Chapter 5.5 International Migrant Workers

Temporary Foreign Worker Program

The TFWP is one of the two main federal programs under which Canadian employers can hire IMWs. Its main objectives are “to facilitate economic growth by responding to labour market needs, while ensuring a balance is kept between the interests of businesses and those of the Canadian workforce” (HUMA 2016, 1). The TFWP encompasses various other subprograms, including the agricultural stream, the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), the Global Talent Stream (GTS), the high- and low-wage stream, and the in-home caregiver stream (ESDC 2024b). Thus, Canadian employers can hire foreign workers for any legal employment as long as they comply with the program’s requirements.

Under the TFWP, Canadian employers are authorized to hire foreign workers only when they cannot fill positions with Canadian citizens or permanent residents (IRCC 2023a). Thus, they are required to submit a Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) application before they can hire an IMW.3 The LMIA is a document issued by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), which certifies that the IMW is filling a labour shortage and that no other Canadian worker or permanent resident is available to fill the position. While the application for an LMIA differs slightly according to the subprogram of the TFWP, obtaining this LMIA generally requires employers to demonstrate they have made adequate efforts to advertise the position and have tried to recruit Canadian citizens or permanent residents.

After the LMIA application is approved, employers must then provide a copy of the LMIA letter as well as a mutually signed employment agreement in order for the worker to apply for a work permit at IRCC prior to the LMIA expiry date (for the requirements after applying for an LMIA for the high- or low-wage stream, see ESDC 2023a). IMWs under the TFWP will receive a closed work permit, the duration of which will vary depending on the program (usually from eight months to three years). An extensive literature has highlighted the effects of closed work permits on the precariousness and vulnerability of IMWs (Weiler 2018; Vosko 2022).

Regarding OSH, employers must follow employment laws, provide training to IMWs to allow them to perform the work safely, and give IMWs appropriate protective equipment (ESDC 2023d). Moreover, employers cannot force IMWs to perform work that is dangerous. IMWs have the right to refuse work that they think is dangerous until both the IMW and the employer agree that the danger is removed or the problem no longer exists or the IMW has received the proper equipment and training (ESDC 2023d). If workers are injured or sick because of their work, they are allowed to claim workers’ compensation benefits if they are employed in a sector covered by workers’ compensation in that jurisdiction (ESDC 2023d).

On September 26, 2024, the Canadian government imposed new restrictions on employers hiring IMWs in low-wage positions. It tightened the eligibility criteria to reduce the use of IMWs (Emilien and Jalette 2024; Radio-Canada 2024). Low-wage LMIA applications were no longer processed in metropolitan areas where the unemployment rate was 6 percent or higher. In some regions, the initial enterprise-level 20 percent IMW limit for low-wage positions was reduced to 10 percent (ESDC 2024b). The IMW cap on the proportion of low-wage positions in the construction and health care sectors was reduced to 20 percent regardless of the geographic region. In addition, the maximum period of employment for low-wage positions was reduced from two years to one year. LMIAs submitted for low-wage positions in the Montréal area were suspended for almost a year, from September 3, 2024, to November 30, 2025. This refusal to process applications also applied to Laval from March 3 to November 30, 2025. These federal government measures were intended to encourage companies to hire workers already present in Canada (Radio-Canada 2024).

Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program

The SAWP is a stream of the TFWP that operates based on bilateral agreements between Canada and participating countries. Under the SAWP, Canadian employers are authorized to hire workers only from participating countries: Mexico and Caribbean countries (ESDC 2023b). Employers can hire foreign workers only for occupations related to primary agriculture or for occupations listed on the national commodity list. As for other streams of the TFWP, these employers need to apply for an LMIA.

One specificity of the SAWP is that participating foreign governments are in charge of recruiting and selecting migrant workers, maintaining a pool of qualified workers, and making sure that workers have the necessary documents to apply for a work permit (ESDC 2023b). IRCC issues closed work permits for SAWP workers for a maximum period of eight months and with a minimum of 240 hours of work within six weeks (ESDC 2023b). Agricultural migrant workers’ transfer from one employer to another is authorized, provided the employer has the worker’s consent and prior written approval from both the foreign government representative in Canada and ESDC/Service Canada. Additionally, under the SAWP, employers must provide IMWs with adequate, suitable, and affordable housing that has been previously inspected by the appropriate authority. Deductions from workers’ pay for this housing are strictly regulated according to the province and must be listed in the employment agreement.

