CHAPTER TWO


Post-Secondary Education and the Apprenticeship Training System

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you will be able to:

      Explain the role of post-secondary education and apprenticeship training in the Canadian training system.

      Describe how funding and governance arrangements affect access to, control of, and benefit from training.

      Identify the hidden curriculum in K-12 and post-secondary education.

As we saw in Chapter 1, many stakeholders criticize the Canadian training system for providing too few workers with the skills that employers require. This critique is most often levelled at the post-secondary education system. For example, workers may be termed “overeducated but underqualified,” thereby suggesting that there is a gap between formal education and the skills required by work. Business leaders often use this critique to advocate for greater business involvement in or control over PSE. For example, according to Tom Jenkins, chair of OpenText Corporation and co-chair of the Business Council of Canada’s Business/Higher Education Roundtable,

New technologies, disruptive innovation, demographic shifts and intense global competition for talent are quickly raising skill requirements and changing expectations for new graduates. To ensure our next generation can compete and succeed in the 21st century knowledge economy, we must take concrete steps towards a system in which Canadian companies and institutions are more efficiently and effectively connected.1

Proposals for improving PSE graduates’ ability to “compete and succeed” include mandatory work-experience programs for all college and university students to “bridge the gap between the skills industries need and what the workforce offers.”2 These recommendations frame PSE as primarily labour-market training, thereby marginalizing its social and cultural contributions. Government programs often reinforce this framing of PSE. For example, British Columbia’s EducationPlannerBC is an online tool aimed at high school students. It integrates career planning, labour-market information, and the PSE application process and thereby constructs PSE mainly as a pathway to employment.3

Employer assertions that PSE fails to provide students with useful vocational skills helps reinforce the belief that there is a skills shortage among Canadian workers. Although the notion that there is a significant and persistent skills shortage is widely promoted by employers, this narrative is demonstrably false. While acknowledging that there are periodic mismatches between the demand for and supply of workers with specific skill sets (such as in the skilled trades), David Livingstone and his colleagues demonstrate that the employment-related knowledge and skills of Canada’s labour force exceeds the capacity of employers to provide jobs needing those skills.4 This phenomenon of underemployment—wherein the KSAs of workers are underutilized in their jobs—reveals a skills surplus. Underemployment is particularly pronounced for recent immigrants, people of colour, and persons with disabilities.

There are several explanations for underemployment. On the supply side, the number and proportion of workers with PSE has risen significantly over time. Worker participation in ongoing, informal education is also high, although, as noted in Chapter 1, it is uneven. On the demand side, employers have deskilled some jobs, including, for instance, by reducing workers’ opportunity to make decisions about what to do and how to do it. Not surprisingly, underemployment is less common among corporate executives, professionals, and managers and more common among industrial and service workers. Employers’ tendency to use credentials as selection tools for jobs (even though jobs may not require workers to utilize all of the skills developed during PSE) may further contribute to underemployment.5

As we consider questions of access, control, and benefit in post-secondary education, it is important to keep in mind that the continued currency of the “overeducated but underqualified” narrative serves the interests of employers in two ways. First, it suggests that the declining economic fortunes of workers can be remedied through skill training. Essentially, this narrative shifts blame for dissatisfying and precarious work onto workers and absolves employers of responsibility for the consequences of their job-design decisions. This false attribution of responsibility is a part of a broader “blame the worker” narrative that appears in other contexts, such as workplace injury prevention. Second, the skills-shortage narrative suggests that workers and taxpayers should pay for additional training, because they will be the primary beneficiaries of it. In reality, the employer’s prescription of “more training” will further flood an already loose labour market, thereby allowing employers to decrease the wages of skilled workers.

This chapter begins with a brief examination of the role of primary and secondary education in setting the stage for labour-market training. We then turn our attention to the PSE system in Canada. Post-secondary education is the largest component of the Canadian training system, with approximately 2 million students enrolled annually. Among the most interesting trends evident in PSE is the continued influence of gender-based occupational segregation on who takes which programs. A similar pattern is evident in the Canadian apprenticeship system, which provides workplace training in skilled trades and occupations.

