Chapter 1 Modernity

An Instrumental Rationality

In order to understand the rise of ethical leadership properly, we must first focus on the period known as the managerial revolution, which, at the time, presented a specific concept of the way in which individuals should be managed within organizations. Inspired by the positivist paradigm, this revolution ensured a vision of rationality based exclusively on the economy. James Burnham announced the advent of this managerial revolution in 1941, which he claimed marked the end of the domination of capitalists, who would be replaced in the economic sphere by managers. In The Managerial Revolution, Burnham heralded the beginning of the era of rationalization that would usher in a form of planned social relationships within organizations. A series of management tools were then developed to allow managers to exert more effective control over individuals in their organizations and to improve performance at work in order to increase productivity. This is how utilitarian instrumentalism entered human resources. However, this approach, which is still in effect today, has proved to have weaknesses that have become increasingly evident to researchers (March and Simon 1958; Foster 1980; Greenfield 1981).

Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (originally published in 1962), was one of the first to highlight the cracks in the model developed in modern times, namely the positivist paradigm.¹ Positivism, as developed by André Comte-Sponville, postulated that individuals could free themselves from certain preconceived notions that bound them to illusions that obstructed their understanding of things.

The Impact of Descartes and Kant on the Concept of Free Will

By taking a step further into the past, we discover that we owe to René Descartes (1596−1650) the idea of freedom of thought, liberated from suppositions and myths. With his famous cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am), Descartes would play a major part in this flow of ideas by adding reflexive consciousness to the notion of the free subject. Immanuel Kant (1724−1804) followed this trajectory by stating that enlightenment "is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in a lack of understanding but rather a lack of resolution and courage to use this without direction from another" (Kant 1996 [1784], 17).

Descartes provides a rational basis for the concept of a universal source of knowledge founded on the mathematical model, thereby establishing the epistemological standard of science. For Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770−1831), Descartes is the philosopher-founder of modernity and of a rationality freed from superstition. Reason was to express itself by way of scientific knowledge, by postulating the equality of all men² and the existence of free will and autonomy, and by demanding democracy as a way of governing oneself.

This concept was to reach its climax and have an impact on society as a whole with the advancement of the sciences. The epochal element of the positivist vision was to attempt to reduce all phenomena to a single causality and to attribute neutrality to these same phenomena in the name of scientific rationality. Questions that explore the why, namely, those that attempt to explore the root causes of things, are excluded from this vision. The main questions are limited to the how, that is, to questions formulated in terms of the laws of nature, often expressed in mathematical language. Through observation and repeated experience, this form of questioning is intended to identify relationships underlying observed phenomena that can explain the reality of facts. In some ways, this cult of reason follows a rational process of highly instrumental induction. This superstructure, which profoundly influenced Western thought and the Anglo-Saxon world, culminated in a paradigmatic revolution that was largely accepted until its re-examination in the 1960s.

Paradigm Shift: Towards Postmodernity

The work of Kuhn, among its other merits, highlighted the mental models that governed the thinking of scientists. Because they are based exclusively on mathematical thinking, these models exclude certain axioms that are required for a full understanding of reality. Indeed, the positivist model does not explain everything and, in particular, ignores the search for meaning. The re-assessment of the positivist model has not, however, led to the disappearance of this conception of rationality, which is still present in the form of neo-positivism. It is currently being put to the test against the complexity of today's world. A positivist spirit subsists in certain habits of thought and in the structures that this trend put into place. Its legacy can be seen in the technical, legal, and administrative rationality that directs our relationships with others, as well as our way of thinking. Reasoning exclusively oriented towards this type of rationality results in fragmented and restrictive thinking that lacks any understanding of interdependency. Why, then, should we be surprised by our difficulties in finding new solutions for today's ills? The re-examination of the positivist model clearly demonstrates the limitations of such reasoning (see Senge and Gauthier 1991; Morin 1999; Argyris and Schön 1996).

Rationality: Caught Between Two Worlds

We are forced to observe that the presuppositions initially excluded from the positivist vision, as well as the spiritual and axiological dimensions, sometimes reappear in the form of major crises that society must bear.³ These missing dimensions—the return of the spiritual, the rise of ethics, and the place of values—return full force, raising numerous questions and stirring debate. For many people, these non-mathematical dimensions are annoying because they are difficult to understand and control. Rather than initiate a dialogue on these aspects of life, we neglect them or find ways to camouflage them in the name of technical rationality. These dimensions cannot be expressed as equations, however; they call on another form of logic, one that includes tensions and paradoxes. One of our present challenges is that of responding to ethical questions raised particularly by advancing biotechnologies and by environmental concerns. This ethical questioning manages to impose itself while also causing us to lose our bearings somewhat; the divide between the why and the how becomes increasingly complex and uncertain.