International Mobility Program

The second major migration program in Canada is the IMP (IRCC 2022). The IMP “is deemed to create significant social, economic, or cultural benefit to Canada, or where the work creates reciprocal opportunities for Canadians and permanent residents to work abroad” (IRCC 2022). Under this program, employers are exempt from the requirement to obtain an LMIA. The program encompasses a variety of streams, among which are the postgraduate work permit program, intracompany transfers, International Experience Canada, spouses of skilled workers and students, and so on (IRCC 2023b; O’Donnell and Skuterud 2022). Under the IMP, participants can receive either an open work permit or a closed work permit depending on the stream of the program. Between 2002 and 2024, the number of permits issued under the IMP (many of which do not require a labour market assessment) grew from 69,275 to 719,280, whereas permits issued under the TFWP (i.e., involving labour market testing) grew from 64,025 to 192,240 (Lu and Hou 2023; IRCC 2017a, 2017d). In the IMP, family members such as spouses or common-law partners of international students can also apply for open work permits (IRCC 2024b). However, in January 2024, IRCC (2024a) introduced changes to the eligibility criteria. While previously available across all levels of study, including undergraduate and college programs, open work permits for spouses were subsequently limited to those whose partners were enrolled in master’s and doctoral programs.

While IMWs are theoretically protected by Canadian labour laws, the literature shows that in practice, the exercise of rights is compromised by their precarious migratory status (Gesualdi-Fecteau 2015; Hastie 2017; Strauss and McGrath 2017; Cedillo, Lippel, and Nakache 2019; Hanley et al. 2020; Depatie-Pelletier and Dumont Robillard 2013). Some workers are reluctant to exercise their rights for fear of losing their jobs and being deported; others avoid exercising their rights to avoid jeopardizing their chances of obtaining permanent residence. Closed permits tie the worker to the employer, which can accentuate the power imbalances between the employer and the worker. This is especially true for workers in low-wage positions hired under the TFWP (Strauss and McGrath 2017; Wright, Groutsis, and van den Broek 2017). Employers’ control over IMWs is particularly problematic when the closed work permit is combined with the requirement to reside at the workplace, as is generally the case with SAWP workers. In this case, the risk of IMWs becoming geographically isolated and controlled by the employer is increased (Depatie-Pelletier and Dumont Robillard 2013).

A discussion of the effectiveness of OSH regulation in relation to IMWs needs to focus on both the type of work and the characteristics associated with the status itself. Specific programs encourage recruitment of IMWs in specific sectors, while others encompass all sectors where there is a labour shortage (for a larger discussion on “justice gaps,” see Marsden, Tucker, and Vosko 2021; Marsden 2014, 2019; Gesualdi-Fecteau 2014, 2015). While specific hazards are associated with sectors where a large number of IMWs are hired (e.g., agricultural work, health care, live-in care work, trucking, and construction), regulatory challenges are associated not only with the jobs themselves but also with the precarious migratory status of IMWs, regardless of the work undertaken.

In the next section, we will discuss some challenges that IMWs in low-wage positions are likely to face when seeking full protection from the OSH regulatory framework. Whether IMWs are hired through the IMP or the TFWP, workers in low-wage positions are likely to work in a vast array of sectors. Several studies have looked at the reality of agricultural migrant workers and caregivers, but IMWs are also likely to work in hospitality, food processing, fisheries, forestry, and construction (Lu 2020). While all IMWs in low-wage positions grapple with intersecting constraints on regulatory effectiveness, including precarious employment and immigration status, and constraints on autonomy, control, voice, and visibility to OSH regulators, many also experience challenges related to gender and race. Agricultural migrant workers and caregivers are likely to face specific challenges.

General Challenges International Migrant Workers Can Face: A Review

In this section, we will explore the challenges that IMWs in low-wage positions are likely to face. This will be followed by a discussion of the specific challenges confronting seasonal agricultural migrant workers and caregivers. IMWs may face an accumulation of vulnerabilities when it comes to OSH—namely, precarious immigration status, limited public health care entitlements and access, precarious employment, low income, and racial discrimination (Hanley et al. 2014; see also Boocock et al. 2011). Several categories of IMWs in low-wage positions are not allowed to migrate with their families. The inability to benefit from family reunification makes these IMWs more “available” and generally more likely to work long hours.

Employer-provided housing may increase the degree of control that the employer can exercise over these workers outside the periods of formal availability. Living at the employer’s home or in the vicinity of the work site can have the effect of “blurring” the line between work and nonwork time.