Primary and Secondary Education in Canada

Primary and secondary education (hereafter the “K-12 system”) is not normally discussed as part of the Canadian training system. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 1, employers often seek to influence the K-12 curriculum (such as by demanding that computer training begin in kindergarten). One government response to these kinds of demands is the introduction of work-experience and apprenticeship programs that connect (usually high school) students with the labour market. For example, apprenticeship programs—such as the Ontario Youth Apprenticeship Program—make it possible for students to complete high school while simultaneously working towards a trade certification.6

These programs aside, the K-12 system makes two main contributions to labour-market training. First, and most obviously, schools teach (most) students basic reading, writing, and computational skills. These skills are required for most jobs, and most subsequent labour-market training programs assume basic numeracy and literacy. Second, and less obviously, schools instill into students attitudes, ideas, habits, and expectations that employers find useful. This latter contribution to the training system is often referred to as the hidden curriculum of schooling. The term “hidden” can be a bit misleading. This process is not hidden in the sense that it is a secret conspiracy. Rather, this curriculum is hidden in plain sight because it the accepted norm.7

Think back to your own K-12 experience. It likely entailed attending a school five days per week for seven hours a day. In the classroom, the teacher determined what happened, for how long, and what behaviour was acceptable. Students were rewarded for carefully following directions and were punished for disrupting the work of others. Punishment was applied via an amalgam of social pressure, loss of privileges, suspensions, and expulsion. Your performance was periodically assessed using assignments and tests, although you may have noticed that some students—perhaps those who were deemed “good” (by virtue of their behaviour or because they belonged to a particular identity group)—often received better grades than students who were “bad,” regardless of their actual respective performances.

These structures and processes closely mirror those of a traditional workplace. In this way, the school system teaches future workers that their role is to be punctual, obedient, and diligent—characteristics that most employers desire in workers. The K-12 system also teaches students to expect limited discretion in what they do during the day and when and how they do it. Students learn that deviations from “the rules” will result in punishment. Students also learn that who they are can affect how they are treated and that their gender, heritage, and class can affect what they can expect in life.8 The lengthy process of acculturation that students face normalizes employers’ authority in the workplace, including employers’ “right” to determine what training is required, who should receive it, and how it should be delivered.

Post-Secondary Education in Canada

As noted in Chapter 1, Canada’s constitution vests authority over education in provincial and territorial governments. Each Canadian province and territory operates a publicly funded post-secondary education system. These public PSE institutions include colleges, universities, and technical institutes as well as various specialized institutes, such as colleges of art and design. Most provinces and territories also allow for (and in some cases regulate) private PSE institutions. Some private institutions are for-profit institutions that provide career training. Other private institutions have a religious or cultural focus. Study at these institutions typically results in the awarding of a credential. Box 2.1 outlines the most commonly available PSE credentials.

Public PSE institutions derive revenue from four main sources: operating and capital grants provided by their provincial or territorial government, student tuition and fees, research-related grants, and various other income streams (including campus services and private philanthropy). While each province and territory runs its own system, the federal government provides a significant portion of funding through the Canada Social Transfer. Overall, Canadian governments spend more than $12 billion on PSE each year. Public funding accounts for approximately 52 per cent of PSE revenue, a percentage that has been in long-term decline.9 This decline in funding has been offset mostly by increases in student tuition and fees.

While it can be difficult to make international comparisons due to differences in PSE arrangements and terminology, among the sixteen OECD countries to which Canada is most similar, Canada ranks second in terms of the percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) spent on PSE institutions (behind only the United States). Canadian institutions receive approximately 1.5 per cent of GDP as transfers from governments and 1.0 per cent of GDP from private sources (such as tuition fees), although there are significant interprovincial differences in the proportion of public and private funding.10

Post-secondary education is often subject to the blanket criticism that it fails to provide training that leads to jobs (e.g., “If it is higher education, why can’t you get hired?”). Setting aside the multiple aims of PSE, many PSE credentials do have a strong labour-market orientation, specifically aiming at preparing students for occupations. That said, as we’ll see in Chapter 4, the right to practise some occupations is contingent upon securing a licence from a professional regulatory organization.