To illustrate this way of thinking, we can take the case of an organization. It is easier to define an organization by what it does—its behaviour, its function, its procedures (namely the how)—than by what lies beyond the public veneer—its internal structure, its relationships, its interactions, its overall purpose (in other words, the why). It is rare to find descriptions of organizations that pertain to modes of adaptation, to connections, and to suitability in terms of context and environment because such things resist the logic of a simple causal explanation. Addressing these other dimensions allows for an examination of the organization that takes into account its multifinality and the complexity of reality.⁴ About reality, Paul Watzlawick states:

Everyone develops an idea of the real. In scientific and political discourse, in everyday discussions, we defer to the supreme referent in the final analysis: reality. But where is this reality? And more importantly, does it really exist? Of all illusions, the most perilous consists in believing that there is only a single reality. In fact, there are different versions of reality, some of which are contradictory, and all of which are by-products of communication, rather than the reflection of objective and eternal realities. (1976, 41)

This complexity of the real highlights the various levels of organizational reality. The first of these is the physical or material level of being, of facts and of objects. This first level is that of objective reality, visible and quantifiable. The second level, or the social level, which derives from the former, is a psychic reality devoted to meanings and value and to organizing the categories and systems of the preceding objective reality. A fact becomes an event only by its effects and repercussions in people's minds. This same fact is recorded in the organizational memory. The third level, or the cultural level, relates to the symbolic reality of beliefs and rules that direct and delimit the meanings and value of objective reality. This level distinguishes true from false, normal from pathological, beautiful from ugly, acceptable from unacceptable, and just from unjust. Of course, bureaucratic reality must be added to these realities, in which the real is recorded in official documents.

The complexity thus generates a certain diversity, in the form of distinctive levels of reality, and sparks off a variety of structural arrangements and behaviours. This complexity, very much in evidence today, distinguishes itself from a binary vision in which contrasts reign. We are located here in universes that are sometimes hard to measure—that emerge in a sort of flux and in contrasts that are more or less capable of being reconciled. These universes exist side by side, sometimes sitting rather uneasily with one another. Often a single point of view is privileged, namely, that of financial viability.

Vincent de Gaulejac (2005) focuses attention on this vision that permeates organizations. Most managers go to extremes in their pursuit of financial viability, in their need to please shareholders as well as safeguard their own positions. They find it easy to switch from a mode of administration that treats people like human beings to one that considers human resources to be entirely at the service of the enterprise, much like any other type of resource or raw material. This concept destroys the meaning of any human action that attempts to open itself up to other rationalities.

Organizations that apply such logic should not be surprised to see the commitment of their employees lessen to a similarly utilitarian level, one of purely contractual relations with the business. This situation cannot persist without repercussions to the health and families of the workers. We have only to consider the increasing number of cases of professional exhaustion, a malaise often associated with increasing workload and with a significant loss of purpose, as well as with a decline in the feeling of belonging, manifested in wavering loyalty to the organization. These symptoms reflect the priorities that large businesses most often privilege. Such businesses dictate a certain vision of how organizations should be run, one that denies complexity. As a result, a sort of apathy has set in, destroying the ability of employees to use their own judgment. It is sometimes surprising to observe the extent to which individuals become paralyzed by a lack of principles with which to explain decisions. They can become very dependent on the judgment of the board of directors or of the organizational hierarchy itself. This is not to incite organizational delinquency, but there does appear to be a sort of generalized inability to think for oneself, an inability that can be produced by a lack of criteria for judgment. In a study carried out in one of the major private sector engineering companies (Lamonde et al. 2007), I noticed a certain caution when it came to ethical dilemmas and the question of which decision to take. As a matter of routine, validation had to pass along the hierarchical path. Engineers were often given great decision-making latitude; in times of difficulty, however, this seemed to diminish, as the hierarchy did not allow individuals the freedom to exercise their ability to judge. This can be explained, in part, by the desire for a consistent and standardized set of practices, which essentially demands that one exercise a sort of lowest-common-denominator reasoning, one that disregards the specific contexts in which people function.