Many IMWs in low-wage positions, although this is not universally true, do not speak the language of their employers, be it English or French. Some share the language of a majority of their colleagues, particularly the agricultural migrant workers who are recruited from the same geographic areas: the Caribbean and Central America (Hanley et al. 2019, 67). In other cases, workers from a variety of countries may find themselves in a workplace where there is no common language shared by most workers. Even when most of the migrant workforce shares a common language, this is rarely the language of the community in which they are working, nor is it the language of the regulator and the provider of tools and documentation to assist in training (Premji, Messing, and Lippel 2008).

On the one hand, language barriers might expose workers to additional hazards, as safety instructions are not necessarily provided in a language understood by workers, making IMWs more vulnerable to occupational injuries and diseases (Thibault-Leblanc 2021, 169; Premji, Messing, and Lippel 2008; Dabrowska-Miciula 2023, 79; Preibisch and Otero 2014; Cedillo, Lippel, and Nakache 2019; Sargeant and Tucker 2009; Gravel et al. 2014; Caxaj and Diaz 2018). On the other hand, in many provinces, OSH public legal education tools to better understand the applicable regulatory framework are not available in the language of the worker, and there is an important variation between provinces in this regard (Gravel and Premji 2014; Kosny et al. 2014). As Kerry Preibisch (2004) points out, IMWs are therefore generally deprived of community ties and have limited access to forms of “social membership.” This linguistic and geographic isolation can constitute the basis for social isolation, contributing to the marginalization of these workers from their host community.

In sum, precarious immigration status and the related conditional and temporary nature of their stay, the communication difficulties for workers who do not speak French or English, and their lack of financial resources are all factors that may contribute to a lack of awareness of rights and of the institutions responsible for their implementation. These constraints will influence when and how IMWs will resort to drawing on OSH regulatory protections and accessing workers’ compensation regimes.

The key regulatory instruments in all provinces rely on workers’ participation in the protection of their health, and the right to refuse dangerous work is a cornerstone of OSH law. McLaughlin, Hennebry, and Haines (2014), in discussing OSH legislation in Ontario and based on their findings from an empirical study, suggest that the design of legislation in that province with regard to agricultural migrant workers makes it unlikely that workers would have access to mandatory health and safety committees in their workplace. In addition, fear of being sent home can mean that IMWs will not speak up.5

OSH legislation also requires that workers be provided with adequate training and information about the hazards to which they are exposed,6 adequate protective equipment, and, in some provinces, access to occupational health care services. Most OSH laws assume, and require, that workers participate in the identification of hazards and their elimination, and when that is not the case, regulatory failure may easily ensue. While some regulators attempt to provide enhanced services to IMWs, they are not necessarily successful. Interactions with public institutions are sometimes in themselves a source of stigma and intimidation for IMWs.

The IMP is currently the primary program through which IMWs enter Canada (IRCC 2022; Coderre and Nakache 2021; O’Donnell and Skuterud 2022). This program encompasses a variety of subprograms with varying bilateral agreements and regulations, thus leading to differences in admission and employment conditions in Canada (IRCC 2022; Coderre and Nakache 2021). The International Experience Canada subprogram enables young citizens from designated countries to enter Canada through the Working Holiday, Young Professionals, or International Co-op (Internship) programs (IRCC 2023c). Studies reveal that beneficiaries of IMP programs also experience precariousness and insecurity in both their employment and their residency status (Vosko 2023; Coderre and Nakache 2021).

The willingness of the OSH inspectorate to conduct preventive inspections seems limited, at best. In most provinces, this inspectorate does not have a precise understanding of where the IMWs are employed, limiting their capability to run extensive information campaigns or to conduct preventive inspections. In some provinces, however, the OSH inspectorate has partnered with specific consulates to provide education to IMWs about health and safety standards—systemic measures are still awaited (for an overview of health and safety resources available in various Canadian provinces, see Agnieska Kosny and Marni Lifshen 2011, 57).

The enforcement of OSH regulations and constraints on access to the workers’ compensation regime are largely based on worker-initiated complaints and compensation claims. Most Canadian provinces fail to routinely track complaints made by migrant workers: Only Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) were said to do so in 2014 (Hildebrandt 2014; this has been identified as an issue in other regional contexts, such as in Europe [Guldenmund, Cleal, and Mearns 2013]), and not surprisingly, research has shown that IMWs underreport compensable injury (Cedillo, Lippel, and Nakache 2019; Hanley et al. 2014; Yanar, Kosny, and Smith 2018; Preibisch and Hennebry 2011).

