Chapter1 Hosting the Hostage Hospitality, the Uyghur Other, and Chinese State-Imposed Peace

Guests, Officials, and Bandits: Muslims from the Imperial to Republican China

The integration of Muslim “Others” into Chinese society has been uneven and is ongoing. To be sure, the history of Islam in China is complex and each community’s experiences and relationships to the state and majority populations are distinct to time and location. Yet Muslims have largely remained on the geographic and social peripheries of Chinese metropoles since they first arrived in the Middle Kingdom nearly fifteen hundred years ago. Muslims established their first permanent settlements during the Tang Dynasty (618–907) when the reopening of important Silk Road routes attracted Arab and Persian Muslim “foreign guests” (Ch. fangke) to bustling trade hubs at Chang’an (Xi’an), Guangzhou, and Quanzhou. However, in the imperial capital at Chang’an, Muslims were isolated. They were confined to semi-autonomous foreign quarters, restricted to designated markets to conduct business, and discouraged from fraternizing with local Chinese.7 The Mongols relocated large numbers of officials from the Near East and Central Asia—many of whom professed Islam—to serve the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368). As Mongol subjects, the statuses of Muslims changed from “foreign guest” to semu, or members of “assorted categories of people.”8 However, Muslim support for the (“alien”) Mongol overlords as well as their commonly assigned administrative duty to collect tax bred animosity among Chinese.9 Relations improved somewhat during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Muslim officials continued to be valued civil servants in the imperial bureaucracy, Islamic religious elite found ways to integrate Islam into a Confucian cultural milieu, and Muslim families began adopting Chinese surnames.10 Despite Muslim attempts to embrace Chinese elements of their identity, however, neo-Confucian literati endeavoured to reestablish the Ming as a cultural Chinese dynasty and remained suspicious of Muslims. In fact, to dissolve their ethno-religious identities, Emperor Ming Taizu (r. 1368–1398) mandated that all Muslims marry ethnic Chinese but later relaxed the requirement.11 Relations deteriorated during the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Muslim-led—but not necessarily Islamist—revolts broke out in Yunnan (1856–1873), Gansu (1862–1877), and Qinghai (1895–1896) resulting in the deaths of millions.12 Meanwhile in Kashgaria (modern-day Xinjiang), a warlord from the Khanate of Kokand named Yaqub Beg overpowered the already weakened Qing garrison and established an Islamic emirate (1865–1877). It would take a massive military campaign led by Zuo Zongtang to defeat Yaqub Beg’s army and claim the region under the Qing.13 Xinjiang was annexed as a province in 1884.

In ways similar to the Qing, the Nationalist government (1911–1949) recognized Hui (Muslims) as one of the five nationalities of the Republic of China. However, Sun Yat-Sen and his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, adopted an assimilationist approach to China’s ethnic diversity, which essentially viewed Muslims as (Han) Chinese converts to Islam.14 This rhetoric aligned with the Nationalists’, or Guomindang’s (GMD), goals of assimilation: ethnic difference was to be ignored before it was eradicated.15 Internally weak and preoccupied with an encroaching Japan, however, the GMD government was largely unable to incorporate non-Han into the national fold.16 After years of civil war, the GMD was defeated by the Communists in 1949.

Becoming Pomegranate Arils: Muslims in the People’s Republic of China

To set themselves apart from the assimilationist approach of the Nationalists, the CCP initially recognized, created where it never existed, and celebrated China’s ethnic diversity. Inspired by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, as well as British imperial practices in India, the CCP attempted to create a “scientific” taxonomy of non-Han peoples shortly after coming to power.17 This “identification” project (Ch. minzu shibie) recognized fifty-six distinct ethnic groups, ten of which are classified “Muslim.” Uniting the disparate populations into a “great family” (Ch. da jiating)—though one that prioritized the Han majority—would not be easy. Mao recognized the dangers of Han chauvinism and the fragility of ethnic unity. Therefore, with the exception of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the CCP initially adopted a gradual approach to amalgamation (Ch. ronghe)—that is, the fusion of all ethnic and ethno-national groups into an all-encompassing nation, but one that retains mostly Han elements.18 Since the Reform Period (1976–present), CCP leaders have offered a package of entitlements to ethnic minorities, including a bonus-point policy on the country’s college entrance examination, relaxed enforcement of the “one-child” policy, and legal protection under various anti-discrimination laws.19 These measures intend to reduce socio-economic disparity between majority Han people and marginalized ethnic minorities.

Now under the leadership of general secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping, the Han-dominated Party-state has adopted a tribal cultural nationalism that views some forms of ethnic and religious diversity as political threats.20 To be sure, sporadic episodes of violence have disrupted even superficial peace in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region for over a decade. On July 5, 2009, peaceful protests in the region’s capital city, Ürümchi, spiralled into three days of rioting, which claimed 197 lives and resulted in over two thousand injuries and the disappearances of hundreds.21 In the years following the “7–5 Incident,” the CCP has labelled otherwise unrelated attacks at a police station in rural Turpan, in front of Beijing’s iconic Tiananmen Square, inside the Kunming Train Station, and at a coal mine in Aksu, as co-ordinated global terrorism. Much as the Indian government has done among Muslim minorities and the dominant Hindu majority in Assam (see Saikia, this volume), the Chinese government instrumentalizes fear of violence to simultaneously strengthen popular support among the Han majority and strike terror into Uyghur communities.

