. A mere observer at the meeting, Jay Lovestone later commented dismissively: “The strongest fellow in the negotiating committee was Feather, and Feather was as strong as a feather.”29

The ICFTU would need to go back to the drawing board and again try to come up with an acceptable response to Meany’s original letter before the two sides met again. This time it would have to deal with the UAW application for affiliation. The ICFTU Five met in Dusseldorf ahead of the October 1969 executive board to map the way forward.30 Vic Feather argued that the reply needed above all to make clear that the UAW application was firmly rejected and that the ICFTU had no intention of recognizing any American organization other than the AFL-CIO. He reasoned that it shouldn’t be seen merely as a bid to placate the AFL-CIO; affiliating the recognized national centre was the principled approach. Buiter disagreed, suggesting that such a proposal might antagonize the executive board given that the ICFTU was suffering financially, its morale sapped as a consequence of an AFL-CIO policy that seemed to amount to a strategy of “rule or ruin.”

Others worried about being left “holding the bag” if they pulled up the drawbridge to the UAW only to find that the AFL-CIO still wasn’t prepared to rejoin. They were disturbed at the Americans’ unwillingness to “trade” on their return to the ICFTU fold. If they could be sure of the AFL-CIO’s readiness to reaffiliate, there seemed little doubt that they would recommend meeting Meany’s demands. However, executive board members would not want to eat crow if it was uncertain that the AFL-CIO would rejoin. Split between these two positions, the group simply decided to report the nature of the discussion in New York and hand the matter back to the board’s finance and general purposes committee for one last attempt at formulating a response.31

When the ICFTU executive board met the following week and its finance and general purposes committee addressed Meany’s letter, the mood had shifted. Georges Debunne was not present for this exercise, and Arne Geijer stayed away from the board altogether, having advised Reuther: “It is hopeless because our friends have not got the guts to stand up, and I am going to disassociate myself.”32 In their absence the finance committee was unanimous in proposing to reject the UAW application, and the full executive board subsequently ratified the decision amid a growing sentiment for “putting our house in order.” Debunne and Dalla Chiesa of UIL were alone in criticizing the “lack of dignity” involved in having to submit to AFL-CIO “preconditions.” As Paladino reported to Meany, the board had finally grasped “the realities of the situation.”

Yet there was still disagreement over the agenda for the next round of talks with the AFL-CIO. How wide ranging should they be when there was no assurance that the Americans would return? Buiter warned of the constitutional impropriety of entering into discussions with a non-affiliate on the future of the ICFTU. To avoid this, he suggested that the wording of the reply must specify that talks would only take place within the constitutional framework of the ICFTU. This became the focus of intense debate, with the British representatives fiercely opposed to Buiter for introducing “a false issue” that would only “complicate matters.” The TUC finally had its way; the resolution adopted aimed to answer Meany’s letter along the lines the Americans demanded. Expressing the hope that this spurning of the UAW would enable the reunification of the free trade union movement, the ICFTU letter to the AFL-CIO looked forward to “the continuation of our dialogue.”

As Paladino noted, the ICFTU’s latest position was a product of the TUC’s sticking to its guns to the very end.33 He informed Meany that executive board members were relieved to have finally and unequivocally dealt with the issue, having expressed to him their hope that the letter to be sent to the AFL-CIO would be interpreted as a “correction of past errors.” The rejection of the UAW’s application was, he maintained, never in doubt; even the two abstainers, Debunne and Dalla Chiesa, made no specific reference to their support for the UAW, registering their abstention on the grounds that the resolution went too far in satisfying the AFL-CIO. With justification, Paladino’s report to Meany concluded: “the case of the AFL-CIO has clearly triumphed.”34

The UAW had been outmanoeuvred, largely as a result of the AFL-CIO’s continuing influence within the international labour movement. One-time editor of the UAW paper, Frank Winn, who had been close to Walter Reuther since the 1930s, grasped a key dimension of what had happened, commenting that the only time the UAW president ever underestimated an adversary was in his judgment of George Meany.35

Walter Reuther reported the ICFTU decision to his UAW executive board with evident disgust. It was, he said, the first time the ICFTU had denied the right of an applicant to come before it for a personal hearing. The UAW had received little support, deserted by former friends. The Canadians had reversed their position since the previous spring and had gone along with the prevailing logic, saying: “We have to clear the decks for the return of the AFL-CIO. If that means condemning the UAW, then so be it.” Even the FGTB and UIL representatives, its stalwart supporters in previous meetings, only abstained on the vote—and then principally over the issue of whether there should be further open-ended discussions with the AFL. “How do you live with people and have any self-respect or any sense of integrity if this is the way you are used?” Reuther asked. Arne Geijer had told him he intended to have nothing more to do with the organization whose president he had been for eight years. Walter Reuther now had little option but to follow suit: “If this is the way the ICFTU is going to be, then it is not worth our effort. . . . We therefore ought to intensify our work . . . with the IMF.” It was always sad to see an organization commit self-immolation, Victor Reuther observed, but that was exactly what the ICFTU was doing.36