Table 1, taken from de Gaulejac, highlights the main paradigms being promoted in managerial theories and by schools of administration, which guide behaviour in the workplace. This managerial power, which de Gaulejac criticizes so forcefully, has a manipulative range in accordance with terms acknowledged and accepted by all. He very rightly points out that we have moved from disciplinary power to managerial power, from control of the body to the mobilization of desire, from set working hours to an unlimited investment of one's self, from following orders to commitment to a project (2005, 83–87). From this critique of the managerial power that prevails in our organizations, we cannot leave out the direction given to leadership that, now yoked to this power, exists to serve a neoliberal ideology. Writing about global financial markets, in which companies now find their performance constantly scrutinized by investors, Pierre Bourdieu comments:

Subjected to this permanent threat, the corporations themselves have to adjust more and more rapidly to the exigencies of the markets, under penalty of "losing the market's confidence," as they say, as well as the support of their stockholders. The latter, anxious to obtain short-term profits, are more and more able to impose their will on managers, using financial directorates to establish the rules under which managers operate and to shape their policies regarding hiring, employment, and wages. Thus, the absolute reign of flexibility is established, with employees being hired on fixed-term contracts or on a temporary basis, and repeated corporate restructurings and, within the firm itself, competition among autonomous divisions as well as among teams forced to perform multiple functions. Finally, this competition is extended to individuals themselves, through the individualisation of the wage relationship. (1998, 3)⁵

Source: Translated from de Gaulejac 2005, 57.

This state of affairs persists, and is indeed rarely contested, because a false rationale exists to justify it, one that is for the most part left unchallenged. In order to support its cause, this technical rationality allies itself with an arsenal of tools that serve to quantify what a manager is supposed to do and to help him list the qualities he must possess. This leadership is exercised exclusively within the framework of financial performance, in the service of a market economy that promises us posterity and human happiness. (For instance, the shift of direction in educational institutions towards a client-based approach is a direct result of purely financial considerations.) According to Bourdieu, it is the many "techniques of rational domination that impose over-involvement in work (and not only among management) and work under emergency or high-stress conditions" (1998, 3).

Many believed that critical reason, cost efficiency, and techno-science would allow the the human race to enter a better age, freed from illusions. Rationality would give us what we desired—the ability to reach our optimal level of accomplishment. In "Les nouveaux maîtres du monde" ("The World's New Masters"), Ignacio Ramonet focused on this singular habit of thought, which by definition excludes all human considerations: concentrate all power into the hands of a few financiers, whose only aim is to increase profits (1995, 2). This way of thinking is, however, increasingly losing the charmed quality that modernity promised.

Today, numerous signs indicate that this economic paradigm, which governs our professional and personal lives, is weakening. John Kenneth Galbraith, in his Economics in Perspective (1987), calls attention to the important ideological slippage brought about by economics. This sector of human activity has opted to focus on calculations, cash flow, and economic transactions instead of pursuing ethical questioning around issues such as poverty, exploitation, and power relationships. It is because these concerns have been pushed into the background that we now see an increase in social demands and a return to questions of ethics. Some, among them Peter Berger (1999), use the term desecularization when talking about the process that has been set in motion.

This desecularization is carried forward mainly by small groups or civil associations. Their demands are based on the need to respect the environment, on the increasing disparity between rich and poor, on problems of exclusion, intolerance, discrimination, and iniquity—in short, on the enduring forms of social injustice that prevent us from achieving social harmony. These issues call for a profound change in the way leadership operates.

It is not surprising to note the rising demands for social justice from groups opposing neoliberal organizations and governments that have divorced themselves from all social responsibility and promote instead the current imperatives of a market economy to justify their actions. The modernization of the state, grafted onto the liberalization of markets, raises questions about leadership that remain little discussed.

Most of the time, the strategic arsenal that is put in place is intended to guide management according to a specific model. For now, this is a management of instrumental rationality that offers a single-minded vision: profitability and productivity. Within these confines, individuals are left with little room to manoeuvre, as most choices are imposed by the company. The exercise of power seems to be motivated exclusively by the desire for productivity, triumphantly announcing the dawn of a new era, in which greater flexibility in working conditions and heightened worker autonomy will be the rule.

