Introduction
The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul was published in 1964 by Alfred A. Knopf. According to a statement by the publisher, it came to its attention from Aldous Huxley via the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Although Huxley is best known for his novel Brave New World, he was a public intellectual with a lifelong concern about technological-human relationships. In response to the centre’s interest in European works on technology, Huxley recommended Ellul’s 1954 La technique. On the recommendation of the centre and Robert K. Merton, Knopf had a later edition of the book translated into English by John Wilkinson and published under the new title since the French word technique does not translate well into English.
The term “technique” was confusing to English-speaking people when reading the translation. What Ellul means by the term is the whole gamut of rational standardized procedures (means) for reaching goals (ends), including all forms of mechanical, electronic, and now biological technologies; formal organizational structures such as bureaucracies; and rational, goal-oriented procedures and mindsets. In this work, “technique” refers to the overall phenomena, “technology” refers to machines and other physical technologies, and “organization” (alternatively “bureaucracy”) refers to the social structural aspects of technique. In addition, I will use Max Weber’s term “rationalization” (formal rationality, technical thinking, or goal-oriented rationality) when referring to goal-oriented procedures and thought processes. When discussing the overall phenomena, I will often reference the three types as a reminder that technique (material technologies, organizational practices, and goal-oriented rationality) is a multi-dimensional concept. Finally, Ellul’s use of “technological society” refers to societies in which technique is dominant and its breadth and depth expanding.
Merton wrote the foreword to the English version of the book, calling it a “comprehensive and forceful social philosophy of our technical civilization” (1964, p. v). For those who do not know of Merton, he was a pre-eminent sociologist of the 20th century. Although he perceived shortcomings in the work (as do I), he defended the book against charges of being a modern-day Luddite tract or a sociological apocalyptic work. According to Merton, Ellul’s substantial contribution is an examination of the role of technique in society, the forces behind its development, and its impacts on individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. Merton agreed with Ellul that we live in a civilization in which technique extends into all areas of social life: “It is a civilization committed to the quest for continually improved means to carelessly examined ends” (p. vi). Merton also agreed with Ellul that the expansion of technique is inevitable and impersonal. It is the result not of the machinations of evil corporations or states but of a social evolutionary process that favours centralization, planning, productivity, and efficiency.
It should be clear that Ellul is firmly within the Weberian sociological tradition. Like his contemporaries, C. Wright Mills and Norbert Elias, Ellul extends Weber’s rationalization theory. However, Ellul carries it much further than anyone, drawing out the full implications of technique in all of its ramifications, functions, and dysfunctions. Moreover, like Marx, who could appreciate the efficacy of capitalism in developing industry, Ellul is explicit in his remarks on the power, efficiency, and results of technical means. However, he recognizes the real downsides as well.
My second reason for focusing on Ellul’s theory is that it has stood the test of time. In the 70-plus years since Ellul first wrote and published the original work (1955), technology has significantly advanced in mechanical, chemical, electronic, and biological systems. Governmental, corporate, and non-governmental organizations have multiplied, their interrelationships have grown tremendously, and goal-oriented rational behaviour has invaded nearly every aspect of our lives. The ever more powerful coordination and control techniques (electronic and organizational) have developed and will continue to do so. Ellul is a brilliant sociologist and uses his theory to make accurate observations about the character and types of propaganda (psycho-social techniques) and predictions of its growth in democratic and authoritarian societies. For example, he accurately forecasts the polarization of political parties and the rise of political agitators in the United States and warns of the dangers of media concentration.
This book reviews four sociological works in which Ellul develops his macro-theory of technique. A detailed review of his theory is necessary because he is an insightful sociologist and deserves a much wider audience than he now has. He can sometimes be a problematic and recursive writer, though at other times he can be eloquent. Some of his phrases are unclear, and occasionally his examples are dated or obscure. I attempt in this book to clarify, focus, and update his insights by citing specific portions of texts to anchor my interpretations.
