Chapter 2 Ethical Leadership

The overall objective of this chapter is to address the concept of ethical decision making in leaders who are striving to be ethical, especially managers of educational institutions, which was the area of my research for more than a decade. I intend to bring to light the ethical nature of the decision-making component of leadership and to root its meaning in theory. I do not wish to re-examine these theories in detail, as numerous authors have already dealt with these subjects, and their books, which judiciously retrace the evolution of these concepts, can serve as a reference. I am interested instead in examining the daily exercise of such leadership.

Following a brief theoretical overview, I will move on to the concrete part of this book, namely the development of an ethical decision-making process for use in the workplace. My concept of ethical leadership seen through a decision-making process is in line with the work of Peter Senge, which deals with systematic learning (Senge 2005; Senge and Gauthier 1991). I chose this perspective because I believe it is possible to develop a greater ethical conscience, both at the individual and organizational levels, and to learn about ethics at work.

I set out from the premise that ethical leadership can help lead to greater synchronicity in collective workplace training. Why associate the concept of ethical leadership with the theory of learning organizations? In the course of the TERA research project,¹ I noticed that learning about ethics was easier when individuals had developed a veritable learning organization, in line with that advanced by Senge. The establishment of a learning organization promotes the ties and the confidence necessary to grapple with ethics at work because it starts out as co-elaboration of meaning, lending it moral legitimacy.

The vision I am proposing for ethical leadership is that it must not devolve upon a single individual but should rather be a collective responsibility, that of developing a structure that favours autonomy for all players seeking to improve the way they carry out their work and, by so doing, offering a responsible and global approach to efficiency. The association of my concept of ethical leadership with this theory allows us to exercise within an institution not a leadership in the true sense of the word but rather a fundamental principle of questioning what is essential in organizations. Before addressing this aspect more fully, however, I will define what I understand ethics to mean.

The Concept of Ethics

As Paul Ricoeur (1992) did, I use the words ethical and moral interchangeably, as they both refer to mores, or conduct. Their etymological roots are different, but it is possible to afford them both the same practical meaning. The word ethics comes from the Greek ethos, while the word moral derives from the Latin mores. There is no clearly accepted definition for ethics. I believe that ethics shows us what it is best to do. The concept is defined either by a reflexive process relating to the notion of what is good or by a collection of normative rules. Ethics overlaps these two dimensions, because it is at once internal and external; it is endogenous. It enlists the process of reflection in order to distance the subject from what is happening. This stepping back allows us to identify, among other things, norms, values, and conclusions by anticipating the possible consequences of a decision. Such choices are those of a responsible person, one who is conscious of his or her actions and their consequences and who is capable of taking responsibility for them. This work of reflection serves as armour for judgment. This relationship with ethics is part of a search for much greater degree of consciousness and capacity for reflection, which can actually become a major challenge in organizations that favour speed and the capacity to react rapidly to situations.

Ethics as a reflexive capacity is not a panacea. However, it does emphasize the importance of the exercise of free will and the moral evaluation of consequences, and it allows for the keen exercise of discernment and judgment.

Monique Canto-Sperber points out that reflection abides by rules and principles according to which we develop our beliefs; it allows us to understand the reasons for these beliefs and to recognize within these a normative impact (2001, 236). This work of reflection cannot pretend to be objective because it originates with our own point of view. Hannah Arendt states that imagination supports the work of reflection, in that it allows one to look from nowhere to oneself, to be a spectator of the world, to be one’s own actor, to achieve some distance by journeying to the interior space of others (see Canto-Sperber 2001, 236–237).² Therefore, if we are unable to claim complete objectivity, what is left in terms of our reflective capacity would be, in my opinion, our level of conscience or moral sensitivity. This pertains both to moral theories and to the area of ethics, more specifically, to applied ethics. I will explore this important component further in the section on ethical decision making.

The cultural dimension is also important in this process of reflection because, quite apart from the fact that culture reflects what is normal, what is acceptable, and what is legitimate in society, it contributes to lending specificity to ethics without depriving it of its distancing effect. This precision ensures that ethics has an active social context, from which it draws its dynamic character. Ethics is therefore a reflection that precedes action: it attempts to understand how the logic of action has been woven, what legitimates it, and what its ultimate goals may be. Ethics is reflection under construction,³ because it is built bit by bit, with the help of other points of view. Seen in this manner, ethics can be regarded as the heart of leadership.

Ethical Leadership

Ethics cannot be considered a management tool, because it is hereby that individuals rise to the peak of our organizations.