This conviction is, however, devoid of any real human or social foundation and is nothing more than the rhetoric of the new public management (NPM), which claims to want to de-bureaucratize organizations and improve life at work. In fact, this rhetoric is meant to divert attention from the real issues. The choices made have major repercussions on workers, who are given less and less scope for self-determination and find themselves helpless in the face of a cumbersome administrative bureaucracy and the need to adhere strictly to official procedures. In such a context, how can they exercise their capacity for judgment and reflection? This situation rather forces them to subscribe to a sort of "ready-to-wear" thinking, easily disposable, that leads to shortcuts in terms of conscientiousness and most always to a short-term vision.

This orientation is not without its impact on those who find themselves in positions of authority, as well as on those who are subject to their authority. Naturally, these circumstances generate tensions, but they also create paradoxes, the meaning of which is increasingly elusive to those who confront them on a daily basis. The effects of this trend are perverse: constraints on the expression of individualistic attitudes at work, the cult of performance, and a heightened degree of standardization that is more and more the norm (Lipovetsky 1983). This ideology naturally has its effect on the behaviour and values of people. We observed the predominance of a certain relativism, the loss of a sense of shared standards, the precariousness of moral values, and a sort of alienation of moral judgment.

Another perverse effect is linked to the excessive use of legal recourse, which justifies and protects anything, even incompetence. How many times have we heard of managers grappling with incompetent employees who are protected by corporate interests, to the detriment of the common good? As Jacques Grand'Maison (1999) rightly points out, our relations with others are increasingly legalistic. Our ability to analyze has been handed over almost exclusively to making procedural and strategic judgments. We do not wish to contest such judgments, because they are necessary, and they have lead to significant advances. However, when used to excess, they lead to distortions, misinterpretation, and friction in the workplace that are increasingly difficult to resolve. This legalistic way of thinking has altered normal relations with others. The only relationship available is one based on force rather than on dialogue. In the face of this narrow conception of human interaction, the social bond gradually decays, culminating in a kind of Gordian knot, sometimes impossible to undo.

Another recent trend, towards increased departmentalization, is also evident in many organizations. Each sphere of activity has become autonomous, thereby reducing knowledge to a fragmented, compartmentalized vision. A mechanistic separation has set in, which stifles creativity that otherwise might result in some sort of synchronism (see Senge et al. 2004). When forging basic links is a challenge, it is not surprising how difficult it becomes to create frames of reference within which individuals can recognize their place.

This way of thinking can be applied only with difficulty to social systems, as it leads us to perceive problems, and reality itself, in a fragmented manner, which again constitutes paradox. Indeed, living systems are not a collection of various parts; rather, they change, grow, and adapt as a whole, at once coherent and incoherent, but essentially organic. This organic reality contradicts a mechanistic vision, such as that outlined by Gareth Morgan in his book on organizational metaphors, Images of Organization (1997). Our social relationships continuously evolve in the course of our contact with other people during our daily lives. Human beings are always engaged in creating new structures—interdependencies—in a constant flux.

The Uneasy Overlap Between Modernism and Postmodernism

As noted earlier, the vision offered by positivism and carried over by modernity has resulted in a rationality detached from values, which clouds "mathematical" judgment and complicates the decision-making process. A split exists between our two worlds—the Cartesian world, which grew out of science and came to flower in the modern era, and a world in the process of re-enchantment, which is rooted in concepts that allow room for the interdisciplinarity of postmodernism. Philosophy describes postmodernity as a passage into another age that engages critique of the previous period, namely modernity. The representatives of the postmodern trend, such as Jürgen Habermas and Jean-François Lyotard, speak of modified boundaries and knowledge. According to Lyotard, in this postmodern condition, knowledge is not merely the instrument of power; it refines our sensibility to difference and strengthens our ability to bear the incommensurable (1984, 9).

All the same, this passage from one era to the next is marked by an incessant back and forth motion between a reassuring vision of the past and an uncertain future. For some, these developments are a feature of the postmodern era, while for others they represent a sort of radicalization of modernity. Indeed, this radicalization comes about when certain concepts that are vectors of modernity—such as critical reason and individualism—undergo rapid expansion. Radicalization, in turn, seems to create a rupture of the sort that makes people receptive to such dimensions as spirituality, ethics, and values.