Framing the incidents as global terror (and not local grievances), the CCP has decided to act with urgency and impunity when dealing with the Uyghurs.22 As such, Xi Jinping urged for the construction of a “great wall of iron” to protect the region from what leaders consider an existential threat to China’s territorial integrity, remarks that inspired the CCP to pass legislation called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s Articles on Eliminating Extremism.23 Officials formally redefined extremism as “propositions and conduct using distortion of religious teachings or other means to incite hatred or discrimination and advocate violence.”24 Under the new law, activities as mundane as refusing to eat non-halal food, removing cable connections to state television, or maintaining a pious appearance are considered extremist and are severely punished. Anti-extremism measures are violently enforced. Since 2016, the CCP interned as many as one million Uyghurs in “concentration re-education centers.”25 Chinese officials—who first angrily denied the program’s existence—now publicly insist they are providing essential vocational training for individuals influenced by the so-called three evil forces—extremism, radicalism, and terrorism—that threaten stability.26 The few families spared from the atrocities of re-education endure a form of house arrest akin to quartering. To this end, the CCP has conscripted over one million Han civilians and sent them to live with Uyghurs in arranged homestays.27 Once a Uyghur space impenetrable to the state high-tech surveillance apparatus, the home has been repurposed by the CCP as a site for acculturation.28

The CCP is confident that its pernicious approach to transforming the Uyghurs will help bring ethnic harmony to fruition. In fact, the government encourages all remaining people in the region to act as if they are pomegranate arils. In 2019, listeners who tuned in to Xinjiang People’s Radio Uyghur language station for its morning broadcast were inundated with five public service announcements that spanned over three minutes of programming. Aired in succession and repeated several times throughout the day, the first four announcements emphasized the importance of loving China and demonstrating this patriotism by adopting “civilized” (Uy. medeniy) behaviour, following general secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping’s leadership, and celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. However, the theme and tone of the final announcement shifted from patriotism to ethnic unity:

One instance of family (Uy. tughqanliship) connectedness, and we will be relatives (Uy. tughqanlar) forever. Let’s embody ethnic unity as if we are members of one family (Uy. bir a’ilik kishiler). Come together, visit each other, and show genuine kindness. Let’s embody ethnic unity as if we are members of one family. We should be thankful for the Party, listen to its words, and follow it. Every ethnic group needs to join tightly as if they are pomegranate arils.

Invocations of family are central to this public service announcement: the message does not simply promote random acts of kindness; it commands ethnic groups who have historically held different understandings of “family” and different positions vis-à-vis the Chinese Party-state to behave as if they are relatives.29 The pomegranate metaphor is confounding. As a model for ethnic unity—and peace—a pomegranate is only effective if tightly bound by a hard rind that constricts its inner membrane. Only with the tight control of these exterior and interior systems do the seeds remain tightly folded into one another. In the case of the People’s Republic, a pomegranate system of inter-ethnic unity only works if there is a Han-dominated police state to hold the seeds together.30 This strategy may impose unity but not peace.

Hosting and Gifting Among Uyghur and Han

Yet in ways similar to the pomegranate, the CCP is demanding unity by exerting force. Indeed, Uyghurs and Han people rarely interact, let alone welcome one another into their homes.31 To smash physical and symbolic ethnic barriers created and maintained by Uyghurs and Han people, officials have implemented mandatory house calls. Programs such as “explore the people’s conditions, benefit the people’s livelihood, and fuse with the people’s hearts” (Ch. fang minqing, hui minsheng, ju minsheng or fanghuiju) have conscripted over one million Han civilians and sent them to live with Uyghurs in arranged homestays.32 The “fanghuiju” initiative has been expanded to reach ethnic minority families across Xinjiang. In 2014, the first year of the program, 200,000 civilian workers embarked on this campaign; in 2016, an additional 110,000 civilians journeyed to the region as part of a similar campaign called “United as One Family” (Ch. jie dui renqing).33 According to a May 30, 2018, Xinjiang TV News broadcast, from 2016 to May 2018, these sent-down workers—referred to sometimes as “big brothers and big sisters”—made 24 million house visits, conducted 33 million interviews (read: interrogations), and organized over 8 million ethnic unity activities. Depending on efficiency and extensiveness of each house call, work teams visit six to ten households per day; some work teams pay daily visits to every household for ninety days.34 Government reports from Hoshut County and Onsu County Aqsu Prefecture uncovered by Human Rights Watch indicate, respectively, that work teams must visit each family fourteen times every month and stay in the homes of local residents no fewer than eight days each month.35

Hosting—and Holding Hostage—the Other

As agents of an authoritarian state, work teams could easily force themselves into Uyghur homes unimpeded; yet they assume, albeit briefly, the identity of unassuming and gracious guests. Indeed, hospitality is the unstable fulcrum on which the CCP’s call to create familial bonds across ethnic boundaries is placed.36 To properly perform the temporary role as guests, civilian workers are expected to commit to a code of conduct. A manual used in Kashgar Prefecture instructs work teams to: (1) knock first; (2) greet the family; (3) observe door etiquette; (4) display proper comportment; (5) hug children; (6) respect elders; (7) receive items with two hands; (8) say “thank you”; (9) leave if you have inconvenienced the family; and (10) end the visits with a “goodbye.”37 In addition to these basic guidelines, each team carries out at least one practical act of kindness—that is, assistance, care, or a congratulations—during each visit to further build rapport with their assigned families.38

Deception helps work teams gain access to reluctant families. A classified manual for work teams suggests devising a “staggered” (Ch. cuoshi) schedule—visitations in the evening, on weekends, and during holidays—to make sure working families are monitored.39 One civilian worker recommends allowing a local (in other words, Uyghur) female cadre knock on the door because a woman—the individual who customarily remains in the home during the busy farming seasons—is likely going to greet the visitor. The Han woman worker further claims that households are unlikely to accept visitors if the patriarch is gone. However, following these steps prevents any unwanted “awkwardness” regardless of who may answer the door.40 In another attempt to gain access to Uyghur families, work teams sometimes inspect homes late at night.41 Called on by uninvited guests, local families have little choice but to provide their visitors with a room or their own bed.42

Once inside the home, work teams shower their families with gifts. The “United as One Family” campaign carries out the “four commons, four gifts” strategy (Ch. si tong, si song). Literally, the phrase “four commons, four gifts” refers to civil servants eating, living, working, and studying alongside Uyghur families while they gift them kindness and knowledge about policy, law, and culture.43 However, gifting takes other forms and is central to the success of the “United as One Family” campaign. Indeed, work teams rarely arrive empty-handed. They present their “hosts” with rice, furniture, clothing, and school supplies—gestures that enmesh Uyghur families in a suffocating social bond forged from material and emotional debt and repayment, or “human feelings” (Ch. renqing).44 Although renqing operates within the complex realm of—largely Confucian-defined—interpersonal ethics, it can be unpacked by analyzing the dynamics of gift-giving. In her canonical book on social relationships in China, Mayfair Yang explains, “Gifts require reciprocity, and so do relationships; therefore, the ethics of gift-giving are extended to all human relationships.”45 In other words, the material gifts are commodified objects of the CCP’s compassion.46