—Marc Leclerc, CEGEP deputy director, St-Hyacinthe

In the world today, it is increasingly difficult to lead with a clear vision of reality. Situations are complex, the context changes rapidly; obligations and duties are rarely fully defined and well delimited. More and more, rights are demanded without thought for their accompanying obligations and without taking into consideration the issue of accountability, whose indicators do not always fit with organizational realities. To this is added an understanding and application of variable geometric norms. For some, applying a standard or rule can become unethical because each situation demands analysis, rather than a blanket solution. Standards thus represent an obstacle to ethical action. For others, rules must be applied without necessarily requiring any critical reflection because their purpose is to assist in quick decision making. A good conscience has thus been preserved since the rules have been respected. However, the good conscience of some is not always the good conscience of others.

In such a context, making an ethical decision can become a perilous obstacle course through a maze of reflection and organizational rules. The path is fraught with pitfalls and may require a certain moral fortitude. This dimension is little discussed in either the literature on administration and management or in university circles. However, when talking to managers, they are unanimous in their affirmation that making decisions today requires a certain amount of courage. People face new human, organizational, or structural challenges and thus encounter increasing difficulty when depending on their moral and professional capacities to identify solutions that go beyond the simple status quo. The complexity, the movement, the pressure, and the abundance of information combine to shape the administrative landscape. This raises numerous questions about the way organizations are currently led.

This different approach to leadership demands adopting new professional standards of conduct at work, from the promotion of more high-minded attitudes to the search for values that have the power to unite. All these elements are often regarded as ideals, which can seem utopian to some. However, many people, workers and leaders alike, have a profound desire to bring about sustainable, more human change in the workplace. This path leads towards ethical leadership.

Nurturing New Social Relationships

Being a real leader does not mean wanting to be popular; rather, it means attempting to make decisions that are good for one’s organization.

—Anne McGee, secondary school principal, Ontario

Given these premises, I believe that a profound reappraisal of the concept of leadership is necessary. Indeed, one finds that the literature on leadership offers a list of the characteristics of those who serve in important positions that one can supposedly emulate. When potential leaders, armed with their diplomas, go for an interview, they are subjected to a battery of tests meant to assess their style of leadership. This very technical approach, however, does not reveal how such qualities might be destabilized in a real working environment. Some who work in human resources do not hesitate to transcend such technical preoccupations. Leadership style and job title are of no use in resolving situations that involve substantial ethical dilemmas, where black and white blend into grey. The sense of authority needed to handle complex situations does not automatically come with leadership, as these two terms are not synonymous. Being in a position of authority means having a defined institutional role in which certain modes of behaviour, attitudes, and actions prevail. It is in the context of these social relationships that ethical leadership becomes manifest. As abundant research has shown (see, for example, Brunet and Savoie 2003), a leader does not necessarily have a well-defined institutional role in the organization. My work focused on men and women in positions of authority who manifested a certain form of leadership. The question that those in situations of authority should ask themselves is whether they are exercising ethical leadership. Is this a moral obligation they must take on? I believe that these simple questions are part of an important shift that is only now beginning to occur in institutions and businesses.

This focus placed on the role, the personality traits, and the behavioural characteristics that one should emulate in order to become a leader, which are sometimes formulated as recipes, stands in contrast to the concept of ethical leadership advanced in these pages. It is surprising to note that the most popular works written on leadership focus on prescriptions for character and behaviour and deal with forms of personal management that recommend investing in one’s self as capital for growth (Salamon 2005).

“As stated by linguist Robin Lakoff, works on therapy in the twentieth century are like works on etiquette or propriety in the last century,” Arlie Russell Hochschild observed in The Managed Heart. “This is because propriety has impregnated emotional life very profoundly” (1983, 192). What is unhealthy in such proposals is explicitly putting forward the personal qualities that one needs in order to be a good leader, which leads to the belief that one is free and autonomous. Furthermore, as de Gaulejac put it: “We trivialize competition as a model of social relations, we transform society into a playground, we trivialize the megalomaniac quest of our leaders and consider as natural the idea of economic warfare. When everyone wants to be a champion, no one is any longer preoccupied with the common good” (2005, 137).