Historical Development of PSE

Until the late nineteenth century, Canada’s post-secondary system was dominated by private, church-sponsored colleges. Enrollments were small, universities focused on educating political elites, and the relationships between provincial governments and individual institutions were varied.11 In 1906, Ontario’s Flavelle Commission recommended a bicameral governance system at the University of Toronto: the government would appoint a board of governors to manage the financial affairs of the university while an academic body (today variously called an academic senate or general faculties council) would set academic policy. This bicameral model of institutional governance was replicated as other provinces established and expanded universities.12

Following the Second World War, there was a significant expansion of enrollments, fuelled first by returning veterans. During the 1960s, most jurisdictions created new universities, and some jurisdictions supplemented existing technical institutes with colleges. Ontario opened stand-alone colleges offering three-year technical programs, while Alberta and British Columbia opened colleges offering vocational training and university transfer programs.13 As part of the Quiet Revolution, Québec’s unique system emerged, driven in part by a desire to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church over PSE. Colleges and technical institutes often operated with less autonomy than universities, although all PSE institutions were heavily dependent upon operating grants from their respective provincial or territorial governments. Over time, the distinctions between colleges and universities have started to blur in some jurisdictions.

In addition to its public colleges, universities, and technical institutes, Canada continues to have a variety of privately operated institutions. A small number of colleges and universities are affiliated with a religious denomination and may or may not receive public funding. There are also over 1,300 regulated career colleges that provide vocational training leading to a diploma or certificate to approximately 170,000 students per year. These institutions often charge significantly higher rates of tuition (due, in part, to the lack of public operating funds), offer compressed programs (when compared with public colleges), and have a lower rate of full-time employment among graduates.14 It is important to note that state regulation is focused on financially protecting students (should the institution suddenly close its doors) rather than on imposing any meaningful oversight over the quality, curriculum, or labour-market outcomes of these programs.

Cost and Access to PSE

In 2014–15, there were slightly more than 2 million Canadians enrolled in PSE (excluding apprentice programs). Many of these programs have clear linkages to the labour market (see Table 2.1). Students from families with high socio-economic status (SES) are more likely to attend PSE (specifically university) than students from families with middle and low socio-economic status. The perceived cost of PSE appears to be a significant factor that limits some students’ plans.15 This suggests that tuition and other costs are an important factor that controls access to PSE.

Table 2.1  PSE Students by Field of Study, 2014/15.

Note. Approximately 56% of all PSE students were female. While gender distribution by program broadly follows this average, there are a number of notable exceptions as set out in Figure 2.1.

Source: Statistics Canada, “Post-Secondary Enrolments, by Program Type, Credential Type, Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary Grouping (CIP_PG), Registration Status and Sex.”

Figure 2.1  Highly gendered fields of study. (Data from Statistics Canada, “Post-Secondary Enrolments, by Program Type, Credential Type, Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary Grouping [CIP_PG], Registration Status and Sex.”)

These gendered patterns in PSE broadly mirror the gender distribution in occupations. Gender-based occupational segregation has proven surprisingly stable despite significant increases in female educational achievement. For example, between 1991 and 2011, the percentage of female university graduates (aged 24 to 35) working as nurses and teachers was stable at approximately 20 per cent. Occupational segregation also appears more pronounced for workers who do not possess a university degree.16 As Box 2.2 shows, ethnicity and geography also affect access to PSE.

The cost of tuition, fees, and supplies affects who can access PSE. As noted in Box 2.2, students without a local PSE institution (or whose local institution does not offer the program they want) may also face costs associated with relocating. Over time, the cost of tuition in Canada has risen significantly. For example, students in degree programs in 2016–17 paid approximately 40 per cent more in tuition and compulsory fees than they would have ten years earlier.22 The rapid escalation of tuition fees began in the mid-1990s when the federal government reduced transfer payments to provincial governments. Provincial governments responded by reducing institutional operating grants.23 For example, Alberta reduced operating grants to public PSE institutions by 21 per cent between 1994 and 1997. Reducing public funding of PSE shifts the cost of the reproduction of labour power from employers and taxpayers to students and their families in the form of higher tuition fees.