Having set the traps and baited them with gifts, the work teams can spring them. According to the expectations of renqing, when Uyghur families accept the gifts—voluntarily or reluctantly—they become indebted to the work teams and by extension the Party in a sudden inversion of the host-guest relationship. According to Pitt-Rivers’s theories about hospitality, sent-down workers intentionally violate and invert the law of hospitality. In the most obvious example of role reversals, work teams supply food, prepare it for their Uyghur “relatives,” and share these meals on tables provided by the government.47 Becoming the recipients of state renqing, similar to impoverished Han people who receive regular cash stipends from the government, Uyghur families incur social and political debt.48 This seemingly casual gesture is an exercise of power: it demonstrates that Uyghur “hosts” are incapable of providing for their government-dispatched Han “relatives.”49 As such, dependency is transferred from the Uyghur community to the Han-dominated Party-state.

Now relegated to the role of guests inside their own homes, Uyghurs are expected to reciprocate by displaying gratitude, co-operation, and compliance. To be sure, work teams do not expropriate domestic space, but they effectively occupy and repurpose it for government use. Indeed, in the company of civilian work teams, Uyghurs families no longer exercise agency over domestic affairs. To display proper guest etiquette (and, more importantly, avoid harsh punishment), Uyghurs cannot refuse to answer questions from their government-appointed hosts. Meanwhile, work teams keep meticulous records of their assigned families.50 A standardized form ensures no bit of information is overlooked.51 Workers must determine an individual’s ethnic status, age, income, political affiliation, religious beliefs, education level, relationship with the “targeted population,” and even the materials used to build the person’s house.52 A typical record resembles the following entry recorded on April 1, 2014:

Ali Ayshan. Thirty-six years old. Resident of village group nine. Household of three. Earns 6000RMB/year from an orchard; earns an additional 10,000RMB driving a taxi. Family has already received the “affordable housing” subsidy. Individual has attended Aqsu technical school and has a secondary-school education. He hopes to earn a living breeding livestock.53

This entry permanently documents this Uyghur person as Other. He is rural, under-educated, poor, relies on government support, and clings to the trades of his ancestors: animal husbandry.

A bilingual phrase book for fanghuiju work teams provides another window into home visits. After teaching the workers basic greetings and introductions, the phrase book offers instructions on how to obtain each family’s information. Sentences include: How many people are in your family? Do your children attend school? Do you like studying Chinese? How much money do you make? Can I take a family picture? and How many people attend mosque?54 Directing these questions primarily to villagers in underdeveloped rural towns elicits responses that will reinforce stereotypes of Uyghurs: they are poor, uneducated, and religious.55 This status is then archived in searchable government databases, effectively officializing Uyghurs’ difference.56

Having been pried open by government agents, the house can be scoured for manifestations of “extremism.” Signs of this deviance include practices as mundane as using the greeting “Assalamu Alaykum” (Peace be upon you,) maintaining a pious appearance, keeping a Qur’an at home, engaging in unsanctioned religious practices, and even owning a tent.57 Once the team enters the house, it inspects for warning signs. The work manual from Kashgar Prefecture provides an extensive list of questions: Does the family have guests from another locale? Do they have too many knives or cleavers? Do they choose to watch VCDs instead of state television? Have they hung religious articles in the home?58 One work team member noted that “some families had sought after knives without QR codes from remote stores while others discarded radios provided to them free of charge from the government. They’re apparently influenced by extremism and don’t want things from the government. This village has deep problems. I won’t go into detail here.”59 An individual’s “stubborn” commitment to these behaviours is likely grounds for internment.

These searches contribute to the further “Othering” of Uyghurs. Combing through Uyghur homes for manifestation of “extremism” preordains Uyghurs as inherently prone to anti-state activity. This is by design. As has been the case in the Islamophobic depictions of Muslims in Europe and the US (see Perocco, this volume; Haines, this volume), media in China sensationalizes the threat of Uyghur “terrorism” to incite fear and stir-up Han nationalism.60

Transforming Recalcitrants into Patriots

After gaining access to Uyghur families and recording their basic information, work teams can now transform them. The process begins with “correct” political thought, which is established through “thought work” (Ch. sixiang gongzuo) and “thought reform” (Ch. sixiang gaizao). These programs can be understood as the collection of the Party’s vast resources and agents for spreading its political messages to the masses.61 This massive enterprise includes large-scale institutions, such as media, schooling, entertainment, and penal facilities, but also more personalized interventions between officials and individuals such as one-on-one talks (Ch. tanxin), group meetings (Ch. tanxinhui), and public performances of patriotism.62

According to the CCP, Uyghurs can cultivate correct political thought by engaging in ritualized political behaviour. In other words, the CCP must construct “nationalized” Uyghur bodies.63 As such, officials require Uyghurs to participate in public flag-raising ceremonies. In June 2017, officials announced the “Three Initiatives” (Ch. san ju cuo), a policy that designated Mondays—10 or 11 a.m. Beijing time depending on locale and season—for the ceremony.64 This weekly performance of loyalty is highly prescriptive. Attendees must arrive ten minutes before the hour, line up in straight rows, and stand quietly. In Aqto County’s Mushitage District, residents organize themselves according to their residential building number.65 Individuals must remove their caps, discard their headscarves, and stand at attention in order to guarantee the “solemnity” (Ch. zhuangyan) of the event.66 Attendees can neither whisper nor walk idly. The national anthem is then sung in Putonghua, China’s national language.