For Bill George, leaders are defined for the most part by their values and characters (2003, 20), and, we would add, the whole is concretized in social relations with others. These qualities seem to play an important part today. Peter Northouse (2004) highlights three skills essential to the practice of true leadership, namely, problem solving, exercising judgment, and understanding. When I examined these three skills, I noted that they have their own meaning with regard to ethical leadership. Problem solving has become complex and requires more than a legal and administrative mode of interrogation, as such an approach, which is exclusively normative, reveals significant gaps in terms of proposed solutions. Judgment is a capacity that lies at the heart of ethics, a capacity that must be exercised with due rigour (Canto-Sperber 2001). This faculty will play an essential role in today’s context, as people are called upon to clarify the circumstances under which judgment is exercised, something that brings with it a certain responsibility, both moral and social. As Richard Sennett observes:

An authority figure is someone who assumes responsibility for the power he exercises. … Modern techniques of management attempt to escape to the authoritarian side of such declarations by trying at the same time not to be held accountable for their actions. … If the responsible agent is none other than “change,” and the whole world is a “victim,” the authority disappears because no one is any longer responsible, especially the leader who lets people leave. It is the pressures of the market that are expected to carry out his work. (2000, 161)

The context becomes the justification that explains both everything and nothing. It has as its pretext to diminish or channel the responsibility that devolves upon persons in positions of authority. Faced with this fact, people struggle with calling into question the meaning and consequences of their decisions (or, sometimes, their indecision). Most of the time, this is accompanied by an attitude from which emotion is absent.

In terms of ethics, moral responsibility demands that a person become responsible. Moral responsibility also rests on one’s ability to manage oneself, to be active, to take charge of oneself—in short, to be the subject of one’s actions. But as someone told me during my research, “one cannot be accountable for everything.” According to Alain Ehrenberg, “to the extent that the demand for autonomy permeates the whole of social life, both private and public, the tendency for each to be responsible for all asserts itself as the authority of a rule, and this regardless of its proper place in the social hierarchy” (2005, 37). What we have here is a paradox, one produced by the demand for greater responsibility and the demand for greater autonomy. How do we explain this tension? I believe that the meaning of responsibility gets lost in the administrative maze: it is increasingly difficult to know who does what and who is responsible for what. Furthermore, the demand for autonomy is not understood in its true sense, namely, that of a greater accountability for actions we carry out freely. Instead, autonomy is generally conceived and practiced in an individualistic manner that often ignores others and is rather embedded in egocentric relationships. By asking people to be autonomous, one is requiring them to manage themselves according to well-defined limits in line with their own will.

For example, autonomy with regard to decisions is an important element in the exercise of authority. But are individuals able to exercise this authority, or are they subject to heterogenous demands, in which criteria are set down without leaving individuals a genuine margin of manoeuvrability, one that would allow for transforming situations for the better? According to Christian Maroy:

Conceded decision-making autonomy is never related only to operational decisions, decisions to adapt to uncertainties and unforeseen hazards within the framework of decisions made by the management staff or the strategic head of the organization without upper-level decisions being challenged. … In short, the autonomy offered and encouraged is always managed, delimited, and bound, often so as to make it impossible to turn to more important decisions. (1997, 117)

In such a context, it might seem difficult for some people to practice ethical leadership. Indeed, this concept is not a panacea for resolving all managerial ills. On the contrary, it seeks to place ethical reflection at the heart of leadership action. Faced with this epistemological position, ethical leadership runs along parallel tracks, in that it incorporates numerous elements of the organization while also standing at a distance, which allows challenges to the desired goals to be better seen and understood. The engine of its action differs from leadership in which interests or calculations alone take precedence, because such leadership requires axiological neutrality. This other position, close to the model of a market economy, forces the leader to think otherwise while disconnecting from the “other.” According to Charles Taylor, this model must be rejected “in favour of a richer vision, more in keeping with what the human being really is” (1992, 49). To that, we might add that it must also be rejected so that we may develop a greater consciousness regarding our conduct and the decisions we make in the working environment.

Ethical leadership is a first step in this search for a new form of working behaviour. It attempts to distance itself from instrumental relationships in order to promote greater humanization in the workplace through the shared construction of values, which foster commitment. This shared construction of values and goals is vital to ensuring greater coherence in organizations. This commitment, or voice, as some authors call it, is becoming increasingly central: individuals disengage or become disaffected because they no longer feel a sense of personal concern with decisions; they feel they no longer have a place or a voice in their workplace, and this in spite of advances in rights and protections. The phenomenon is as interesting as it is paradoxical: we have a greater degree of protection and more rights but less space in which to discuss sensitive issues that in fact have an impact on people. Everything is organized in relation to representation, in which the group speaks in the name of the interests of its members. But can we ask ourselves what outcomes such interests reflect? This question, if considered carefully, is a first step towards an understanding of the true challenges to ethical leadership. The individual may feel collectively protected but does not feel individually heard.