Governments have sought to assist individuals to manage tuition costs in three main ways. Federal registered educational savings plans (RESPs) allow contributions made in the name of a minor to grow tax-deferred. The federal government also partially matches RESP contributions. Nevertheless, only about half of parents have opened RESPs, perhaps because many parents cannot afford to do so.24 Combined with differences in participation rates by SES, the limited uptake on RESPs suggests that tuition reinforces the intergenerational transfer of advantage and disadvantage: future workers whose parents are better off are more likely to be able to access PSE, which, in turn, provides them with access to higher-paying and more stable jobs.

Federal and provincial governments also operate various loan, scholarship, and bursary programs. Loans are sometimes framed as a way for students to “invest” in themselves in order to achieve better occupational outcomes. Between 2009 and 2014, the total value of federal loans owed rose from $12.3 billion to $15.7 billion.25 This data does not capture the value of loans provided by provincial or territorial governments or through private lenders. Students’ use of loans differ depending upon their SES. Both Canadian and US research suggests that students whose parents are in the highest income brackets are less likely than average to access loans, presumably drawing on family resources to defray tuition costs. Similarly, students whose parents are in the lowest income brackets are also less likely than average to access loans, perhaps suggesting debt aversion (at least for PSE costs). Middle-class students are the most likely to take on debt.26

Workers can also temporarily withdraw money from their Registered Retirement Savings Plans to fund full-time post-secondary education for themselves or their spouse or partner through the Lifelong Learning Plan (LLP). Such withdrawals are not considered income for tax purposes so long as they are repaid over time.27 The very small amount of research on LLP usage suggests very limited usage (<0.5 per cent of tax filers).28 While scholarships and bursaries are also a source of funding for post-secondary education, Canada ranks as one of the least generous OECD countries in terms of the overall dollar value of scholarships and bursaries available.29

On the surface, RESPs, LLPs, and student loans appear to ameliorate an important barrier to PSE attendance by providing students from middle and lower SES backgrounds with the opportunity to attend PSE. In this way, RESPs, LLPs, and student loans seemingly legitimize the transfer of PSE costs from taxpayers to individual students by maintaining the perception that ability (and not SES) is the key factor that determines PSE participation. The notion that access to PSE is based on intellectual merit sits uneasily with the fact that, despite the availability of RESPs, LLPs, and student loans, students from lower SES backgrounds still attend university at only half the rate of students from the highest SES background. This pattern indicates that RESPs, LLPs, and student loans only partly address the cost barriers. Legitimizing high tuition costs serves to reinforce the intergenerational transfer of advantage and disadvantage.

Admission requirements also affect who can access post-secondary education. Most PSE institutions have admission requirements, such as completion of specific prerequisite courses. Some programs of study may also have non-academic prerequisites (e.g., successful interview, prior work experience, medical fitness, criminal record check). When there are more applicants than spaces, an institution may prioritize applicants based upon some criteria (such as prior grades). These criteria reinforce the notion that access to PSE is based upon merit. It is worth considering whether there are systemic factors (e.g., bias based on age, gender, ethnicity, and class) that might limit certain groups from obtaining required prerequisites or influence how candidates are rated in more subjective screening methods, such as interviews.

Curricular Control of PSE

Who controls what is taught in PSE is a complicated question because control is exercised at several levels. Government and institutions jointly determine the suite of courses and programs offered by a PSE institution. The criteria governments use when assessing institutional proposals vary, but they broadly mirror those set out by British Columbia, including whether a proposed program “meets criteria related to the institution’s mandate and strategic plan, system consultation and coordination, labour market need and student demand.”30

In some cases, governments have sought to influence the creation or expansion of programs, ostensibly to better align programming with labour market needs. For example, during the 1990s, Alberta made available additional funding to institutions, provided the funding was used to expand enrollment in fields with (putatively) high labour-market demand. Alberta also created a new credential (the applied bachelor’s degree), which included a year of work experience. And the government sought to increase industry input into program design and delivery, in part by ensuring that employers numerically dominated institutional boards of governors.31