In Search of an Authentic Rationality

The first factor that can create confusion in terms of people's judgment is the conception of reality that currently prevails in the decision-making process. Rationality, as we know it, was developed around a material vision. It reflects perspectives that are often one-dimensional, fragmented, and divided, which seems to us to drift away from reality because it does not represent the very nature of what rationality should be. We are not calling rationality into question, because it is necessary, but rather the form it currently assumes, in which rationality is seen from the point of view of instrumental reason. Charles Taylor tells us that instrumental reason is that "rationality which we use when we evaluate the simplest means of arriving at a final purpose. Maximum efficiency, the greatest productivity, measures its success" (1992, 15). This vision must be refreshed by taking the moral dimension into account. The points made by Édgar Morin and Anne Brigitte Kern offer us an interesting lead concerning this redefinition, in line with a postmodern vision:

True rationality is by nature open and engaged in dialogue with the real, which resists it. It constantly goes back and forth between the logical instance and the empirical instance; it is the fruit of debate of ideas, and not the property of a system of ideas.

…

True rationality can be recognized by its capacity to recognize its own shortcomings. (1993, 188, 192)

Rationality, so described, brings to light a dialectical process that is detached from all ideological reference and games of influence. The nature of rationality rests not in deliberation or negotiation but rather in dialogue. The latter is an important concept in terms of moral theories, involving, as it does, concern for others. Likewise, it expresses an appreciation for the distinctiveness of each person. Dialogue does not radicalize social relationships; it is an invitation to openness and the conservation of this social bond. In this way, we see the burgeoning of an inclusive sensibility characterized by dialogue and the recognition of complexity.

Dialogue Versus Deliberation

The practice of dialogue—a term often used by international organizations, such as UNESCO or the United Nations—is distinct from a more deliberative model in which only those who possess a well-developed power of argument succeed in making their point of view understood. The argumentative model, so prevalent in law and politics, is clearly encouraged in Western societies. Applied to leadership, it would be known as leadership by influence. Feminist philosophers have criticized this argumentative, deliberative model as one that silences too many voices (Gendron 2003; Young 1996; Jaggar 1995; Noddings 1984). According to Iris Young, the "tendency to restrict democratic discussion to argument carries implicit cultural biases that can lead to exclusions in practice" (1996, 122). As Claude Gendron points out:

[The deliberative model] emphasizes the use of reason instead of political power, each person having an equal vote, regardless of his social position or power. The process is based on argument, and only the force of the best argument is accepted as a suitable element to guide the participants to a mutual agreement. However, the rational nature of this agreement requires that there be equality between participants in the debate, and that each is able to express himself freely in a forum free from domination. (2003, 59)⁶

The question is, how does one know which is the best argument? By its power of persuasion, or its influence, or its popularity, or by some other criterion?

According to Young, this "forum free from domination" proves difficult to create. The search for a different, inclusive mode of communication responds to a need that clearly exists in the hierarchical workplace. For instance, during the 60th Congress on Ethics and Dilemmas Within Organizations, in 2005, a number of participants, from various government agencies, trade unions, and private organizations, indicated the need for dialogue-driven discussion sessions where people could come together to reflect on and identify new solutions to complex challenges. This request is in line with two problems manifest in the workplace: the prevalence of individualistic behaviour, one the one hand, and the need to strengthen collective relationships, on the other. This ongoing tug of war is but one of the challenges faced by organizations.

By way of example, let us look at some research carried out in a hospital environment on absenteeism and the organization of labour, which offers some insight into the process of dialogue. This project, carried out in 2006 and 2007, aimed to create an understanding of the phenomenon of absenteeism at work (Langlois and Marcoux 2007). The hospital administrators were very concerned about the problem of absenteeism, which was significantly affecting organizational efficiency. At an initial meeting, it was agreed to invite various targeted staff—nurses, nursing auxiliaries, managers, executives, physicians—to engage in a dialogue-driven discussion with the goal of identifying the causes of absenteeism and determining its impact on the organization. When the discussion process was elaborated, several members of the management team—which included general management, financial management, human resources, and advisors—voiced their concern about the composition of such a group and its capacity for exchange: to gather different groups of employees together was not a common practice. We quickly noticed that the group was divided between those who adhered to a fragmented notion of roles and those who thought in terms of existing social relationships and who saw the possibility of moving beyond "roles" in order to negotiate a workable solution. This tension notwithstanding, we noticed that the logic that prevailed and that produced a degree of consensus was that anchored in a technical and instrumental rationality. The concept of social relationships had to remain subordinate to this logic. Eventually, management agreed to give it a try. After six months during which a trial organization was put in place, one that relied on dialogue, the experience proved to be very meaningful for everyone involved. One of the major gains was an enhanced understanding of the work that each person does and the impact it has on the work that others do. Everyone felt a sense of solidarity and interdependence, which was due mainly to the discussion groups set up in the workplace. Several people realized that meeting as a team, a practice that had existed previously but had been abandoned, needed to be reinstated for the good of all.