The Concept of Human Nature

It is interesting to note that, in 1954, Douglas McGregor declared: “Good leadership in industry depends more than any other single thing on the manager’s conception of what his job is or of what management is. Second, it depends on his convictions and on his beliefs about people” (32–33). According to McGregor, the “Y” theory, which sees the human being as a responsible person, one who is motivated to work and who favours self-control and autonomous self-direction, represented the modern way, the path to be taken. To this, he later added: “Under proper conditions such results encourage people to direct their creative energies towards organizational objectives, give them some voice in decisions that affect them, and provide significant opportunities for the satisfaction of social and egoistic needs” (1957, 18).

The concept of giving someone a voice in the decision-making process is a means for satisfying social and egoistic needs. The goal of giving people a voice, in McGregor’s view, is radically different from that advocated by ethical leadership. The concept of the human being implicit in ethical leadership is not as simplistic, and it is much more positive. It rests on the assumption that people are prepared to commit themselves to changing things provided they are given the opportunity in an authentic context. In this sense, the gift theory advanced by Jacques Godbout (2007) can shed light on the human concept advocated by ethical leadership. The author presents several examples of people who, finding themselves in difficult situations (we need only think of the work of Abbé Pierre on behalf of the destitute, associations such as Alcoholics Anonymous, organ donors, and so on), are able to set aside personal interests in order to improve the world around them. When we view human beings as egotists bound up in some sort of moral straightjacket, we lessen the possibility of exploiting their true potential. Such a person is instantly condemned to be perceived in terms of the existing conception, which places a significant restraint on the exercise of leadership itself.

Ethical leadership is a notion that views human nature in a positive way and considers the human being as capable of contributing positively to the development of an organization. Obviously, there will always be people who, for a variety of reasons (physical or psychological illness, unconventional behaviour, lack of competence, incivility, and so on), create greater difficulties at work than others. It is here that responsibility acquires its full meaning by refusing to cover up such behaviour, which, in the end, can poison the work environment. During my research, several people told me about how difficult they found it to react to certain kinds of behaviour, behaviour that, owing to a lack of adequate intervention, only increased and became worse. In order to explain their failure to intervene, people often mentioned the fear of taking action, a lack of audacity, or ignorance. The desire not to displease employees or upset the organization was one of the factors that further served to justify this lack of leadership. Pretending that such behaviour does not exist has significant repercussions in terms of ethical behaviour at work, however. Research on ethics and management is unanimous: a person in a position of authority who trivializes this type of behaviour implicitly accepts such behaviour, thus opening the door to organizational deviance.

Ethical leadership is a concept that is increasingly making its mark on certain areas of administrative science. The concept did not appear all at once but rather emerged by means of a piecemeal analysis of how a manager should act. This rather Kantian dimension (respect for laws, norms, duties, and so on) was brought forward in 1938, when Chester Barnard’s The Functions of the Executive appeared. Barnard broaches the topic of ethics by mentioning the obligation of the manager to respect the moral sense that exists within an organization and to resolve disputes that arise as this code is applied.

It was only just before the 1980s, however, that we began to see ethics appearing in the literature on management, notably that concerning the structure of the workplace and the conduct appropriate thereto, as part of an analysis of bureaucracy and its perverse effects on human behaviour, with the focus falling on behaviour qualified as unacceptable. For example, Robert Jackall carried out an in-depth analysis of ethos in bureaucracy in “The Moral Ethos of Bureaucracy” (1984) and, some years later, called attention to the lack of ethics among managers in Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (1988). The details that emerged document the distortions of a bureaucracy that, pushed to an extreme, proves to reveal a flagrant lack of ethics. The application of procedures to govern all administrative action, along with the reduction of conscience and behaviour to a set of standards, impede people in their efforts to act and to behave in a responsible manner. Maintaining, at all costs, a culture of management shackled by the dictates of a market economy results in a loss of meaning at work. In such a context, the goal is profit, regardless of the cost and long-term effects on people and the environment. The perverse effect of all this is that, by constantly looking to control behaviour at work, managers curtail the capacities and natural energies of their employees. This approach is, in fact, more about managing wallets than about managing people. (In this respect, Max Weber’s thoughts on the ethics of conviction offer an incontrovertible starting point. It seems that Weber’s stance has not lost any of its topicality when one considers the controversies it sometimes provokes in the field of applied ethics.)