Attendance is mandatory for most members of the community. All government officials, “sent-down” workers (fanghuiju), Party members, Party activists, retired officials/veterans (Ch. silao renyuan), and individuals over eighteen must participate.67 A document circulated in Qaraqash warns that individuals who miss the ceremony without reason will be rectified (Ch. zhenggai): one offence results in a meeting with a government official; two absences result in mandatory night school; and a third offence carries a penalty of “concentration re-education” (Ch. jiaozhi zhongxin jiaoyu zhuanhua).68

After the flag is raised, government officials lecture to the attendees for at least thirty minutes. This time provides an opportunity to communicate the Party’s ideals to a captive audience. In Pichan County’s (Ch. Shanshan) Shuangshuimo district, cadres delivered a speech about the importance of “ethnic unity” and “eliminating evil” to over four hundred people.69 A May lecture in Aqto County covered the three evil forces—extremism, separatism, and terrorism—and “Two-Faced People” (officials who parrot the Party line in public but are suspected of engaging in the three evil forces).70

Officials believe formulaic expressions of patriotism will strengthen Uyghur loyalty toward China and the Party. The motto “every household is gifted a flag, each family hangs the flag, everyone studies the national anthem, every village hoists the flag, and we are constantly thankful for the Party” (Ch. Jiajia song qi, huhu gua guoqi, renren xue guogge, cuncun sheng guoqi, shishigan dang en) demonstrates this apparent connection.71 In fact, a government report from Guma County (Ch. Pishan) claims that the weekly activity aids residents in “deeply establishing an affinity with the fatherland.”72 A resident of Bazhou told officials that “every day I see the flag, I also see the Party and feel excited.”73 Furthermore, the CCP uses these weekly events to make patriotic spectacle. Similar to state-organized national holiday celebrations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the weekly flag-raising ceremonies project CCP authority on Uyghurs and remind them they are Chinese citizens.74 The Party mobilizes these communities, forces obedience, and imposes meaning upon the participants through post-ceremony lectures.

The events also effectively force Uyghurs to stand side by side with officials, Party members, law enforcement personnel, and their assigned relatives, most of whom are Han. The scene, the subject of regular photo ops, presents an idealized, yet translucent image of unity. Although the flag ceremony brings Han and Uyghurs together, the union is forged using force. The arrangement of bodies reproduces a social hierarchy, which indexes Uyghurs as ethnic and political Other. Standing behind neatly dressed Han officials and an occasional Uyghur bureaucrat, lay Uyghurs are publicly displayed as society’s underlings.

Gifting Civilization

According to the CCP, Chinese civilization can remedy major social and cultural deficiencies in Uyghurs. Although CCP policies are not simply derivative of imperial practices, the belief that non-Chinese “barbarians” could become civilized by adopting Chinese modes of livelihood, or laihua, has been at the centre of several successive Chinese “civilizing projects.”75 As cultural beacons, sent-down workers provide the Party-state with live-in tutors to guide Uyghurs toward Chinese civilization. Work teams use visits to teach Uyghur families standard Chinese language, the Chinese national anthem, socialist values, and Xi Jinping thought.76 However, work teams are also to focus on teaching family planning policies, instilling ethnic unity, and reviewing laws on religious practices.77 According to a report posted by the Qaghiliq County, explaining CCP policies using simple language and “drip irrigation” (Ch. diguan) teaching methods will help residents realize that their good days have not serendipitously fallen from the sky but that “the origins of these good days are the Party’s good policies.”78

Civilian work teams are also instrumental in spreading Han cultural norms in Uyghur villages. Few tasks are more important than introducing major holidays and ensuring every village celebrates them. Spring Festival (Ch. Chunjie) activities require weeks of preparation and hundreds of hours of work. In Ürümchi’s Baiyanghe Village, preparations began February 5, 2018—ten days prior to the New Year—after the weekly flag-raising ceremony and public lecture. Then work teams helped residents create “New Year’s couplets” (Ch. chunlian) depicting the “happiness” character (福) and delivered extras to elderly residents.79 Night classes introduced Uyghurs to the festival’s basic customs: on what day would it fall that year and what should one should eat?80 In Kashgar’s Yengisheher County, local officials held the “Ethnic Unity—One Family” New Year’s Gala. Residents performed in skits titled “I’m going to meet Chairman Xi,” staged drum and fan dances, and sang songs such as “We thank the Party.”81 Not to be outdone, work teams in Yeken taught residents how to perform a dragon dance.82 Meanwhile, work teams throughout the region assisted residents in hanging New Year’s couplets outside their homes.83 Upon delivering couplets to one household, a civilian worker told his assigned relative, “This couplet is meant to say that after we became ‘relatives’ our affection is deeper and our hearts are closer.”84 The composition of this newly forged “blended” family is not one of “tughqan” or close relatives; rather it is an asymmetrical Han-big brother-Uyghur little brother relationship that is characteristic of China’s “big family.”

The New Year’s festival usually concludes over a communal meal typical of Han families. From northern Xinjiang’s cities to its southern oases, work teams held jiaozi dumpling-making parties for local residents.85 An official from Kashgar praised similar jiaozi events held the previous year:

Today everyone is making jiaozi of all different colours, and we are eating the filling of “ethnic unity” jiaozi. We are living happy and beautiful lives. This event has also strengthened the resolution of both Party members and the masses to love the fatherland, show gratitude towards the Party, and listen to their words, and follow them.86

These events capture the prevailing objectives of the government-arranged family visits. Work teams attempt to bring Uyghurs into the fold of China’s “great family,” but in the marginalized roles as obedient children to the CCP and respectful younger siblings to their older Han brothers and sisters. Furthermore, a jiaozi feast taps into prevailing principles of Traditional Chinese Medicine: food presumes the power to transform the person. Eating jiaozi is not only symbolic of acting Chinese: it is a step toward becoming Chinese. But the widespread observance of halal dietary practices in these communities, one of the few religious observances the CCP respects, reminds Uyghurs and Han people of their differences, even when they celebrate these festivals together.87

Conclusion

Government-imposed inter-ethnic mingling in Xinjiang relegates Uyghurs to guests in their own homes. Their Han hosts then provide totalitarian “care” to these families.88 Formerly one of the few Uyghur spaces that existed beyond the government’s high-tech surveillance state, the home has been thrust to the centre of CCP human intelligence collecting activities.89 Hospitality, regardless of how hostile or ambivalent it may be, nevertheless create new zones of encounters. Therefore, this social convention possesses the potential to engender mutual respect, strengthen feelings of belonging, and establish positive peace, that is, the facilitation and development of shared feelings of humanity.90 However, the CCP’s approach does not pursue peace; it does not intend to increase tranquility; nor does it hope to promote individual well-being. It seeks stability (Ch. wending) and the partial transformation of Uyghurs. The consequences will be great: the elimination of ethnic markers that Uyghur have identified as essential to their identities and have transmitted for generations. Unlike imperial dynasties of the past, the Party-state does not provide a choice for Uyghurs, or other ethnic minorities, to acculturate on their own terms while it shares control with Indigenous elites. It will not loosen its grip to allow local governing practices to handle day-to-day affairs or non-Han cultures to thrive.91 Yet if the CCP respects the promises it extended to Uyghurs in the Law of Regional Ethnic Autonomy (self-government and freedom to develop their own languages, religions, and cultures), stops its mass incarceration program, and leaves Uyghur homes, positive peace, created through tughqan networks, is within arm’s reach.92

Notes

1. 1 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).