This study of an approach based on discussion and the establishment of inclusive dialogue groups showed that these definitely met a need. Nevertheless, the project of establishing dialogue must overcome a major obstacle when put into practice: the habit of seeing efficiency exclusively in terms of supposed savings of time. Dialogue is often considered a "waste of time," but this does not correspond to the actual profile of productivity.

Individualism: The Construction of Personal Meaning

Another typically postmodern phenomenon is the rise of individualism. No doubt the recognition of individual rights has had positive ramifications in terms of a recognition of personhood. This trend was formalized with the recognition of human rights, with its implied values of respect, dignity, and consideration for the person. The concept of human rights also allowed individuals to become emancipated and to distance themselves from holism—a social concept in which personal sovereignty is voluntarily limited in the interests of the whole. Over the years, the notion of personal fulfillment has become a fixture in our daily lives. As François de Singly (2005) notes, individualism currently gets bad press, as it is often associated with the tyranny of the free market, with the survival of the fittest, with indifference to others, with egocentrism, and with incivility. Even while many of the ills of postmodern society are attributed to individualism, the fact remains that it calls into question the very foundations of our way of living together, a cohabitation that is constantly being redefined. For organizations, this trend presents a great challenge, especially in the context of the better management of human resources in an organization that is trying, for better or for worse, to mobilize its employees.

The tendency to keep others at a distance can reveal an underlying sense of powerlessness. It also suggests that people are having difficulty in agreeing on common terms of reference. In the past, religions played a guiding role by imposing certain collective norms, but these were often exclusive and established without the necessary links to other religious groups. This brought about a form of ostracism, the fallout from which is still abundantly evident. Frédéric Lenoir (2005) notes that people today take their bearings from here and there, despite a lack of coherence among these various points of reference and without establishing links between them, which results in a sort of autonomization of the subject. Some also see therein a sort of relativism, a religion à la carte or ad hoc ethics.

This diversity of meaning and values is an increasingly important issue. It has destabilized our relationships and our professional behaviour because it includes so many challenges to social consensus and matters of collective living. One of these challenges consists of the proposal that we insist on tolerant behaviour, which many see as moral relativism. Such tolerance can, in theory, allow individuals who hold different beliefs to coexist in an organization. However, in practice, tolerance imposes certain limits on the search for genuine understanding, such as dialogue demands. Tolerance is not total indifference, but neither is it a positive act of respect. As Mirabeau declared in 1789, tolerance is insufficient. We must go beyond this stage and strive instead for mutual understanding. It is very clear that the imperative of autonomy has become a daily way of life, but this imperative can collide with anything that commands obedience, control, or conformity. The refusal to enter into a logic of obedience without asking questions is one of the characteristics of individualism, which, in the context of the workplace, challenges the working contract, whether written or unwritten, demanding that it take into account this need for autonomy. Those concerned point to the voluntary character of compliance, to the mutual agreement that is necessary to the success of an undertaking that requires some level of personal engagement. During our research at the hospital, we were surprised to discover the extent to which people seeking to improve the way work was organized had to confront resistance on the part of co-workers when it came to working collectively. Those involved in such efforts were considered, at best, to be wasting their time and, at worst, were even perceived as traitors.

Through the process of individualization, people create their own frameworks for meaning and are free to choose whether to ascribe to a specific belief. They are able to exercise free will, even if this can be difficult in the face of power games, lobbying, and conflict among competing ideologies. Charles Taylor speaks of the moral ideal, which should be implicit in the process of self-fulfillment, as being a form of truth in itself (1992, 28). But this inevitably introduces a certain complexity into collective relationships that concern our behaviour in the workplace.

Collective Relations in Need of Reconstruction

Another phenomenon that characterizes the transition between the modern and postmodern periods is the way in which we live out our collective relations. The influence of Adam Smith cannot be overlooked in this regard. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), he concretized the way in which we view relations with others. In developing a model that promoted an ethics of interests founded on a particular vision of economics, Smith stated very clearly that every person must pursue self-interest in order for society to function. It is in this manner alone that society will realize its collective interests and, in the process, arrive at a condition of happiness (Gunn 1989). Or, as Jacques Godbout put it in 1993, the production of goods has prevailed over the quality of bonds, a phenomenon characteristic of contemporary society.