The regulatory power of government gives it significant high-level control over what is taught in PSE, especially given that governments also appoint most of the members of institutional boards of governors. This is not say that PSEs have no ability to act independently or advocate for policies that are in their interests. Rather, it simply acknowledges that the power of PSEs is, at least partly, circumscribed by the operation of their governance structures and their reliance upon government largesse. As noted above, governments have often used this power to try to align PSE offerings with the needs of the labour market. Things are not entirely one-sided, however. Faculty members at institutions also have significant power to shape curriculum. As a group, faculty members tend to dominate academic decision-making (in academic senates or general faculties councils), which includes establishing the focus, curriculum, and admission requirements for programs. Faculty members also have significant individual control over what is taught in their classrooms. An important limitation on that freedom can come from professional organizations that regulate some occupations (see Box 2.3).

The Benefits of Post-Secondary Education

The PSE system provides a number of benefits to different stakeholders. Workers with post-secondary education attain higher wages than those who do not complete PSE. Among PSE graduates, university graduates receive returns of 11.5 per cent (men) and 14.1 per cent (women) on every dollar they invest in PSE.32 Post-secondary graduates are also more likely to work full time and less likely to be unemployed, and these benefits increase as workers’ level of PSE increases.33 These effects vary by jurisdiction and other factors. For example, Indigenous people in Canada earn less than non-Indigenous people with the same qualifications.34

Post-secondary education is also associated with better health outcomes, likely because level of education is highly correlated with other employment factors (e.g., income, employment security, and working conditions) that contribute to health.35 Together, these positive outcomes of PSE bolster the narrative that training is workers’ responsibility (because they are the main beneficiaries), thereby excusing employers’ limited investment in training. Making individuals responsible for their own training is consistent with human capital theory as set out in Box 2.4.

The most obvious benefit of PSE for employers is that they have access to an educated workforce at relatively low cost (to the employers). Among similar OECD countries, Canada has the highest proportion of its labour force with a PSE credential, reflecting in part its extensive college system as well as its immigration policies.38 A second benefit of PSE is the maintenance of an oversupply of highly skilled workers. As noted above, the high level of underemployment among Canadian workers suggests that employers are not using the KSAs of the workforce. In this situation, maintaining the number of PSE graduates sustains a loose labour market. As we saw in Chapter 1, this puts downward pressure on wages in oversupplied occupations.

The state benefits from PSE in a number of ways. Post-secondary education is politically beneficial because institutions are sources of both regional prestige and increased economic activity. For example, Canada’s public colleges and universities reported total revenue of $37.4 billion in 2009, most of which was spent locally on employee salaries.39 The state also benefits from PSE because it contributes to production. Employers require a trained workforce in order to operate and, historically, the state has delivered much of that training through the K-12 and PSE systems.

Post-secondary education also contributes to social reproduction. For example, PSE reinforces the notion that jobs are allocated based upon candidates’ specific credentials rather than immutable personal characteristics or personal connections. This belief reinforces the idea that Canadian society is a meritocracy. This belief often rubs up against reality. For example, the significant gender segregation evident in some fields seems to cry out for explanation. One possible (albeit incorrect) explanation is that women are bad at math and men are bad at caring for others, and thus gender segregation is the outcome of merit-based hiring. A more plausible explanation is that there is some other factor (such as gender-based socialization and discrimination) at play.

The idea that society remains profoundly unjust for female workers is socially destabilizing: workers are less likely to support a system that distributes resources and rewards in a way that appears to be unfair. The idea that merit drives this distribution is more palatable than the notion that heritage, class, and gender do. Indeed, much of the structure of PSE—including admission criteria and competitive admission processes, the awarding and curving of grades, and high drop-out rates—reinforces the notion that PSE (and, more broadly, society) is a meritocracy. Reinforcing the view that society is a meritocracy may be the central lesson in the hidden curriculum of PSE.