Dialogue in Bal Harbour

It was less than eighteen months since the Warsaw Pact forces had invaded Czechoslovakia, but already the ICFTU’s European affiliates were resuming their contacts with the unions of the Soviet bloc. The DGB congress had decided on this course in May 1969. In September 1969, following Victor Feather’s first annual conference as TUC general secretary, Jay Lovestone pointed out to George Meany that the combined weight of the engineers’ union led by Hugh Scanlon and Jack Jones’s transport workers’ union, two mainstays of British trade unionism’s “broad left,” had been decisive in overturning existing TUC policy and calling for the resumption of East-West contacts. At the same time Lovestone informed Meany that at the German metalworkers’ congress, the Soviet ambassador to West Germany, no less, had been guest of honour.37

More worrying still, Poland’s trade union centre had written to Western European unions floating the idea of a trade union conference on “international security,” while a counterproposal by some ICFTU affiliates had been to hold an East-West European trade union conference under ILO auspices. For the first time, as part of Ostpolitik, there were now DGB plans to establish contacts with the East German trade union centre, the FDGB. And Heinz-Oskar Vetter had been to Moscow in December 1969 with a DGB delegation to discuss future exchanges with Alexander Shelepin. What was envisaged were German-Soviet exchanges by national and sub-national union bodies and newspaper editors along with cultural programs organized by the two centres. The AUCCTU agreed to visit West Germany in May 1970. The talks were reported as very amicable, with Welt der Arbeit effusive over the fact that Shelepin had agreed to attend a banquet with Vetter at the West German Embassy. The discussions had also been notable for the fact that Shelepin had provocatively questioned the appropriateness of the DGB’s inclusion of a West Berliner in its delegation; the Soviet Union did not recognize West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic.38

Whether or not the AFL-CIO really would have seen fit to rejoin the ICFTU without these developments must be moot, but three weeks before the ICFTU Five and the AFL-CIO team were due to resume their dialogue in Miami in early February 1970, Jay Lovestone wrote that, but for the recent meeting between Vetter and Shelepin, the AFL-CIO would probably be back in the ICFTU. But now the omens for that dialogue were not promising.39

Heinz-Oskar Vetter travelled to Bal Harbour ahead of his ICFTU Five colleagues and spent a few days acclimatizing on the fringes of the federation’s leisurely winter executive council session before his colleagues arrived. Updating them, he enthused that the atmosphere was good and that Meany had been personally friendly, though he had no idea what his plans were for the meeting. He thought the Americans might be interested in discussing ways of strengthening the executive board and its committees—the focus being to curb Buiter’s powers—though he sensed that they were not proposing his removal. Vetter also had the impression that the Americans just might want to discuss East-West policy. How right he was.

As the meeting started, Meany declared himself satisfied with the ICFTU’s rejection of the UAW application. That matter was now closed. Feather then hoped to steer the discussion in the direction of more general policy issues, but straight away Meany launched into his next major sticking point—the issue of East-West contacts. Immediately a chill descended on the meeting. Feather interjected that the ICFTU’s affiliates, just like the AFL-CIO, must be free to make their own policy. Meany replied in belligerent tone: “I can give you an answer very clearly—we don’t want to be in an organization where affiliates exercise their rights and form alliances with totalitarian governments—I can tell you right now we will not be—not be—associated with people who exercise that right.”

The remarks were directed very much at Vetter. Alluding to his recent friendly talks with Shelepin, Meany snapped: “I don’t want someone calling Shelepin ‘Brother Shelepin’ and then calling me ‘Brother Meany.’” He was particularly upset that Shelepin had queried the participation in the DGB’s Moscow delegation of a West Berliner. And he mocked the German interest in “co-existence,” a subject that, he noted, the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968 knew all about.

Speaking in earnest, Vetter defended his recent meeting in Moscow, whose aim was to lessen international tension. It was also intended to forestall criticisms by West German communists that the DGB was not doing enough to end the division of Germany. He pointed out that the DGB had already shown principle by declining a Soviet invitation to join in the celebrations of Lenin’s centenary and the May Day celebrations where rockets and military hardware were paraded. But he was prepared to discuss trade union matters with the AUCCTU, and given that the Soviet organization planned a return delegation in May, he suggested that this item now be taken off the present agenda. By May, when the AUCCTU had paid their visit, the prospects for lowering tension would be clarified; if the signs were no longer promising for improvements in international relations, the DGB would end its talks with the Russians. Vetter became indignant when Beirne asked sarcastically whether it might take another Soviet invasion or even a war to clarify the picture for him. Meany then agreed to drop the topic from the current agenda.