Today's problems—environmental degradation, a declining sense of belonging, social disintegration—raise the question of moral obligation and duty. Solutions to these problems depend on our capacity to question ourselves about who we are and what kind of society we want, about what we are doing and the reasons that drive us to do it—in short, about our capacity to become involved and to call ourselves to account for our actions without resorting to avoidance or retreat. Calling ourselves to account does not distance us from others. On the contrary, this behaviour helps us to stay connected to reality and thus to witness the repercussions our actions can have if we carry them out in a relational framework.

This capacity for connection that verges on an ethics of reliance, such as that described by Édgar Morin (2005), does not deny the grey areas, nor the fact that we cannot explain everything, that there exists a sort of indeterminacy, and that, despite this lack of precision, we can rely on our capacity to become involved. We develop relationships and involve ourselves therein, because, in the course of our involvement, we form bonds to others. This is the way life is. We do not live by explanations alone; rather, we live because of our participation in the encounters we have in the course of random activities. This way of being reduces the distance between ourselves and others.

Our participation in these encounters constitutes a challenge when it comes to the construction of our collective relationships, inasmuch as we live in relation with others. It seems increasingly difficult to close one's eyes to the consequences of our actions and the impact these have on others. As George Wald observes, "The past few years have made us aware, as never before, of the depth of kinship among all living organisms. … So all life is akin, and our kinship is much closer than we had ever imagined" (1996, 46).

Accordingly, we must abandon the vision that affords primacy to instrumental reason in order to break open the iron cage spoken of by Max Weber. For Charles Taylor, it is possible for us to free ourselves from this cage by "deliberating what ought to be our ends, and whether instrumental reason ought to play a lesser role in our lives than it does" (1992, 19). Taylor underscores that instrumental reason yields only a limited range of choices, restricting us to a narrow vision, and makes us see reality as if it were a tunnel, or the circular model of intelligence advanced by Plato. According to Taylor, institutions and structures founded on techno-industrial reason "force individuals to accord these a weight we would never otherwise offer them in a serious moral debate and which could prove to be extremely destructive" (1992, 20). Instrumental reason finds itself powerfully shaken when it is questioned by the new ethical issues raised, especially, by technological and biological developments.

Individualism and the search for new collective relationships constitute one of the issues of the postmodern period. The challenge is to rethink our behaviour in the light of new standards of acceptability while allowing ourselves space for dialogue. When discussion revolves around what we consider acceptable or not, we are able to get beyond the famous politically correct as soon as we reconsider our choices, our institutions, and the way in which we function. Unfortunately, this process sometimes leads to another extreme: the desire to make everything ethically correct. This orientation ensures that our reflective capacity in relation to ethics finds itself outbidded by a normative approach that borrows its logic exclusively from a misuse of legal technique, an effect also seen in the use of ethical codes.

This restrictive legal logic forces us to choose between the tolerable, that is, behaviour deemed permissible by law and rules, and the intolerable, or conduct that society does not condone. Given such logic, it is difficult to reflect on what might be the best decision to make. What is considered tolerable does not necessarily encompass everything there is in terms of the social good. It is by questioning this that we create an ethical space, one that can lend coherence to human actions, a space in which it is possible to reflect on outcomes and on the actions to be undertaken. As such, consequences come to determine what is ethical.

To open oneself to ethical reasoning requires that we take more time to reflect on what constitutes ideal behaviour. In collective relations, the accent is on ultimate ends and shared values.

Social Regulations: What Regulations?

One question that often arises during exchanges with ethicists concerns the view of ethics solely as a mode of social regulation (Boisvert et al. 2003). Ethics proposes social regulations of its own, but this is not its only function. What type(s) of regulation would be necessary to sustain an ethical practice? Philosophers, like ethicists, apply an autoregulatory mode to ethics. The autonomy of the subject is paramount in initiating ethical reflection on various issues or in the case of a moral dilemma. Making a decision relieves the individual (free agent and accountable for his actions), but the search for the path to follow can and often must be carried out with others, and this to the benefit of all. Moreover, the exercise of reflection must be added to this, that which provokes reconsideration. The resulting decision will be confronted by heteroregulatory modes. Institutionally speaking, the individual is not a disembodied being. He is faced with labour standards, laws, organizational policies, and regulations. He cannot ignore this universe with which he is called to comply. However, through ethical reflection, nothing can stop him from questioning certain practices or regulations that might seem inappropriate in a given context.