2. 2 Thomas B. Macaulay, “Minute on Indian Education,” February 2, 1835, in Bureau of Education, India, Selections from Educational Records, Part 1: 1781–1839, ed. H. Sharp (Calcutta: Superintendent, Government Printing), 116; available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_education_1835.html.

3. 3 Magnus Fiskesjö, “Rescuing the Empire: Chinese Nation-Building in the Twentieth Century,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 1 (2006): 15–44, at 41.

4. 4 Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” in “Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis,” ed. Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, October 28 (1984): 126.

5. 5 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92–123; cf. Stoler, Carnal Knowledge, 40.

6. 6 On negative peace, see John Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91.

7. 7 Jonathan Lipman, Familiar Strangers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 26–29.

8. 8 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 32–35.

9. 9 Donald Daniel Leslie, The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: The Case of Chinese Muslims, Fifty-ninth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology (Canberra: Australian National University, 1998), 21. Available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id732.html (see p. 11).

10. 10 Kristian Petersen, Interpreting Islam in China: Pilgrimage, Scripture and Language in the Han Kitab (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Sachiko Murata, William Chittick, and Tu Weiming, The Sage Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic Thought in Confucian Terms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

11. 11 Michael Dillion, China’s Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement, and Sects (New York: Routledge, 1999), 31; Leslie, Integration of Muslim Minorities, 29 (p. 15 in PDF).

12. 12 David Atwill, “Blinkered Visions: Islamic Identity, Hui Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873,” Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 4 (2003): 1079–1108; Lipman, Familiar Strangers.

13. 13 Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864–1877 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).

14. 14 Yee Lak Elliot Lee, “Muslims as ‘Hui’ in Late Imperial and Republican China. A Historical Reconsideration of Social Differentiation and Identity Construction,” Historical Social Research 44, no. 22 (2019): 226–63, at 251.

15. 15 Magnus Fiskesjö, “Rescuing the Empire,” 25.

16. 16 Benno Weiner, The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 15.

17. 17 Thomas Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011).

18. 18 Xiaowei Zang, Ethnicity in China (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 22–23.

19. 19 James Leibold, “Han Chinese Reactions to Preferential Minority Education in the PRC,” in Multicultural Education in China: Integration, Adaptation, and Resistance, ed. by James Leibold and Chen Yangbin (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014): 299–319; Barry Sautman, “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4, nos. 1–2 (1998): 86–118; Zang, Ethnicity, 44–52.

20. 20 James Leibold, “Planting the Seed: Ethnic Diversity in Xi Jinping’s New Era of Cultural Nationalism,” China Brief 19, no. 22 (December 31, 2019): https://jamestown.org/program/planting-the-seed-ethnic-policy-in-xi-jinpings-new-era-of-cultural-nationalism/.

21. 21 “Wushi ‘qiwu’ shijian chuli jinzhan: xingju 718 ren pibu 83” [The handling of Ürümchi’s ‘7–5’ incident is making progress: 718 people have been arrested; 83 people have been detained], Reuters, August 4, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/idCNCHINA-249320090805; “Amnesty Challenged China on Xinjiang Riot Accounts,” BBC News, July 2, 2010 https://www.bbc.com/news/10491758.

22. 22 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” International Security 44, no. 3 (Winter 2019/20): 9–47, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00368.

23. 23 Xi Jinping quoted in Mao Weihua and Cui Jia, “New Xinjiang Regulation Aims to Prevent Extremism,” China Daily, March 31, 2017: “misrepresents religious teachings to incite hatred, foments discrimination, and advocates violence.” The regulations further stipulate that it is unlawful to (1) disseminate extremist ideas, (2) force others to participate in religious activities, (3) interfere with weddings and funerals with extremism, (4) remove or refuse radio transmissions and television broadcasts, (5) broaden the use of the category “halal” beyond food and refuse non-halal brands, (6) force others to veil or wear extremist symbols, (7) withdraw children from state-schooling, (8) print or download extremist material and (9) engage in other forms of extremist speech or behaviour; People’s Government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, “Xinjiang Weiwu’er zizhiqu qu jiduanzhuyihua tiaoli” [Regulations on Extremism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region], March 30, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20190405162901/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2017/03/30/128831.html.

24. 24 People’s Government of China, “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification,” China Law Translate, March 30, 2017, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-regulation-on-de-extremification/.

25. 25 Jessica Batke, “Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions in Xinjiang’s Camps Come From?” ChinaFile, January 8, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figure-detentions-xinjiangs-camps-come.

26. 26 Lily Kuo, “From Denial to Pride: How China Changed Its Language on Xinjiang’s Camps,” The Guardian, October 21, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/from-denial-to-pride-how-china-changed-its-language-on-xinjiangs-camps.

27. 27 Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing,” ChinaFile, October 24, 2018, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang.

28. 28 For a discussion on the transformation of the physical home, see Timothy Grose, “If You Don’t Know, Just Learn: Chinese Housing and the Transformation of Uyghur Domestic Space,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 44, no. 11 (2020): 2052–73.

29. 29 On local or Indigenous understandings of “family,” see Rune Steenberg, “Transforming Houses: The Changing Concept of the House in Kashgar,” Internationales Asienforum 45, nos. 1–2 (2014): 171–91.

30. 30 I am grateful to Darren Byler for helping me to develop my interpretation of this metaphor.