The Apprenticeship System in Canada

Employers have routinely raised concerns about the availability of an adequate pool of skilled trades workers. Skilled trades workers (plumbers, chefs, electricians, etc.) are produced by Canada’s apprenticeship system. Historically, governments have also used immigration as a way to increase the supply of skilled tradespeople. This history of using immigration as a substitute for labour-market training is examined in Box 2.5 below. Current approaches to labour migration are discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.

An apprenticeship is a multi-year form of labour-market training that relies heavily on workplace training, supplemented by four to eight weeks of annual classroom instruction. An apprenticeship entails a fixed-term contract between an employer and an apprentice, wherein the employer provides wages and training in exchange for the apprentice’s labour. At the end of an apprenticeship, a worker may choose to take exams for their trade qualification (TQ) and, if successful, is often referred to as a “journeyperson” (or, historically, a “journeyman”).41

In keeping with the constitutional division of powers discussed in Chapter 1, each province and territory runs its own apprenticeship training system. Canada-wide, there are approximately 200 apprenticeable trades, although this number varies by jurisdiction. About three-quarters of these trades are found in the construction, manufacturing, and resource industries. Generally speaking, a government-appointed apprenticeship board provides advice to the government on apprenticeship matters. The apprenticeship board may also influence the membership of trade- or sector-specific advisory committees that help establish the curriculum of each trade or occupation.

As part of each provincial or territorial apprenticeship system, the government will designate certain trades and occupations as either compulsory or optional certification trades. Compulsory trades or occupations are those where employment is restricted to registered apprentices and journeypersons. By contrast, optional certification trades or occupations may be performed by anyone whom an employer deems to be competent to perform the work. Interprovincial labour mobility is aided by the Red Seal program, which allows qualified trades people in more than fifty trades to have their trade qualifications recognized in other provinces and territories, provided they pass examinations. Figure 2.2 illustrates the percentage of apprentices in each jurisdiction.

Apprenticeships are most common in the skilled trades (e.g., plumbing, electrical work) but also exist in food and service trades. In 2015 (the most recent year for which data is available), there were 453,543 registered apprentices in Canada. Table 2.2 outlines the distribution of apprentices by trade.

Figure 2.2  Percentage of apprentices by jurisdiction, 2015. (Data from Statistics Canada, “Registered Apprenticeship Training, by Sex and by Province and Territory.”)

Table 2.2  Apprentices by trade, 2015.

Source: Statistics Canada, “Registered Apprenticeship Training, Registrations, by Age Groups, Sex and Major Trade Groups.”

Approximately 46 per cent of apprentices were registered in only four trades, training as plumbers/pipefitters, electricians, carpenters, and automotive service technicians. Women represent 13.5 per cent of all registered apprentices. New apprenticeship registrations and completions generally rose between 2000 and 2013, although new registrations dropped slightly during the 2008 recession. Yet, over time, the number of completers who were issued trade qualifications remained static.42

Access to Apprenticeship

Employers exert almost complete control over access to the apprenticeship system. Would-be apprentices must secure a job with an employer who is prepared to both provide on-the-job training and release the apprentice for periodic classroom study. Apprenticeship enrollments rise and fall with the employment rate. During an economic boom, employers expand operations and will offer employment to apprentices. During a bust, apprentices may be unable to secure apprenticeships, resulting in high dropout rates. What this suggests is that the number of apprentices and, ultimately, the number of trade qualification holders are largely determined by employers’ (un)willingness to take on apprentices, rather than by the supply of potential apprentices.44

This boom-and-bust cycle of apprenticeship opportunities also suggests that employers are directly responsible for any shortage of skilled trades people. Even during a boom, only about 19 per cent of employers that hire workers in designated trades and occupations bother to train apprentices.45 That employers are responsible for the shortage of journeypersons and apprentices sits uneasily with the usual “skills shortage” recommendations of employers, who demand governments do more to channel young people into trades and, in the meantime, increase the supply of skilled foreign workers. No amount of recruiting among high school students will affect the supply of tradespeople if employers collectively offer too few apprenticeship opportunities.