We believe that in order for ethics to be fully actualized in daily life, it is imperative to have a thoughtful mix of these two modes of regulation: autoregulation and heteroregulation. Sometimes, a hybrid mode will be necessary, whence the importance of a rebalancing exercise with regard to these modes of regulation, in accordance with critical thinking.

Ethical Demands

The quest for ethics is situated in the context described above. New requirements, with which workers are burdened, have put great pressure on them in terms of decisions they must make. This generates a certain complexity, which in turn makes it necessary to reflect deeply on the issues and the imaginable consequences. It is essential to understand this ethical quest fully. Where does it come from? What makes it so popular today?

According to some authors (Legault 1999; Bourgeault 2004), the need for ethics became apparent in the wake of recent major financial scandals as well as advances in bioethics and stem-cell research. According to Frédéric Lenoir (2005), we are experiencing a radicalization of modernity, bearing in mind that certain defining concepts of the modern period—critical reason and individualism—have been subject to an intensification, thereby provoking this radicalization. The latter ensures that people are ready to open themselves up to dimensions that touch on spirituality, ethics, and values. Generally, one notices that receptivity to the axiological dimension is present at the organizational level. A certain primacy is attributed to values such as integrity, transparency, and equity, at least in organizational discourse.⁷ We believe that the challenge lies in action, but we will return to this in the presentation of our TERA model.

This shift towards practices that emphasize the importance of values to an organization can take a variety of forms. One of these seeks to provide organizations with codes of conduct designed to put an end to behaviour that could seem deviant or to offer standard procedures for conflict resolution. The manner in which these codes are developed is crucial and shows once again that logic is privileged. Here, the danger lies in developing a code of conduct based on the logic of instrumental rationality while pursuing outcomes that are often anchored in dialogical rationality. What is the legitimacy of these codes? Is such a code also binding on its authors? And how can ethics be imposed by authority? Are we faced with a postmodern way of imposing a professional code on wage earners? No doubt, the way such codes are constructed will reveal either an imposed approach or one that invites fully conscious and voluntary support. The latter is much closer to an ethical organizational approach. Table 2 highlights the two prevailing models in organizations in terms of codes of conduct or the articulation of values.

I observed that in organizations that follow an ethical path, instrumental logic and the logic of dialogue tend to overlap, sometimes producing a certain confusion. We are witnessing a kind of fragmentation of these two modes of logic, which can generate numerous contradictions. Constructing an approach based on a code of behaviour, or on a statement of values, or on specific ethical strategies—these do not promote the same ethical aim. What is often heard is that organizations want responsible and autonomous employees while at the same time they confine them within an instrumental logic that can stifle critical reflection and prevent the exercise of judgment. The human capacity that an ethical orientation engenders strives to go beyond an exclusive normality and beyond the inappropriate use of legal methods.

The first part of this book has highlighted assumptions related to the two visions—the modern and the postmodern—that now intermingle in organizations and influence our behaviour at work and our way of perceiving the real. This discussion did not aim to create an exhaustive list of elements that make up these currents of thought but rather to focus attention on the construction of a form of rationality that has now advanced to the point that it prevents us from seeing the real.

The interest in ethical and in axiological considerations developed simultaneously as a reaction to the capitalist market economy. The two ways of perceiving and understanding reality have progressed in parallel, without crossing each other. However, one cannot but notice that the merchant model is tending to come apart and is showing signs of losing impetus, which leads us to reposition ethical reflection and re-examine the values implicit in our organizations.

In this respect, the events of 11 September 2001 reopened discussions on universal values and the need for reflection on the position these occupy. Is there room to situate these values outside the Western straitjacket in which traditional references have become even more precarious following these dramatic events? There is no doubt that the debate on universal values is nothing new.

Today, there is a forceful return to ethical reflection, with questions raised about the goals being pursued. This is a serious challenge, because it is not easy to find consensus on what is considered part of ethics. Neither is it easy to revisit the concept without producing tension between what is legitimate and acceptable and what Ricoeur (2004) so beautifully calls an "intertwining of lights" ("entrecroiser des lumières"),⁸ which can serve to clarify approaches far removed from morality and ideology. This clarification, distinct from ideology, gives back a privileged place to discernment and free will in order to question what is normative and to put ethics at the service of social justice.

The second part of this book deals with ethics as a decision-making mode. We will define this concept in light of advances in the areas of moral theory, of educational administration, and of management, and we will present a process of ethical decision making that aims to be responsible and authentic, one that can be discerned among those who practice ethical leadership.