31. 31 Cristina Cesàro, “Consuming Identities and Resistance Among Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang,” Inner Asia 2, no. 2 (2000): 225–38; Timothy Grose, Negotiating Inseparability in China: The Xinjiang Class and the Dynamics of Uyghur Identity (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019); James Leibold and Xiaodan Deng, “Segregated Diversity: Uyghur Residential Patterns in Xinjiang, China,” in Inside Xinjiang: Space Place and Power in China’s Muslim Far Northwest, edited by Anna Hayes and Michael Clarke (New York: Routledge, 2016), 122–48; Joanne Smith Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

32. 32 Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered.”

33. 33 Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered”; “Xinjiang 11 wan gangu zhigong yao yu jinceng qunzhong jie dui renqin, mei liang yue jianmian yici” [One hundred ten thousand Xinjiang cadres and workers will become relatives with the masses and meet once every two months], Fankong faxuesheng zhi you, October 17, 2016, https://archive.ph/JndUX; Sun Xiuling and Ma Li, “‘Fanghuiju’: Zhu cun gongzuo shi dang zhongyang zhijiang fanglue zai Xinjiang de weida Shijian,” Xinjiang Shehui Kexue (2018): 158.

34. 34 Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered.”

35. 35 For the uncovered government reports, see “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” Human Rights Watch, May 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region#; for the number of visits work teams conduct, see “Xinjiang Heshou: ‘Si tong’ gongzuo changtaihua yi shigan fuwu qunzhong” [Normalization of the ‘Four Commons’ Work in Hoshut County, Xinjiang Serves the Masses with Steadfast Work], Sina, November 20, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-11-20/doc-ifynwnty5703055.shtml; and for the duration of the visits, see “Xinjiang Wensu xian: lizu xin qidian, shuxie xin shidai de xin dajuan” [Xinjiang Wensu County: Establishing a New Starting Point, Composing a New Answer for the New Era], Yixian jujiao [Focus Line], March 2, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180730161140/http://www.fzjdv.com/news/minsheng/2018-03-02/21251.html.

36. 36 See Matei Candea and Giovanni da Col, “The Return to Hospitality,” in “The Return to Hospitality: Strangers, Guests, and Ambiguous Encounters,” special issue, edited by Matei Candea and Giovanni da Col, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18, no. S1 (2012): S6–S12; Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Julian Pitt-Rivers, “The Law of Hospitality,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2, no. 1 (2012): 501–17, at 504 (originally published 1977).

37. 37 “Si tong” “si song” huodong: gongzuo shouce [Four Common, Four Gifts: A Work Manual], 2018, https://livingotherwise.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/%E2%80%9C%E5%9B%9B%E5%90%8C%E2%80%9D%E4%B8%89%E9%80%81%E6%B4%BB%E5%8A%A8%E6%89%8B%E5%86%8C.pdf.

38. 38 Kashi shi lingjuli [Zero Distance Kashgar], “Dang jian zhi chuang: Kashi shi zhashi kaizhan ‘si song’ gongzuo ning minxin ju minli” [A Window into Party Building: Kashgar City Thoroughly Carried out the ‘Four Gifts’ Work], August 23, 2018, http://www.sohu.com/a/245108985_340216.

39. 39 “Ruhe jiejue shequ renhu zoufang ‘mennanjin’ de wenti?” [How does one resolve the issue of visiting ‘reluctant households?’], Fangminqing, huiminsheng, juminxin huodong: baiwen [Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Bring Together the Hearts of the People: One Hundred Questions] (Ürümchi: Xinjiang Weiwu’er zizhi qu neibu ziliao zhun yinzheng, 2015): 34–35.

40. 40 Chen Xuanbo. Azihan yi nian: zhu cun riji [One year in Azihan: A Diary from the Village] (Ürümchi: Xinjiang Qingshaonian chubanshe, 2015): 25.

41. 41 Fanghuiju, Personal Diary, March 3, 2018.

42. 42 Tashiku’ergan lingjuli [Zero Distance Tashkurgan], “‘Si tong,’ ‘si song’ ganbu xinsi xi, song shang jingxi xian zhenqing” [Four Commons, Four Gifts: Cadres are caring and send surprise to show their true feelings], January 26, 2018, http://archive.ph/eNeuF.

43. 43 Xinjiang lüyou guanfang wang [Xinjiang Tourism Bureau], “Shenru kaizhan ‘si tong’ ‘si song’ huodong gezu qunzhong xinjin qing nong qin ru yijia” [Thoroughly carry out the ‘Four Commons,’ ‘Four Gifts’ Campaign so people from all ethnic groups feel like family], February 21, 2018, http://zw.xinjiangtour.gov.cn/info/1201/54139.htm.

44. 44 Mayfair Meihui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1994), 68. Regarding the various kinds of gifts, see Darren Byler, “‘Uyghurs Are So Bad’: Chinese Dinner Table Politics in Xinjiang,” SupChina, June 3, 2020, https://supchina.com/2020/06/03/uyghurs-are-so-bad-chinese-dinner-table-politics-in-xinjiang/ (rice); Xinjiang Gongqing Tuan [Communist Youth League of Xinjiang], “Qinqing: jiu zai yi zhang kangzhuo, yi zhan taideng! Zizhuqu tuanwei ganbu jieqin zhouze ji” [Kindness in a table and a lamp: Notes on a week of bonds with the Autonomous Region’s Communist Youth League Committee], December 13, 2017, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FSjScHZ9c1LuZThGkG3cag (furniture); Shihezi University, Zhu 51 tuan 20 lian fanghuiju gongzuo zu jiang liubai yu jian yiwu song dao kunnan qunzhong shou zhong [Fanghuiju Work Team 51 Company 20 offered over 600 pieces of clothing to the impoverished masses], May 5, 2015, http://web.archive.org/web/20200811220308/http://www.shzu.edu.cn/d6/9c/c2a54940/page.psp (clothing): and Huozhou Shuili [Huozhou Water Conservation Bureau], “‘Fanghuiju’ ying minxin cunmin song jinqi biao xieyi” [Fanghuiju wins the hearts of the people; villagers send jinqi pennants in gratitude], July 25, 2017, https://m.sohu.com/a/159993510_99919052 (school supplies).

45. 45 Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets 70.