There are currently few published definitions of the concept of ethical leadership. Ethical leadership was first described as a skill needed to guide and inspire people with regard to what is morally right and technically acceptable for the organization (Cuilla 2004; Heifetz 1994). The first empirical works on the subject came from research carried out by Linda K. Treviño (1986). Her work brought to light the ethical characteristics of leaders and the meaning of an ethical culture. This latter concept is closely related to leadership, because it represents values, norms, beliefs, traditions, and common assumptions that guide ethical behaviour. According to Treviño, ethical leadership is vital to the creation of an ethical culture at work. An ethical leader is a leader who cares, who listens to what employees have to say, and who has their best interests in mind. In addition, an ethical leader communicates messages concerning ethics and values, not only during major publicized events but also on a daily basis, through conduct and decisions that reflect a particular ethics. In making decisions, ethical leaders always asks themselves what is best for each employee, for the group, or for the organization as a whole, depending on the situation. Linda Treviño, Michael Brown, and Laura Pincus Hartman (2003) together argue that an ethical leader serves as a model to be emulated in matters of ethics, a model that generates employee confidence and offers an example of the right way to do things in an organization. The ethical leader helps others to become responsible and to define success, not merely in terms of results but also in terms of the way in which one goes about obtaining these results (Treviño 2007).

Authority and Power

The practice of ethical leadership may seem utopian to some. In fact, such leadership sometimes faces an opposition that seems part of the very nature of things: without engaging in an excessive or exclusive quest for gain and power,⁴ it aims neither at disproportional control over others nor at gain to the detriment of others. Some doubt that it is possible to put such leadership into place, while other researchers (Brown, Treviño, and Harrison 2005), noting this possibility, have created tools to define such leadership. During my research, I arrived at the same conclusion: that it is possible to develop this leadership by sensitizing people to the different stakes and challenges that make up these practices (Starratt, Langlois, and Duignan 2010).

I am attempting to describe this concept on the basis of my empirical studies. Ethical leadership can be defined as part of a system of actions directed towards raising awareness of conduct in the workplace and towards a search for a common understanding of professional practices. This research requires profound reflection in the course of which values and goals to be pursued are identified. Once this is accomplished, the work of reflection makes up the bedrock on which decisions can be based. Gradually an ethical conscience develops, which leads to a better grasp of reality. This awareness allows for the initiation of critical ethical reflection on a situation, thereby bringing to light the possible choices in terms of potential consequences and long-term effects. Certainly, the reflexive process demands rationality, but this rationality engages in a dialogical relationship that also integrates the transrational mode (moral intuition, and so on) rather than the irrational mode (see Hatcher 2004). The reasons underlying this process exclude self-interest and instead aim to improve the practices and quality of the environment by looking for the common good, which rules out a materialistic and calculating spirit.

There are other motivations for human action besides purely egotistical interests. The rise of ecological thinking (Dahl 1996; Suzuki 1997) and preoccupations with social concerns offer contemporary examples of other such motivations. Ethical leadership does not belong exclusively to those in authority. Obviously, they are more often able to deploy their ethical actions with greater reach in their organizations. However, every person has the capacity to practice ethical leadership within his or her own sphere of action. Values are at the heart of ethical leadership and are an important vector, alongside authenticity and empowerment. This becomes a fundamental principle by which to examine what is essential in organizations.

Ethics is at the heart of leadership (Ciulla 2004), and the practice of ethical leadership calls for a review of our approach to decision making. In order to understand this position, it proves essential to examine how theories of decision making were fashioned and introduced into the professional environment. I will not attempt to cover all the theories that have been developed but will instead focus on those that have had a positive influence and that predominate in administration and educational management. In so doing, I will talk about theoretical models of ethical decision making.

Decision Making in the Exercise of Leadership

The Theory of Rational Choice

In the first part of this study, we focused on the type of rationality that now prevails and on spin-offs of it that we can observe today. The notion of rationality is often understood in an instrumental mode. For instance, James S. Coleman stated that, according to the theory of rational choices in management, “by acting rationally, a player necessarily commits himself to a process of optimization. One says sometimes that he is maximizing his utility, or that he is minimizing his costs or other” (Coleman and Fararo 1992, xi). When one makes a so-called rational decision, one notices, in light of this theory, that the process of reflection is directed exclusively towards one central factor: the maximization of profits, or greater productivity. This reduces and obscures other dimensions that could help to enrich reflection, such as values, principles, possible consequences, and so on. Furthermore, everything is seen through a lens of quantitative assessment. Admittedly, calculations, algorithms, and statistics are important, but they are only one side of the equation. They do not truly shed light on the meaning and goals pursued, only on one aspect of the situation.