Mixed Reviews
Jacques Ellul is a guru-like cult figure to some and a neo-Luddite to others. A sample of several reviews of his major works will give the reader a range of opinions on him. Andrew Nikiforuk (2018), in a retrospective review of The Technological Society, calls Ellul the Karl Marx of the 20th century, asserting that he predicted the “chaotic tyranny” of technological society. Nikiforuk compares Ellul’s analysis of technique’s effects on politics, economics, and social life in the 20th century with Marx’s analysis of capitalism in the 19th century. Ellul’s dense 500-page book outlines technique’s power and domination over social life and how technical innovation affects every aspect of human culture. Nikiforuk argues that “Ellul didn’t regard technology as inherently evil; he just recognized that it was a self-augmenting force that engineered the world on its terms. Machines, whether mechanical or digital, aren’t interested in truth, beauty, or justice. Their goal is to make the world a more efficient place for more machines” (paras. 28–29). Technology, Ellul writes, engineers all that it touches to material that it can manipulate and master, including human beings.
For example, the human technique of propaganda enables people to integrate into technological society and adapt to the constant disruption caused by technical change. “Technology disrupts and then disrupts again with unforeseen consequences, requiring more techniques to solve the problems caused by the latest innovations” (Nikiforuk, 2018, para. 30). Ellul’s book, Nikiforuk writes, should be read as a wake-up call that our freedom is on the line and that we must not abdicate our responsibilities by leading trivial lives. We must be conscious of which technologies we should bring into our lives and communities. “Read him,” Nikiforuk says. “He remains the most revolutionary, prophetic and dangerous voice of this or any century” (para. 83).
Howard Falk (1965) has very different views of the book and criticized it on two fronts. Like many readers, he objects to the view that technique has escaped human control, a key assertion of the book. Also like many others, Falk finds the book far too pessimistic (see also Norberg, 1971; Vance, 1968; Vecchio, 1967). He also wrongly asserts that Ellul’s whole argument relies on the assertion that social organization is centred on industrial production—countering (wrongly) that the United States was in the beginning of a post-industrial era, in which industrial production is no longer of central importance. However, his charge of pessimism regarding technique escaping human control resonates.
Rupert Hall’s (1965) review also hits on the common theme that Ellul is far too pessimistic regarding the workings and futures of technological societies, pointing out that he does not counterbalance his critique of technique with all of the wonderful things that technological society provides. Hall claims that Ellul cannot see a single redeeming feature of technique, heaping up evidence against it but citing no evidence in its favour. However, as Ellul consistently points out, this is the hook of technology: the benefits always come with the costs. The Technological Society is about the costs of the technical system’s convenience, wealth, and benefits. I should also point out that the benefits of technology were the rage when Ellul wrote his opus. Was it necessary to repeat the wonders?
Calling Ellul a “prophet of disaster” while offering no plausible means for avoiding it, Hall asserts that Ellul ascribes too much power to technique and not enough to faith in the human spirit: “All great scientists and virtually all creative artists and philosophers have possessed this faith in humanity; so have all great social reformers. Ellul appears to be without it. His analysis leaves him with no basis for rational optimism. His diabolus ex machina—Technique—is greater than man” (1965, p. 128). The label of pessimism is one that Ellul cannot quickly shake.
John Coleman, reviewing The Technological Society retrospectively in 2012, calls it “a dazzling phenomenology of the technical state of mind” (para. 2). “It is an almost harrowing inspection of the rise of modern technological society since the Industrial Revolution, which allows little leeway for effective agency to control its excesses. It is a book that is almost deterministic and, even, fatalistic” (para. 3). This lack of adequate human agency in Ellul’s theory, Coleman believes, is the major flaw in the analysis. He asserts that, like many sociologists, Ellul carries the constraining powers of social structures too far and that humans can withdraw their consent, individually or collectively, as happens in revolutionary times. “So, I take Ellul’s analysis quite seriously about the kind of dilemmas inherent in our technological society and within our minds. Although, I assume his work would read differently if his sociology were more informed by those who juxtapose structure and agency and know that there are elements of human agency (e.g., acceptance, acquiescence, willful cooperation) in every social structure” (para. 13).