46. 46 Jie Yang, “Song wennuan, ‘sending warmth’: Unemployment, New Urban Poverty, and the Affective State in China,” Ethnography 14, no. 1 (2013): 104–25.

47. 47 Xinjiang Gongqing Tuan [Communist Youth League of Xinjiang], “Qinqing.”

48. 48 Jie Yang, “Song wennuan”; Jennifer Pan, Welfare for Autocrats: How Social Assistance in China Cares for its Rulers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

49. 49 Pitt-Rivers, “The Law of Hospitality,” 515.

50. 50 Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered.”

51. 51 Fanghuiju zuofang shouce jianyi ban [A Simplified Handbook for Fanghuiju Visits], “Baohu jiating jiben qingkuang dengji biao” [Registration Form for a Family’s Basic Situation], July 2, 2018, https://wenku.baidu.com/view/cdaff634fd4ffe4733687e21af45b307e871f9a1.html.

52. 52 In Xinjiang, the “targeted population” (Ch. Zhongdian renkou) includes the so-call “five grades” (Ch. Wuji) and “10 types of people” (Ch. Shi lei renyuan). “Five grades” people include those who: (1) pose a real threat to society; (2) have a tendency (Ch. Qingxiang) to possess a real threat to society; (3) are ideologically stubborn (Ch. Wanggu); (4) are ideologically or emotionally unstable; and (5) common persons. Meanwhile, the “10 types of people” referred to those individuals who: (1) engaged in “three evil forces” groups but did not commit a crime; (2) harboured (Ch. Baobi), organized, or funded terrorist activities, but have not been convicted of a crime; (3) committed acts that threatened national security, but were already released from prison; (4) engaged in activities that threaten state security, including released criminals who had committed common crimes; (5) engaged in crimes against state security; (6) disseminated (on the Internet or otherwise) opinions (Ch. Yanlun) about ethnic separatism and religious extremism; (7) took advantage of social disorder to create rumours that influence social order; (8) engaged in “illegal religious activities” such as delivering unsanctioned khutbah, or sermons, organized religious gatherings, and operated or attended private religious schools; (9) printed, sold, distributed, or transported illegal religious articles, especially those who are repeat offenders; (10) and expressed dissatisfaction with society and may pose a threat to national security or others. See: Timothy Grose, “‘Once Their Mental State is Healthy, They Will be Able to Live Happily in Society’: How China’s Government Conflates Uighur Identity with Mental Illness.” ChinaFile, August 2, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/once-their-mental-state-healthy-they-will-be-able-live-happily-society.

53. 53 Chen Xuanbo, “Azihan yi nian: zhu cun riji,” 29.

54. 54 “‘Fanghuiju’ huodong shuangyu yingzhiyinghui 100 ju” [Fanghuiju Campaign’s One Hundred Bilingual Sentences One Should Know], https://web.archive.org/web/20190409014807/http://www.yczg.gov.cn/html/xzzx/2014-12-8/1412819623010157.html.

55. 55 Naiyu Cha, “Witness to Discrimination: Confessions of a Han Chinese from Xinjiang,” Amnesty International, June 16, 2020; Timothy Grose, Negotiating Inseparability, 32, 38, 42–43, 48.

56. 56 Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered.”

57. 57 Tanner Greer, “48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp,” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/13/48-ways-to-get-sent-to-a-chinese-concentration-camp/.

58. 58 “Si tong” “si song” huodong: gongzuo shouce, 2018. https://tinyurl.com/yefywaxb.

59. 59 Fanghuiju, Personal Diary, March 3, 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180907120056/http://snapshot.sogoucdn.com/websnapshot?ie=utf8&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.zhealot.com%2F&did=c5d74e009483daee-7046a302e3b4bd3b-babe56109596c2f18721b63a0c631762&k=c184bef35831d0fde6638cb19790f4d8&encodedQuery=&query=www.zhealot.com&&p=40040100&dp=1&w=01020400&m=0&st=0.

60. 60 Sean Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs,” Central Asian Studies 50, no. 2 (2018): 232–58.

61. 61 Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

62. 62 For a general reference to political ideology work, see Henry He, Dictionary of Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China (New York: Routledge, 2015). See also Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship.

63. 63 Ieva Zake, “The Construction of National(ist) Subject: Applying Ideas of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucaut to Nationalism,” Social Thought and Research 25, nos. 1–2 (2002): 217–46.

64. 64 Pishan Xian Lingjuli [Zero Distance Guma], “Fanghuiju: Lizu ‘Zhouyi shengguoqi ting xuanjiang’ cheng changtai” [Fanghuiju: Establish the norm of making Mondays for flag-raising ceremonies and lectures], February 20, 2017, https://freewechat.com/a/MzA5MDc1NDA1Mg==/2651371825/3; “Kashi 180 yu wan qunzhong changtaihua canjia zhouyi shengguoqi xuanjiang ganen jiaoyu guodong” [In Kashgar, over 1.8 million people normalized Monday flag-raising ceremonies, lectures, and gratitude education], Xinjiang Ribao [Xinjiang Daily], May 2, 2019, http://web.archive.org/web/20180829100013/http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2017/0502/c186332-30120123.html; “Xinjiang Moyu Xian ‘san jucuo’ guifan zhouyi guoqi huodong” [Xinjiang’s Qaraqash County ‘three measures’ Standardize Monday Flag-Raising Activities], Haiwai Wang, April 5, 2017, http://web.archive.org/web/20191022003327/http://m.haiwainet.cn/middle/457197/2017/0405/content_30839769_1.html; “Xinjiang Tuoli Xian ‘si guifan’ zhuashi mei zhou shengqi xuanjiang huodong” [Xinjiang Toli County ‘four standardizations’ grasp hold of the Monday flag raising ceremonies], Sina, July 25, 2019, https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-07-25/doc-ifyihrwk2288371.shtml.

65. 65 Aketao lingjuli, “Fasheng lingjian: Aketao Xian jiceng, xuexiao chixu shenru kaizhan fasheng liangjian huodong” [Aqto Zero Distance: Vow Loyalty to the Party: Grassroots officials and schools in Aqto County continue to carry out in-depth loyalty activities], February 6, 2018, https://freewechat.com/a/MzAxMjE4NTMxNg==/2660433249/6.