Therefore, the principal course of action is oriented exclusively towards individual interests, where everything is calculated according to axiological neutrality. As Jacques Godbout notes: “The search for one’s own interest is the main, not to say the only engine for human action. This is the most extreme position, the harsh version of the theory of rational choice” (2007, 40). The strategic analysis proposed by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg (1977) faces the same challenge in terms of reflexivity. This analysis aims to enhance the power of the actor and his control of the organization and to restore all social relationships to the dimensions of financial interests and capital.

In rational choice theory, instrumental rationality is a rationality of means with respect to the final end. Human action is oriented to a single goal: to make a neutral decision while optimizing results. This rationality is part of linear logic, but it far from reduces uncertainty. As Coleman observes, people are never fully aware of the consequences of their choices, because their judgment excludes important dimensions that would allow them to foresee all possible consequences. From this comes the idea of a certain limited rationality, as advanced by James G. March and Herbert A. Simon (1958).⁵

A Limited Rationality

The works of March and Simon, which deal with an analysis of administrative behaviour as it relates to decisions, have allowed for a highlighting of the concept of limited rationality and the changes experienced within modern organizations. These are part of the domain of cognitive psychology and deal with the analysis of administrative behaviour in relation to decisions. They contest the neoclassical model of rational choice that ignores certain realities: persons who find themselves confronted by limits that prevent them from acting rationally. They bring to light problems relating to the treatment of uncertainty, imperfect information, and the limitations of the calculations of individual agents. For March and Simon, it proves necessary to develop decision-making procedures that focus on processes of training. Simon departs from the scheme that defines rationality as being a method and proposes a model of rationality that serves the investigation of possible choices to be considered in terms of behavioural decisions. Thus, decisional behaviour rests on the selection of possible contingencies, leading to the intervention of potential consequences of decisions linked thereto. Seen in this light, the rationality of decisional behaviour rests on a person’s deliberative faculty. According to Simon, rationality denotes a style of behaviour that is appropriate to the realization of given goals and is located within the boundaries imposed by conditions and given constraints (see Favereau 1989). In short, limited rationality, as developed by March and Simon, is made up of cognitive capacities, which are considered relative, and an external environment, marked by complexity. The choices of decision makers rest on “a simplified, limited and rough scheme of the real situation” (March and Simon 1958).

In “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality,” Simon broaches the topic of intuitive rationality,⁶ which he classifies as a faculty that forms part of limited rationality (1984 [1976]). Intuitive rationality brings to light an approach appropriate for the process of choice: analysis, reasoning, judgment, intuition, and invention. Simon views this faculty as a deliberate and conscious process, which can direct action, even from an emotional standpoint. In recognizing this intuitive component of the decision-making process, Simon also understood its absence from theories of decision making, because it can be seen as a departure from a model of deliberation founded exclusively on calculation. Even if the concept of limited rationality has been recognized by certain researchers, most continue to pretend that it does not exist and believe that it is possible to obtain perfect information, which will serve for making a decision.⁷

To consider rationality as being limited and imperfect, as proposed by the neoclassical economic model, weakens the dominant model and permits catching a glimpse of other paradigms, such as the ethical dimension and the notion of intuitive rationality. According to the neoclassical model, the only important factor in the decision is the determination to take action in order to obtain the best result. Thus, we evaluate the rational behaviour of the decision maker by measuring it against results of the choices he makes. March and Simon open a slight breach in this certitude by examining the process more closely. However, the approach used to evaluate the consequences is sometimes limited to questions of utility or profit.

As mentioned earlier, Simon sees in this process a capacity that favours training. This term must be understood here in the cognitive sense, namely, as training that allows one to understand how information is assembled during a problematic situation and to discover how it is more or less methodically retained in order to resolve other, similar situations. Yet we remain all the same in a very mechanical approach to the decision-making process that separates out each of the actions in keeping with a pre-established sequence. This type of process, in its very structure, corresponds to a closed universe. Emotions are excluded in order to obtain better control, which creates a sort of artificial universe where explanation proves useless, impossible, and even harmful at times. Human actions are stripped bare of their meaning and categorized precisely, as if the universe of work were sterilized, exempt from complexity and contradictions. This process does not seem to correspond to a reality that is organic, progressive, interrelated, and interconnected in ways that can be compared to fractal images.