Charges of Pessimism
The charges of pessimism in Ellul’s work need to be explored further. Despite his denials, there is more than a grain of truth to them. Perhaps because of the criticism that Ellul received with the original French edition (1954), by the time he wrote the foreword to the revised American edition of The Technological Society, he was aware that many readers would take his writing as that of a pessimistic technophobe. He rejects the label, stating that he is not by nature a pessimist, nor has his sociology led him to such a conclusion. Turning the tables on those who would cast such aspersions, Ellul asks critics to consider their own values that would trigger such judgments. He writes that anyone bringing to the analysis beliefs such as “Progress is always positive,” “Man is good,” and “Man has always overcome challenges” (1964, pp. xxvii–xxviii) will label it as incorrect and pessimistic. However, the accuracy of the analysis can only be judged factually. Did Ellul analyze facts objectively? Are there substantial omissions in the data? Do the analyses warrant his conclusions? The charge of pessimism should not negate his work, for it is not the role of a critic’s metaphysical assumptions to challenge factual analyses.
Another reason for critics’ charge of pessimism is the claim that Ellul describes a rigorous determinism in the development and spread of technique, which denies individual actors’ free will. Free will is a much debated and open question in the social sciences, and Ellul’s analyses neither affirm nor deny its existence; the issue does not enter his argument. Ellul is a sociologist, and his analyses are of social structures and forces, focusing on the groups and organizations that make up a society. At this level of analysis, individual actions and beliefs “do not here and now exert any influence on social, political, or economic mechanisms” (p. xxviii). As a sociologist, he asserts that a social aspect of reality is independent of the individuals who live their lives and make their decisions within a society. Social reality, though changing and influenced by individuals, pre-exists them and largely determines their beliefs, values, and actions. In The Technological Society and other books and articles, Ellul makes the case that technique is a significant and growing social force within technological societies and has a dramatic impact on social, political, and economic structures as well as the characters of the individuals who make up that society.
However, Ellul does not claim that individuals in technological societies are more determined by those societies than individuals who lived in premodern eras. Humanity has always been primarily determined by the prevailing social order: prohibitions, beliefs, lifestyles, traditions, and values. It is an illusion, he writes, to think that we are free because such traditional social forces—inculcated by institutions such as family, community, and religion—have lost much of their power. Instead, our conditioning is now much more deliberate and calculated, emanating from schools, workplaces, governments, and supranational agencies and promulgated by mass and social media. Conditioning based on technique is designed and continually honed to be ever more efficient and effective; it promotes conformity to the status quo, individual adaptation to technique in all areas of social life, and integration into the social classes and organizations that make up technological civilization.
Ellul bases the probable evolutionary trajectory of technological society on the contention that social, economic, and political phenomena are interrelated and interdependent. Recent history, say the beginning of the modern era around 1500 CE, reveals a pattern of the evolution of these institutions, a pattern that can be extrapolated into the future. This pattern is what Ellul reveals in his writings on technological societies. He describes the growth of technique in various areas of social life—production, politics, management, science, police work, education, propaganda, and the like—and, based on these observations, devises a theory of technique, the causes of its growth, and its impacts on political, economic, and social institutions as well as individuals. It is a theory that parallels Weber’s rationalization theory (see Chapter 1). The technological society that Ellul describes in his work is as it existed at the time of writing and “its probable evolution” (p. xxx). As a macro-social theory, his perspective helps us to understand how large-scale social structures and dynamics influence individual behaviour. It is a framework that allows researchers to analyze systemic factors affecting people’s lives. Fortunately, we have over 70 years of history since Ellul made his forecasts and can readily judge his theory’s accuracy and power to date.
A social theorist cannot foresee external factors that can disrupt the social evolutionary process, such as a general nuclear war, the collapse of civilization because of a massive asteroid strike, or the Second Coming of Christ. Aside from these cataclysmic events, Ellul insists that there is also room for human action; in fact, he contends that it is our only hope to maintain any semblance of human freedom. Suppose that we all live a trivial existence and continue to adapt without thinking about the changes wrought by technique. In that case, Ellul contends, the social evolutionary process that he has described will continue unabated, “and the determinants will be transformed into inevitabilities” (1964, p. xxix). However, such individual actions and external factors are beyond his analysis and cannot be foreseen.