IMWs will encounter a broad range of obstacles if they seek to obtain just compensation. In a study that included employers of IMWs, employers themselves acknowledged that workers were afraid to declare their injuries for fear of losing their jobs or being deported (Gravel et al. 2014).7 As shown by Basok, Bélanger, and Rivas (2014), IMWs often adopt calculative and reflexive practices to avoid deportation and secure their own employment. And a recent study of the return-to-work (RTW) process after injury among migrant agricultural workers in Québec and Ontario found evidence of workers pressured to RTW prematurely, bureaucratic and other challenges dealing with their relevant workers’ compensation board (WCB), and that injury and failure to RTW negatively impacted their long-term well-being (Mayell et al. 2025).

The fear of not being called back explains the reticence of workers to declare injuries and to speak up about hazardous working conditions and poor housing conditions (Salami, Meherali, and Salami 2016; Gallié, Ollivier-Gobeil, and Brodeur 2017; see also Allen 2017). It goes without saying that undocumented migrant workers are even more vulnerable to denunciations by anyone, including the employer or their fellow workers (on the specific vulnerabilities that undocumented workers face with regard to access to health care and OSH schemes, see Hanley et al. 2014; Campbell et al. 2014; Magalhaes, Carrasco, and Gastaldo 2010; Yu et al. 2020; Cedillo, Lippel, and Nakache 2019; Alberta Workers’ Health Centre 2017; Foster and Luciano 2020).

Previous research has also shown the impact of the recruitment process on the strategies of IMWs during their employment in Canada (Gesualdi-Fecteau et al. 2017). Indeed, most IMWs arriving in Canada are recruited through intermediaries operating abroad who are responsible for the recruitment and allocation of IMWs to Canadian employers. The costs associated with the recruitment process, such as medical examinations, visa fees, health insurance, or other administrative costs, are typically charged to the worker. In many cases, workers resort to taking loans from relatives or financial institutions to cover these costs. As recruitment intermediaries have considerable influence over the recruitment process, workers must abide by the fees and procedures imposed by these entities. If IMWs are indebted during the recruitment process, they are very unlikely to voice their concerns about working conditions out of fear of jeopardizing their current employment, being deported, or being blacklisted from future employment opportunities and unable to pay off these debts.

A study conducted by Cole et al. (2019) confirmed that IMWs face structural challenges related to accessing health services, including lack of adequate translation/interpretation services and information about insurance coverage, scheduling conflicts between clinic hours and IMWs’ availability, and difficulties in arranging follow-up tests, treatments, and examinations. In Canada, eligibility for public provincial health care varies among IMWs (Hanley et al. 2014). Although most programs grant these workers access to publicly funded health care, their temporary ineligibility during the initial three months of employment in specific provinces presents a significant obstacle (Sikka, Lippel, and Hanley 2011; Hennebry, McLaughlin, and Preibisch 2016). During this period, employers are required to offer medical insurance for their employees; however, the associated costs can be prohibitive for many. Moreover, reliance on private insurance can also present challenges, as, in some instances, health care providers have rejected private insurance for IMWs (Hennebry, McLaughlin, and Preibisch 2016). Access to provincial health care is further complicated by the fact that IMWs rely on employers to provide them with the health cards necessary for accessing provincial health care services. Research reveals that despite having legal access to publicly funded health care, in some cases, very few IMWs actually possess the necessary provincial health cards (Hennebry, McLaughlin, and Preibisch 2016).

IMWs’ access to health care is sometimes jeopardized in other ways as well. In some cases, they are denied access to a health care professional by their employers and their agents. In other cases, the employer’s agent sometimes accompanies the worker when attending a medical exam, which raises issues of confidentiality and privacy (Hennebry, McLaughlin, and Preibisch 2016). A Québec study of agricultural migrant workers found that very few knew they were covered by workers’ compensation and could access free health care (Amar et al. 2009, 22). Language differences and long hours of work are also often cited as limiting such access (Hennebry, McLaughlin, and Preibisch 2016).

IMWs who develop an occupational illness and go back to their home country may lose benefits because of the complexity of their situation, where “medical and administrative continuity is blurred” (Gravel et al. 2014, para. 76; our translation). Further complexity may arise when the illness develops only after IMWs have returned to their homelands, and they may have difficulty accessing benefits in the country where they contracted the illness (Temple Newhook et al. 2011). Investigations by journalists have shed light on the hardship IMWs may face when they are injured at work (Champagne 2023a). The fact that IMWs also generally live in employer-provided housing adds another layer of complexity. For instance, while healing in Canada, the worker may have difficulties finding proper accommodation (Champagne 2023b).