The mechanical conception of the decision-making process can produce a sort of dehumanization of interpersonal relations, resulting in the fracture of all possible ties, because the decisional universe that is proposed suggests a disembodied universe, lacking in emotions, beliefs, and values. It is as if we find ourselves faced with a sort of antiseptic decision, one that exists in neutral territory. In such a universe, moral judgment can only be suspended. As Simon remarks:

For most problems encountered by man in the real world, no procedure that he can carry out with his information-processing equipment will enable him to discover the optimal solutions, even when the notion of “optimum” is well defined. There is no logical reason for this to be so necessarily; it is simply a rather evident empirical fact concerning the world in which we live—a fact about the relation between the enormous complexity of this world and the modest capacities with which man is endowed to treat information.” (1984, 441)

Is it realistic to believe that it is possible to obtain perfect (optimal) information? I do not think so, because all information collection is subjective. Faced with this difficulty, people instead look for solutions that Simon characterizes as satisfactory: “Most human decisions, whether individual or organizational, are related to the discovery and selection of satisfying choices.” One example is the procedural rationality resulting from deliberations appropriate to satisfying the parties concerned. The definition and application of norms in the process of deliberation can be complex and can force individuals to favour a satisfactory solution over an optimal one (Simon 1997 [1945]). But can the solution be truly satisfactory? And for whom is it so? What are the values that will have been favoured over others that are overridden? According to Jürgen Habermas (1990b), this phase is subject to consensus. In Simon’s proposal, which consists of searching for a satisfactory solution, there is persistent discomfort that appears to be personalized. Admittedly, this can be a first threshold of understanding (people get along well, they are in agreement, and therefore they are satisfied), but it seems that this threshold must be crossed.

Decision making is subject to important disciplinary influences. For example, each discipline depends on a conception of rationality adapted to its own research problems. In psychology, for instance, William James (1981 [1890]) defines rationality as being a “process of particular reflection known as reasoning.” Irrational behaviour would consist in offering an impulsive response to emotional mechanisms without adequately involving thought. Thus, rationality can be perfect and optimal, according to a neoclassical, limited model (March and Simon 1958), a bounded one (Boyer and Orléan 1997), or a contextualized one (Ancori 1992). Faced with these multiple conceptions, rationality, seen within the context of decision making, is connected to actions, consequences, and results envisaged by the individual or group of individuals.

For example, let us take a situation experienced by most public organizations. Since the 1990s, with the advent of new public administration (NPA), organizations have tended to reduce their human resources (employees) while increasing their tasks. These reductions, especially in public organizations, become more marked under the pretext of heightened rationalization. One sees the subtle burgeoning of far-reaching measures of control that aim to better regulate and define the actions of each person. This brings to mind the psychometric tests used for recruitment and employee selection, as well as the electronic surveillance sometimes used to excess to follow their every action and move at work. How can we promote genuine commitment in such an environment of control and surveillance? (See Rosenberg 2005.) Tasks are increasingly subdivided, dissected, standardized, and compartmentalized. Decisions in such a context are justified provided they allow for the improvement and quality of services. These administrative actions and the effect they can have on employees are rarely contested. Everything is justified by economic rationality. In such a context, human beings are seen as an easily moulded workforce from which an unlimited amount of work can be demanded, depending on circumstances. People are called upon to demonstrate greater responsibility and autonomy in their work, because, after all, are they not accountable for their actions? This does not take into consideration the reduced resources and the increase in tasks, which in fact means doing more with less, and the effects of the extra workload on the health of individuals.⁸ The culture of performance and the climate of generalized competition have repercussions on the health and the morale of workers. It is paradoxical that we have arrived at this conclusion in spite of all the knowledge we have today and the research that has been carried out on the subject of the healthy workplace. On the one hand, we have logic that advocates a revival of paradigms that make room for values, the search for meaning, ecological thinking, concern for the environment, social responsibility, and all ideas and considerations that are fundamentally human. On the other hand, there is the post-positivist reasoning based on financial return and human capital that serves only the quest for material productivity. Such reasoning persists and currently functions to create a certain disenchantment with the world and yet also new perspectives that respond better to today’s needs.

Ethical reflection allows us to pierce the fog by imbuing its concepts with value, but it has not yet attained its full force. As stated earlier, ethical reflection demands that we develop new forms of workplace competency, ones that help us acknowledge the uncertain and organic character of situations and take into consideration the contextual aspects and specificities of a given situation while also reconsidering our presuppositions. The first step consists of recognizing the moral reality of organizations, which would, especially, allow performance to be defined in some other way. These observations prompt us to look more closely at ethical decision making.