Employers also constrain women’s access to apprenticeship. As noted above, only 13.5 per cent of registered apprentices in Canada are female, ranging from 2 per cent in Nunavut to 24 per cent in Ontario. As illustrated in figure 2.3, there is significant occupational segregation by gender in the trades. While there are a number of potential explanations for low female participation and gender segmentation, the direct and indirect behaviour of employers appears to be key. Female apprentices are much more likely than male apprentices to report discrimination by employers when seeking out a sponsor for their apprenticeships. Among those who completed their apprenticeship, 13 per cent of women (versus 1.3 per cent of men) reported hiring discrimination. Among female apprentices who had decided not to complete their apprenticeship, reports of discrimination are almost double that number.46

Female apprentices also report high levels of on-the-job harassment, a lack of facilities for women, and schedules and work practices that are more difficult for women to manage than for men—all factors that are within the control of employers.47 While we’ll return to the issue of gender-based discrimination in industries such as construction in Chapter 6, this evidence suggests that employer behaviours (and the behaviours that employers tolerate) profoundly shape women’s access to apprenticeship training.

Figure 2.3  Occupational segregation by gender in the trades. (Data from Statistics Canada, “Registered Apprenticeship Training, Registrations, by Age Groups, Sex and Major Trade Groups.”)

Curriculum Control of and Benefit from Apprenticeship

Employers exercise significant curricular control in apprenticeship systems. Apprentices spend between 85 and 90 per cent of their time in the workplace, and employers largely determine what on-the-job training they receive. Employers also sit on various committees that provide advice about (or determine) skill and competency standards for certification, course outlines, and what training is recognized towards certification. While there are other stakeholders in the system, employers are generally the most numerous and, combined with delivering on-the-job training, the most influential. This influence may reflect the most significant direct investment made by employers who train apprentices.

Not surprisingly, employers are also the greatest beneficiaries of the apprenticeship system, which provides employers with workers who have the KSAs that employers deem to be important. The low apprenticeship participation rate among employers suggests that there is a significant free-rider problem, whereby only one-fifth of firms carry much of the cost of training the journeypersons that all employers eventually hire. Workers also benefit from the apprenticeship system, which typically yield reasonably well-paying jobs. That said, there is a significant gendered effect. Relatively few women enroll in and complete apprenticeships. Those women who do participate in the apprenticeship system are clustered in the lowest-paid occupations and trades (e.g., hair styling, food services, child care).

Interestingly, older workers with prior labour-market experience are increasingly the beneficiaries of apprenticeships. In 2013, 53 per cent of new apprentices were over the age of 25, and the proportion of middle-aged apprentices is growing rapidly.48 The tendency of workers to enroll as apprentices later in their careers suggests that employer efforts to attract younger apprentices through work-experience programs in the K-12 sector may not be effective. Given the high rate of injury to apprentices in K-12 apprenticeship programs, limited apprenticeship uptake among K-12 students may be a positive outcome.49

Conclusion

Almost 2.5 million Canadians are enrolled in either a PSE program or an apprenticeship at any one time. For many of these learners, such a program will be the first and most significant instance of labour-market training in their working lives. The most obvious outcome of such training is an enhanced ability to secure well-paying and stable jobs (although that isn’t the outcome for every PSE graduate or journeyperson). This benefit is often used to justify high and escalating tuition costs—a cost-shifting policy that benefits employers and the state.

An important consequence of high tuition costs is uneven access to PSE. Despite state efforts to help workers and their families afford PSE, workers from lower SES families are less likely to enroll in PSE. A second issue around access is gender segregation by programs, which appears to replicate the gendered occupational segregation in the workforce. This is particularly pronounced in apprenticeships, where there are few women overall and these women are clustered in the lowest-paid trades. While employers continue to bemoan the existence of a skills shortage (particularly in the skilled trades), it is important to recognize that this skills-shortage narrative is false in two ways. First, evidence of underemployment suggests that there is, in fact, a surplus of skills in the workforce. And the shortage is actually found in jobs that allow workers to use the skills they possess. Second, where there may be sector-specific shortages (e.g., in the apprenticeable trades), the shortages often are the result of employers failing to do their part in training (e.g., hire apprentices).