Rapid consultation with a health care professional is one of the most critical factors in successful workers’ compensation claims. In some cases, IMWs will prefer consulting a health professional in their countries of origin or turn to their social networks for health advice, such as help with self-diagnosis or tips on self-care (Hanley et al. 2014; for a review of the specific challenges that undocumented workers face, see Sikka, Lippel, and Hanley 2011). Health professionals are generally not trained to deal with IMWs. Some Québec health care professionals believe, erroneously, that these workers are not covered by workers’ compensation or Québec’s health insurance. When workers receive treatments, research has found that almost without exception, there was no follow-up; in one study, several workers explained that they never received results of X-rays or other tests (Hennebry, McLaughlin, and Preibisch 2016).

When an IMW is injured, transnational challenges can arise around continuity of care, as in some cases, IMWs leave Canada during / prior to receiving care (Cole et al. 2019).8 When a non-Canadian worker returns home after an injury and requires medical care as a result of an injury found by a Canadian WCB to be compensable, there has sometimes been litigation regarding the cost of health care outside of Canada.9 Also, medical evaluation may be problematic for IMWs when the worker returns home and can only access health care providers who are unknown to the WCB managing their claim. In this instance, credibility of medical opinions can be questioned, particularly when the opinion is not written in French or English. Furthermore, specialists may not be available in the home locality of the worker, whereas they are available in the province managing the claim (Lippel and Walters 2019, 335). Researchers Gravel et al. (2014) also emphasize that when IMWs return to their home countries after an injury, they may lose the benefits of compensation because of the complexity of the administrative and medical processes.

Despite contributing to employment insurance while in Canada, IMWs have trouble accessing benefits when their contract ends and they return to their home country (CBC News 2024).

If a worker who does not speak French or English manages to file a compensation claim in a timely manner, they may encounter problems understanding the documentation sent in response to the claim. The workers’ compensation filing procedure is complex, with each province having a different procedure. There are documented cases where procedural confusion has led to workers missing deadlines to file a claim; a disproportionately high number of IMWs file their claims past the deadline when compared to other claimants (Allen 2017). Appeals tribunals may be sensitive to these obstacles and extend appeal deadlines,10 but the worker needs to know to ask and, ideally, needs to be there to explain why an appeal was late, something that is hard to do even when the worker is present at the hearing and very difficult to do after the worker has returned home.

Assignment of modified work for IMWs may be complicated by immigration rules, as work visas may not be compatible with the modified work assignment. For some workers, deportation will follow a work injury, and as Orkin et al. (2014, E196) mention, “There are perhaps no other Canadian occupational settings where workplace injuries and illnesses . . . result in employment termination and deportation without further medical care or income security.”

The RTW process can also be jeopardized by the precarious migratory status of IMWs and language barriers. On the one hand, injured IMWs are likely to be repatriated prior to recovery and thus do not benefit from re-employment, retraining, and/or reintegration into the labour market (Hennebry and Williams 2015; Orkin et al. 2014; Yachnin 2025; Mayell et al. 2025).11 On the other hand, language barriers are also likely to impair the RTW process (Mayell et al. 2025).12 A study conducted by Premji et al. (2021) shows that workers who experienced language barriers had limited labour market opportunities. Interviews revealed that workers were often required to do jobs that were unsuitable (e.g., menial, not considerate of functional limitations, and requiring assistance that is not provided) and, in many cases, exacerbated the injury or caused reinjury. These workers reported difficulties negotiating their working conditions directly with their supervisor or employer because of the unequal power dynamics, to which language barriers contributed.

Specific Challenges Faced by Agricultural Migrant Workers and Caregivers

While agricultural migrant workers are likely to share similar OSH concerns as other groups of seasonal workers,13 several studies have examined the working conditions of agricultural migrant workers in Canada. In their review of the literature on the hazards to which farm workers are exposed, Preibisch and Otero (2014, 180–81) include “exposure to agrochemicals, plants, soil, insects, sun and climatic extremes; hazards posed by machines, vehicles, and confined spaces; and repetitive and stressful ergonomic positions” (see also Hennebry, Preibisch, and McLaughlin 2010).14 These authors conclude that occupational issues for this workforce are attributable to accidents, musculoskeletal disorders related to repetitive motion and poorly designed work methods, acute and chronic problems related to exposure to chemical and biological toxins, and transport-related accidents. Pesticide exposure and transport accidents were identified as significant hazards for horticultural workers employed in Québec (Gravel et al. 2014; see also Amar et al. 2009, 56–57),15 sometimes leading to fatal accidents.16 As we will discuss in chapter 6, research has also shown that agricultural migrant workers were disproportionately harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic (Caxaj, Tran, Mayell, et al. 2022, 98; see also Vosko and Spring 2022; Caxaj, Cohen, and Colindres 2022).