Models of Ethical Decision Making

Ethical decision-making processes themselves are also subject to the same debate, as there is no consensus on the definition of the notion of ethics, which vacillates between the normative and the descriptive (empirical). However, most models of ethical decision making are founded on the second definitional trend. We will consider only these latter ones.

Models of ethical decision making have existed since the 1980s. These models have been influenced by the work of both Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, which relates to moral and cognitive development, and of James Rest, who proposes a process based on four steps: identification of the moral nature of the issue, the establishment of moral intentions, the adoption of a moral judgment, and engagement in a moral action. Most decision-making processes are part of Rest’s conception (Rest 1990a, 1990b). Some authors have validated the four aspects of the process and have developed several models. To this approach were added studies that integrated certain variables: genre (Bass, Barnett, and Brown 1999), organizational factors (Treviño and Weaver 1998), and social consensus (Jones 1991; Singhapakdi 1999).

This field of study, which has its roots in the administrative and educational sciences—more specifically in the area of school management—and in moral theories, applied ethics, and psychology, currently benefits from several models of ethical decision making, from a description of behaviour said to be ethical or unethical, and from models of ethical dilemma. Most of the numerous studies that have been carried out employed a quantitative approach that measures dependent variables such as judgment, conscience, moral intent, and conduct, based on demographic variables. The critique that has been formulated in relation to these studies relates mainly to the weakness of the theoretical foundation and the absence of solid hypotheses.

Another important observation: most of the studies used or cited Rest’s conceptual framework. Recommendations by researchers of moral and administrative theories suggest going beyond this theoretical framework to bring to light other possibilities in terms of ethical decision making. No critical perspective has been created in respect to this theoretical framework.

Methodological Considerations

As concerns research methodologies, most of the studies carried out on ethics—over 55 percent in the area of moral theories and administration—used vignettes or pre-established scenarios. As researchers ask their questions based on hypothetical stories, it is easy for the persons being questioned to determine the nature of the ethical dilemmas. Linda Treviño (1998) strongly criticized the use of vignettes, however, because this procedure does not allow for a proper understanding of moral dilemmas. The stories offer an ending that might not correspond to the vision of the participant, as he or she may identify other elements that might allow for a better resolution of the problems. The vignettes and scenarios should therefore be used sparingly and in a stable context, in which certain empirical givens offer solid confirmation of behaviour at work.¹⁰

Another observation relates to research using samples in which 40 percent consist of students to validate results. Much debate has taken place concerning this type of sample, especially in the area of administration, as this does not reflect the reality of administrators or experience gained over time, experience that allows both for the notable improvement of judgment and for possible contamination by the culture of the organization. Also, most of the time, the student is asked to imagine such a situation and to attempt to respond in a hypothetical way. I believe that the use of vignettes with students does not allow for the generalization of data. My results show that experience, age, the size of the organization, and the context are factors that carry a great deal of weight. Beyond the formative nature of this approach, I remain cautious about its general applicability in research.

Most empirical studies use the quantitative approach to measure dependent and independent variables. The use of a technique of analysis depends very much on the theory at issue, as well as on hypotheses or research questions and accessible data. Few studies use mixed techniques capable of evaluating data both qualitatively and quantitatively.¹¹

Another aspect, considered quite complex and difficult to execute, is the ability to promote ethical behaviour in comparison to unethical behaviour. The ambition to draw up a complete map of such behaviours proves to be dangerous. However, what is promising is to examine a person in a situation of ethical dilemma, thereby raising experimented situations that provide evidence of a conflict of values. This approach allows for harvesting much richer data regarding ethical dilemmas and to define conduct that has been privileged according to a given context.

This analysis, in terms of the dimensions that serve to define an ethical process, allows me to highlight the main concepts presently employed in researching an approach that includes ethics. Furthermore, certain limitations have been mentioned that should warn the reader that, in my view, research in applied ethics is still very young and the methodologies in use deserve careful scrutiny. The models have been developed by researchers such as Bruce Kramer, Terry Cooper, and Georges Legault and by government institutions (see, for example, Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1998). However, these approaches must not be seen as recipes that are guaranteed to result in ethical decisions. Such a view would not correspond to the objectives of the researchers. Each author has created a model based on developments in ethics but has not necessarily considered the professional context in which the research was carried out. Admittedly, the goal of my study also consists in presenting a model, but this model emerges from observations collected from school managers and administrators and from scientific documents that aim to better clarify the process under investigation. The next and final chapter provides an explanation of the TERA model.