66. 66 “Xinjiang Moyu Xian ‘san jucuo’ guifan zhouyi guoqi huodong” [Xinjiang’s Qaraqash County’s “three measures” standardizes Monday flag-raising activities], Haiwai Wang, April 5, 2017, www.haiwainet.cn/middle/457197/2017/0405/content_30839769_1.html; “Xinjiang Tuoli Xian”; Xinjiang Moyu Xian ‘san jucuo’ guifan zhouyi guoqi huodong.

67. 67 Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered”; “Xinjiang Tuoli Xian.”

68. 68 “Xinjiang Moyu xian.”

69. 69 Shanshan zuiyuan yi jiaren [Pishan County’s Farthest Relative], “Zhouyi shengguoqi” [Monday Flag Raising], May 6, 2019, https://www.sohu.com/a/312151631_120058016?spm=smpc.author.fd-d.169.1570197408649jg5zZSz.

70. 70 Lingjuli, “Fasheng lingjian.”

71. 71 Bazhou Lingjuli, “‘Fanghuiju’: ba zuizhenzuimei de zhufu he ganen xian gei zuguo muqin” [Dedicate the truest, most beautiful blessings and gratitude to the motherland], October 1, 2017, https://freewechat.com/a/MzAxNTE1NTQ5NQ==/2651724278/7.

72. 72 Pishan Xian Lingjuli, “Fanghuiju: Lizu.”

73. 73 Bazhou Lingjuli, “‘Fanghuiju’: ba zuizhenzuimei.”

74. 74 Laura Adams and Assel Rustemova, “Mass Spectacle and Styles of Governmentality in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 7 (2009): 1249–76.

75. 75 Stevan Harrell, “Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reactions to Them,” in Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, ed. Stevan Harrell (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995): 3–36.

76. 76 Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting.”

77. 77 Kashgar Zero Distance, “Dang jian zhi chuang.”

78. 78 Yecheng xiang zhengfu [Qaghiliq Government], “Yecheng xian hongjun xiaoxue ‘si tong si song’ lian ni wo, chuchu wennuan xian zhen qing” [Qaghiliq County Red Army Elementary School ‘Four Commons,’ ‘Four Gifts’ Connects You and Me, Everywhere is Warm and True], March 4, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20190408221757/http://www.yczg.gov.cn/html/xxdj/2018-3-5/1835110328913237.html.

79. 79 Xiaojiang you hua shuo [The little territory has something to say], “Chunjie tekan: yi shou ‘zhu cun xinqu’ chang chu bai yang hecun xinnian xin qixiang” [Chinese New Year Special Edition: A New tune from the village sings of Baiyanghe’s New Environment], February 20, 2018, https://freewechat.com/a/MzIwNjI2MTc1Mw==/2651868744/1.

80. 80 Xinjiang minsheng [Xinjiang Livelihood], “Aheqi xian: Tie chunlian qie chuanghua wo he qinqie yi qi guo xinjian” [Aheqi County: Posting New Year’s Couplets and Cutting Window Decorations, Spending New Years with Relatives], February 1, 2019, http://item.xjmsw.cn/msgc/20190201/2019020155526.html.

81. 81 Shule Lingjuli [Yengisheher Zero Distance], “Ying xin chun: Shule gedi xiying xinchun jia jie” [Welcoming the New Year: Yengisheher Greets the Spring Festival], February 2, 2019, https://www.sohu.com/a/293095032_120056188?spm=smpc.author.fd-d.732.1568518575976vfPTxGf.

82. 82 Xinjiang fanghuiju, “Piao xuan: Chunjie li de ‘zui mei shunjian” [Vote: The Most Beautiful Moment of the Spring Festival], February 22, 2018, https://freewechat.com/a/MzUyMzA4MTYwMg==/2247494460/3.

83. 83 Xinjiang Geziti. February 8, 2019. P. 4; Xinjiang Minsheng, February 1, 2019; “Aheqi Xian”; Xiaojiang you hua shuo. February 20, 2018; “Chunjie tekan”; Yaxin Wang [I Yaxin]. February 28, 2019; “Jinnian chun jie, women zhe yang guo” [Here is how we celebrate this New Year’s] https://web.archive.org/web/20191029160912/http://www.iyaxin.com/content/201802/28/c218479.html.

84. 84 Xinjiang Gongcheng Xueyuan [Xinjiang Institute of Technology], “Jiajia huhu tie chunlian: honghong huohuo guo da nian” [Everyone Posts New Year’s Couplets and Celebrates as Splendid New Year], February 16, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20191029161002/https://www.wowodx.com/xinjiang/xinjianggongchengxueyuan/xjgcxy/eab22a3bd9a34e56aa4233b9f3c30969.html.

85. 85 Yaxin Wang, “Jinnian chun jie, women zhe yang guo;” Xinjiang fanghuiju, “Zhe ge chunjie, lingdaomen bijiao mang” [This Spring Festival the leaders are busy], February 16, 2018, https://freewechat.com/a/MzUyMzA4MTYwMg==/2247494347/2.

86. 86 Ürümchi lingjuli [Zero Distance Ürümchi]. December 22, 2017. “Jieqin zhou: xiaoxiao jiaozi qingyi nong tuanjie fulu yi jiaqin” [Family Week: Tiny Dumplings Offer Affection to Unite and Prosper the Family], December 22, 2017, http://www.sohu.com/a/212224142_169127.

87. 87 Cesàro, “Consuming Identities”; Maris Boyd Gillette, Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and Consumption Among Urban Chinese Muslims (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).

88. 88 Darren Byler, “Violent Paternalism: On the Banality of Uyghur Unfreedom,” Asian Pacific Journal 16, no. 24 (2018): 11.

89. 89 Darren Byler and Timothy Grose, “China’s Surveillance Laboratory,” Dissent, October 31, 2018, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/chinas-surveillance-laboratory.

90. 90 John Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.”

91. 91 Benno Weiner, The Chinese, 11–16; cf. Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Charles Tilly, “How Empires End,” in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, ed. Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 1–11.

92. 92 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy, Adopted May 31, 1984, http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/13/content_1207139.htm.