Figure 18.  Vic Feather, general secretary of the TUC, 1969–73 (left), with Heinz-Oskar Vetter, DGB chairman, 1969–82. Feather led the campaign to keep the AFL-CIO affiliated to the ICFTU, whereas Vetter’s contacts with the Soviet trade unions in the cause of détente helped to doom that campaign. Courtesy of TUC Library Collections, London Metropolitan University.

There were signs of growing irritation all round. Vetter complained that the stalemate that now existed between them would only demoralize their friends and give comfort to their enemies. Meany retorted that the current impasse was very much a product of the Germans meeting with the Soviets; DGB policy had changed in recent times. Vetter countered that the Americans had advance notice of the DGB’s planned visit to Moscow, as they had sent observers to the latest DGB congress. “Nonsense,” snapped Meany; there had been no official AFL-CIO representative there. Had Vetter mentioned at their October meeting in New York his plans for going to Moscow, the ICFTU could have heard the AFL-CIO response there and then. For many years, Meany said, the problem of visits had been at a lower level and could be dismissed as instances of people looking for a “free trip.” But more recently it had been a case of the head of the DGB going to Moscow, and he added: “If there is a mutual interest between the DGB and the so-called unions of the Soviet bloc then there can’t be much of a mutual interest between the DGB and ourselves.” Vetter asked whether the East-West contacts were the main reason for the AFL-CIO remaining disaffiliated. Meany answered bluntly. “I think we have made our position clear. If these contacts are to develop we do not want to be in the same organization with the DGB.” Seeing how badly the talks were going, Feather intervened to move adjournment. And when they reconvened briefly the following morning, he expressed the view that a continuation of the discussion would be “less than useful at this stage.” Morosely, he intoned: “I consider it [East-West policy] . . . a very negative phase of our discussions.”40 The meeting ended with only a tentative agreement to meet sometime again in 1970.

This latest round of talks had failed miserably, and the ICFTU side left it to the AFL-CIO to decide whether they felt it worthwhile to call a further meeting. It was evident that Beirne and Meany had no intention of rejoining the ICFTU. Discussion within the AFL-CIO leadership was now over whether to bother with a further meeting; the strategic options were between suggesting ad hoc get-togethers from time to time, or alternatively simply “leaking” word of their deep dissatisfaction through Morris Paladino and so bringing the process to an end forthwith.41

Informed of the stalemate, Victor Reuther’s verdict was that the ICFTU leadership had set out to appease an organization that had never shown any concern for the international labour movement but had given priority to its own national and chauvinistic interests, and for what? The TUC’s single-minded strategy of paving the way for the AFL-CIO’s return, it seemed, had achieved nothing other than to permanently exclude the UAW from the ICFTU.42

One more gathering was convened in Geneva in June 1970, on the fringes of the International Labour Conference. Meany didn’t attend, the AFL-CIO being represented solely by Joe Beirne and Lane Kirkland. There was now a different climate: Walter Reuther had died in a plane crash a month earlier, and the UAW’s expensive program of international activities financed from the interest on its strike fund was brought to a speedy end, with the union about to embark on a titanic two-month strike against General Motors that would see its strike fund drained and the UAW effectively mortgaged to the teamsters’ union. A distinct era in American labour’s involvement in international labour affairs was coming to an end.

This time the exchanges between ICFTU and AFL-CIO were sharper and colder, with no sense that a meeting of minds was even a remote possibility. Buiter stated that the ICFTU was unable to accommodate the AFL-CIO further. Beirne responded that it wasn’t only DGB behaviour that concerned the Americans but the failure of purpose in the ICFTU and the apparent lessening of concern for human rights. Vetter observed that the AFL-CIO hadn’t cited the DGB’s actions previously as the reason for its disaffiliation, but Kirkland went beyond that now, stating that the Americans no longer regarded the ICFTU as a useful channel for promoting trade unionism worldwide.

The ICFTU Five pointed out that the organization was engaged in a wide range of activities that were eminently suitable topics for constructive discussion, but Beirne was dismissive, claiming that the organization was currently virtually inactive in many essential areas. The AFL-CIO had broken with the ICFTU, he explained, simply because its key affiliates gave insufficient support to the fundamental purposes of the ICFTU as they and the Americans had understood them in the past. Bringing the exchange to a close, Lane Kirkland had the last word, telling the ICFTU representatives that the discussion had provided no grounds for hope that the AFL-CIO would reaffiliate at an early date. It was time to say goodbye.43