Access to the farms is challenging for those who serve as traditional sources of OSH information, including unions and inspectors (see Law Commission of Ontario 2012; McLaughlin, Hennebry, and Haines 2014; Hennebry and McLaughlin 2016; Basok et al. 2023). Furthermore, the agricultural sector is exempted from some regulatory protections in several provinces, including OSH protections as well as access to unionization (Sargeant and Tucker 2009).17

Regarding access to unionization, in Ontario, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act18 only provides basic rights for agricultural workers, such as freedom to join an employee association, assemble, and make representations. However, its protections do not extend to the right to collective bargaining (McLaughlin, Hennebry, and Haines 2014). In Québec, a superior court ruling declared the exclusion of agricultural workers from unionization rights unconstitutional.19 However, the Loimodifiant le Code du travail à l’égard de certains salariés d’exploitations agricoles20 only ensures basic rights for farm workers, granting them the ability to communicate concerns to their employer, who must listen, but it does not permit collective bargaining (Hanley et al. 2020; Soussi 2019). In NL, the Labour Relations Act21 regulating labour relations and collective bargaining in the private sector does not exclude agricultural workers. In Alberta, agricultural workers are excluded from the Labour Relations Code,22 which guarantees the right to form unions. Instead, farm workers are covered by the Farm Freedom and Safety Act.23

Concerning OSH protections, in Ontario, farm workers were excluded from the Occupational Health and Safety Act24 until 2006. This act guarantees rights such as to be informed about potential workplace hazards, to participate in addressing health and safety concerns at the workplace, and to refuse unsafe work (Vosko, Tucker, and Casey 2019; McLaughlin, Hennebry, and Haines 2014). Agricultural workers are covered by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act,25 providing access to workers’ compensation benefits (McLaughlin, Hennebry, and Haines 2014). In Québec, agricultural workers fall under the protection of both the Act Respecting Occupational Health and Safety26 and the Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases.27 In NL, agricultural workers are not excluded from the Occupational Health and Safety Act28 and the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Act.29 Alberta only included the agricultural sector within the purview of its health and safety legislation in 2016. It was only after this inclusion that OSH regulators were mandated to consider hazards in that industry and the particular challenges associated with protecting the health and safety of IMWs. In Alberta, the Farm Freedom and Safety Act30 outlines how legislation applies to farms and ranches. The Occupational Health and Safety Act31 sets the minimum standards for protecting waged, nonfamily farm and ranch workers, while the Workers’ Compensation Act32 requires compensation coverage for farm workers.

Even where regulatory protections and training requirements exist, they are not adequately enforced, as can be seen from the findings regarding OSH training of agricultural migrant workers in BC (Preibisch and Otero 2014, 190). In Ontario, employers reported feeling undersupported by the state with regard to training in health and safety issues, which they were required to provide to their agricultural migrant worker employees (Narushima and Sanchez 2014).33

A study found that the repatriation rates varied between agricultural migrant workers in Ontario, depending on the country of origin, which suggests to the authors that consular practices may differ between countries providing labour (Orkin et al. 2014). This study provided a description of the types of injuries that led to repatriation to the worker’s home country between 2001 and 2011. Only 13 of the 787 repatriations were at the request of the worker, with the 787 repatriations representing a rate of 4.62 repatriations per 1,000 workers. The diagnostic categories justifying repatriation were primarily medical/surgical and external trauma, with the most common health problems being musculoskeletal and digestive conditions and traumatic injuries.

While different categories of IMWs are likely to be dependent on their employer for housing, agricultural migrant workers and live-in caregivers will generally always stay in employer-provided housing, sometimes located at the work site. Employer-provided housing can expose these agricultural and caregiver migrant workers to further hazards and increase their dependency on the employer (Preibisch and Otero 2014, 189–90; Helps 2020). A 2017 Québec study documented poor living conditions of agricultural migrant workers (Gallié, Ollivier-Gobeil, and Brodeur 2017), and in 2018, there was a tightening of requirements imposed by ESDC (n.d.), which has been inspecting housing provided to agricultural migrant workers since 2014.34 In North Carolina, where the quality of migrant farm worker housing is explicitly regulated, researchers found that violations of housing regulations were common (Arcury et al. 2012).