The PSE and apprenticeship systems play a key role in the reproduction of labour power. In addition to teaching KSAs, there is a hidden curriculum in education systems. At the K-12 level, the hidden curriculum centres on teaching workers to be docile, obedient, and punctual, deferring to authority in all things. In PSE and apprenticeship, the hidden curriculum centres on perpetuating the myth that society is a meritocracy, wherein skill and hard work determine reward. While skill and hard work certainly play a role, emphasizing merit ignores that identity factors (age, gender, heritage, socio-economic status) often shape the options workers have and their success in the workplace.

Notes

1    Business Council of Canada. “Every University and College Student Should Have Access to Work-Integrated Learning.”

2    Ballantyne, “Move to Mandatory Work Experience for Ontario Students Requires Buy-in from Employers, Increased Resources for Schools.”

3    EducationPlannerBC, “Plan. Search. Apply.”

4    Livingstone, Education & Jobs.

5    Livingstone and Scholtz, “Contradictions of Labour Processes and Workers’ Use of Skills in Advanced Capitalist Economies.”

6    Taylor, Vocational Education in Canada.

7    Vallance, “Hiding the Hidden Curriculum.”

8    Anyon, “Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work.”

9    Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Education at a Glance 2016.

10  Lalonde and McKean, Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance.

11  Neatby, “The Historical Perspective.”

12  Jones, “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.”

13  Dennison and Gallagher, Canada’s Community Colleges.

14  Martin and MacLaine, The Role and Value of Private Career Colleges in Canada.

15  Looker and Lowe, “Post-Secondary Access and Student Financial Aid in Canada.”

16  Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté, “Changes in the Occupational Profile of Young Men and Women in Canada.”

17  Jones, “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.”

18  Statistics Canada, “The Educational Attainment of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada.”

19  Statistics Canada, “Education in Canada.”

20  Mendelson, Aboriginal Peoples and Post-Secondary Education in Canada.

21  Taylor and Steinhauer, “Evolving Constraints and Life ‘Choices.’”

22  Statistics Canada, “Tuition Fees for Degree Programs, 2016/17.”

23  Jones, “An Introduction to Higher Education in Canada.”

24  Marr, “The Tax-free Account that Canadian Parents Forgot About.”

25  Employment and Social Development Canada, “Statistical Review.”

26  Houle, “Disparities in Debt”; Tandem Social Research Consulting, Literature Review of Postsecondary Affordability in Canada.

27  Canada Revenue Agency, “Lifelong Learning Plan.”

28  Statistics Canada, “Canada’s Retirement Income Programs.”

29  Lalonde and McKean, Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance.

30  Government of British Columbia, “New Degree Programs.”

31  Barnetson and Boberg, “Resource Allocation and Public Policy in Alberta’s Postsecondary System.”

32  Moussaly-Segieh and Vaillancourt, “Extra Earning Power.”

33  Statistics Canada, “Labour Force Survey Estimates by Employment, Sex and Age Group.”

34  Pendakur and Pendakur, “Aboriginal Income Disparity in Canada.”

35  Mikkonen and Raphael, “Social Determinants of Health: The Canadian Facts.”

36  Bouchard, “Training and Work: Some Myths about Human Capital Theory.”

37  Ibid.

38  Lalonde and McKean, Canada’s Post-Secondary Education Performance.

39  Grant, “The Economic Impact of Post-secondary Education in Canada.”

40  Northern Alberta Institute of Technology, “We Are Essential.”

41  Sharpe and Gibson, “The Apprenticeship System in Canada.”

42  Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016 Report.”

43  Green and Green, “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy.”

44  Sharpe and Gibson, “The Apprenticeship System in Canada.”

45  Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016 Report.”

46  Arrowsmith, “Apprenticeship Analysis: Women and Apprenticeship in Canada.”

47  Laryea and Medu, “National Apprenticeship Survey 2007.”

48  Canadian Apprenticeship Training Forum, “Apprenticeship in Canada: 2016 Report.”

49  Raykov and Taylor, “Health and Safety for Canadian Youth in Trades.”