Some studies, to which we now turn, have focused on the specific OSH hazards and challenges faced by migrant caregivers in Canada (Hill et al. 2019; Vahabi, Wong, and Lofters 2018; Vahabi and Wong 2017; Robillard et al. 2018; Malhotra et al. 2013; Radio-Canada 2023a). These studies highlight the numerous OSH risks that can be intensified by the unique nature of the work carried out in isolated private residences and the challenges related to accessing OSH protections for this category of migrant labour.

The World Health Organization (2017, 43) recently published a report noting “a significant knowledge gap exists regarding the influences on migrant care workers’ health.” Nicole S. Hill et al. (2019) studied the experience of migrant workers employed as live-in caregivers in Fort McMurray, Alberta. They identified four types of hazards: fatigue, psychosocial stress, physical hazards, and exposure to harassment and abuse. They underlined, using a multiscalar (im)mobilities approach (399), the peculiar situation of these workers, where important transnational migration processes overlay a mix of mobility and immobility in regard to their employment. These workers participated in Canada’s Caregiver Program (formerly known as the Live-In Caregiver Program) and came to Fort McMurray in order to care for the children of workers in the oil industry (399). They described to the researchers long hours of work and unpredictable schedules, depending on their employers’ daily or weekly rotations and shifts (405); isolation, due in part to the remoteness of Fort McMurray; long, cold winters; and limited transportation options. Some reported violence and exposure to physical health hazards because of ergonomic conditions of work or exposure to chemical or biological hazards. These findings echo those of other studies that have identified a broad range of hazards (Malhotra et al. 2013), both physical and psychosocial (Vahabi and Wong 2017; Vahabi, Wong, and Lofters 2018), some stemming from vulnerability attributable to their isolation (Fudge 2011), such as violence and harassment (Robillard et al. 2018). Other hazards are intrinsic to the nature of the work, including exposures to cleaning products, pets, ergonomic hazards, biological hazards, and so on (Hanley et al. 2010).

Recent developments in regulatory protections for domestic workers include International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 189 and Recommendation 201.35 In Ontario, the Occupational Health and Safety Act36 does not cover live-in caregivers and other domestic workers, but they are protected by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.37 Until 2021, domestic workers were excluded from the purview of Québec’s AIAOD,38 although they are covered as employees by the Act Respecting Occupational Health and Safety.39 In NL, both the Occupational Health and Safety Act40 and the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Act41 include domestic workers. Until 2018, Alberta entirely excluded live-in caregivers and domestic workers from the ambit of its Occupational Health and Safety Act,42 and although changes have been made, certain OSH rules, such as the Occupational Health and Safety Code, still don’t apply to domestic workers (Hill et al. 2019).43

IMW Occupational Safety and Health Issues in the Courts

In recent decades, IMWs and their allies have resorted to the courts to increase the visibility of injuries and deaths sustained by these workers. These strategies have been more or less successful depending on the case, but from a strategic litigation point of view, they have also sought to shine a spotlight on the realities of IMWs. The following subsection provides some examples of such cases while recognizing that several more could be discussed.

In 2013, Justice for Migrant Workers, an organization supporting the rights of migrant workers in Canada, filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission to obtain a coroner’s inquest following the death of an agricultural migrant worker (O’Toole 2013).44

IMWs are often vulnerable to blacklisting and intimidation. For example, in BC, consular officials tried to undermine a drive for unionization of seasonal farm workers by preventing those favourable to the union from returning to Canada. This led to a series of complaints filed by the union at the BC Labour Relations Board and subsequent litigation by the Mexican government. The latter pleaded “state immunity” so that its behaviour could not be scrutinized by the Labour Relations Board, an argument disallowed by the Court of Appeal.45

After two workers were killed and two others were seriously injured, charges were laid against Sinopec Shanghai Engineering Company of Canada, leading to a conviction and a sentence that required the company to pay a total of $1.5 million, including $1.3 million destined to a “new program teaching temporary foreign workers about their rights when it comes to safety on the job” (CBC News 2013a, para. 7)—an illustration of ways in which creative sentencing can provide constructive support for vulnerable workers.

In Ontario, Industrial Accident Victims’ Group of Ontario (IAVGO), a legal clinic that provides free services to injured workers, led successful litigation on behalf of injured IMWs. As a result, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) adopted a policy (applicable since January 15, 2018) that facilitates access to medical services in Ontario and informs agricultural migrant workers injured in Ontario that their health care in their own country will be paid (IAVGO 2018). As discussed in chapter 4, IAVGO also recently won a case before the workers’ compensation tribunal on behalf of four injured agricultural workers that overturned a long-standing WCB policy in Ontario. The tribunal concluded that the WCB “must evaluate these workers’ ability to return to work, access retraining, and receive compensation based on their labor markets in Jamaica—instead of based on fictional job prospects in Ontario. The tribunal also called out the need to consider systemic anti-Black racism in workers’ compensation law and policy” (Yachnin 2025, 96; see also Mayell et al. 2025).

A group of agricultural migrant workers in Québec successfully sued their employer under the psychological harassment provisions of the Labour Standards Act. The tribunal found that inadequate housing, denial of basic necessities, humiliation at work, requirements to fumigate without protection, disregard for sleep deprivation, and underpayment of workers while suggesting they still earned more than in their home country cumulatively constituted psychological harassment. The employer was required to pay to each worker the sum of $3,000 in moral damages and an additional $3,000 in punitive damages, as well as the cost of psychological care for one of the complainants and the costs of interpreters, lost salaries, and expenses associated with the hearing of the harassment complaints, including the travel expenses incurred by the workers who had returned to Guatemala and had to testify in Québec.46 It is important to note that the Act Respecting Labour Standards (ARLS) ensures the provision of free counsel to claimants who show a prima facie case, so the workers were represented by counsel appointed by the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CNESST), the agency responsible for the implementation of Québec’s ARLS.

Despite the multiple layers of vulnerability experienced by undocumented workers, the case law pertaining to these workers has long been highly disadvantageous. Since the end of the 1990s, however, a trend has emerged in administrative law that favours a broader interpretation of the notion of contract of employment in a context where the work was performed in the absence of a valid work permit. Thus, a legal theory has been developed that does not automatically exclude recognition of the validity of the contract to the extent of the worker’s “good faith.” Gradually, administrative tribunals have come to recognize that immigration offences, including the prohibition of employment without a work permit, do not systematically affect the validity of the employment contract.47 Undocumented workers have, albeit sometimes unevenly through time and from one province to another (Bihari 2011), gained better access to workers’ compensation regimes and to broader labour protections.

Sending Country Initiatives

In some low- to middle-income countries where the remittance economy is important, the state has arrangements in place that claim to offer protection for nationals involved in overseas employment. A case in point is the Philippines, which is one of the world’s largest exporters of labour and is where the remittances from these workers form a major element of the national economy. In the Philippines, the state intervenes in a variety of ways to promote and facilitate overseas employment of its nationals while at the same time claiming to offer them a degree of protection by extending to them a Philippine jurisdiction and regulatory requirements concerning labour standards and health and safety protections (Dacanay and Walters 2011). There are various institutional means by which it purports to do so.

In the case of seafarers, for example, workers are recruited through crewing agencies to work, usually on a short-term contract, on board ships of the global merchant fleet, where they represent the largest single national contingent of a multinational workforce. Ship managers and their principals are obliged to form a relationship with the crewing agency in order to access these workers. The agency, although a private venture, is in turn licensed and controlled by a responsible Philippine state department. The terms of the contract with the seafarer are set out in a standard employment contract to which all actors—crewing agency, foreign principal, and seafarer—are party. It is subject to Philippine law, and its terms and conditions may be tested in Philippine courts (Dacanay and Walters 2011).

In principle, this system could help prevent the exploitation of migrant workers through a free market race to the bottom in which the aims of employing the cheapest labour under the poorest of labour standards might be prevented. Unfortunately, the Philippine state has very little in the way of means with which to undertake surveillance of the conditions on board the ships on which their nationals work. Furthermore, these workplaces are not within their jurisdiction except when they are in Philippine waters. Thus, the seafarers’ actual experience of work at sea may not be quite as protected as indicated by the terms of the standard contract of employment. Moreover, numerous other aspects of the process suggest that, in practice, its real purpose is to maintain the attractiveness of Filipino and Filipina seafarers as affordable commodities on the global seafarer labour market; crewing agents, the state, and even trade unions collaborate to ensure that the image of the Philippines remains that of a source of cheap and trouble-free labour (Dacanay and Walters 2011).