For similar reasons, Ellul offers no solutions to the social, economic, or political problems caused by technique, and this lack has added to his reputation as a pessimist. He argues that no solutions are apparent in the existing social order that he analyzes. He does not claim that solutions will never be found, but he perceives “no breach in the system of technical necessity” (p. xxxi). Consequently, any social solution that he could offer, he believes, would be idealistic, dishonest, and guided by wishful thinking. Ellul is a social theorist in the tradition of Weber (also frequently charged with being pessimistic). His role is first to study technique and its progression within socio-cultural systems and then to generalize from specifics to a macro-social theory of the phenomena. It is necessary to understand the phenomena thoroughly before proceeding to social action, and Ellul takes that important first step.
However, he does not advocate waiting for politicians, economists, philosophers, sociologists, and others to address the problems caused by the proliferation of techniques. Each of us, he says, “must seek ways of resisting and transcending technological determinants”(1964, p. xxxii) in our professions and social and family relationships. According to Ellul, we are surrounded by physical, biological, social, and psychological forces and constraints. Freedom consists of overcoming and transcending these constraints. It is not a matter of being determined or free but a dialectic in which we take action to overcome constraints, “and . . . this act is freedom.” Freedom is not a thing “but a prize continually to be won.” By acknowledging the nature of the technological phenomenon and the extent to which it constrains human thought and action, we take the first step in confronting “the blind mechanisms as a conscious being” (1964, p. xxxiii). Ellul is not advocating getting rid of technology but “resisting and transcending” it. He is unsure of how such resistance can be achieved, which I will explore more fully after examining the full extent of the problem.
Social Movements
Proposing that individuals act to control techniques (physical technologies, organizational practices, and goal-oriented rationalities) in their lives can be an effective personal strategy. People react and adapt to changes in their environments. As I demonstrate in Chapter 1, Ellul lived his life resisting techniques’ oversized and expanding role in his immediate environment. He participated in several social movements both before and after the Second World War. He claimed to recognize the social movements in the late 1960s as a hopeful sign that there might be a countervailing force to the spread of technique (1981, pp. 74–76).
Since the 1960s, we have seen the rise of social movements that seek to address issues such as the environmental costs of burning fossil fuels, the extinction of species, and the destruction of habitat on land and in water. Other social movements have arisen, reacting to the carnage caused by urban sprawl, deforestation, strip mining, fracking, and pollution of seas, lakes, and rivers. Still other movements address social justice issues, the rise of authoritarianism, and the upheaval of economic life. However, these social movement organizations invariably deal with these problems by advocating the development of further techniques: the employment of physical technologies, regulations, organization, surveillance, planning, education, and propaganda. Ellul demonstrates that such social movements have the positive function of taking some of the rough edges off technological society and furthering the integration and adaptation of more individuals into the social order, but they do not challenge technique; in fact, they, too, are carriers of it.
Marx made a compelling analysis of capitalism and its periodic crises. However, he let his hopes contrive the deus ex machina of a proletarian revolt to establish socialism, peace, and prosperity. Ellul’s analysis of technological society does not allow Ellul to be so free with his hope for change. There might not be a revolution by the proletariat or any other class that will solve the problems of technique. The Iron Cage (another reference to Weber) has too many attractions. Rather than revolution, such social movements point to a dialectical process in dealing with technique. Elite resistance to fundamental change that threatens their power and control is formidable. Their power is greatly enhanced by their positions atop economic and government structures and their institutional mastery of technique. Breaking the elite grip on power and control will be achieved, if at all, one issue at a time and constantly repeated (see Chapter 4). Such social action will advance humanity’s interests, whether wholly successful or incremental in achieving its goals. Moreover, that might be the most effective action that we can take regarding the future of technological society.
Social Evolution
Ellul posits that the social evolutionary process has been one of ever more technical advances for more than a millennium. We adapt to our ever-changing social and physical environments through technique. The fact that this evolutionary trend might lead us to a totalitarian future abhorrent to most people is not a cause to dismiss the theory. It should be considered and tested against all available evidence. It is a macro-social theory, in line with the theories of Weber and other sociologists influenced by rationalization theory. Perhaps Ellul overstated the case (a common fault of authors and sociologists), perhaps he is too pessimistic or does not allow for human agency (another common fault of the group), or perhaps subsequent events will prove the theory wrong. The test of a macro-social theory is not the optimism or pessimism that it projects but how accurately it reflects social reality.
Ellul’s theory of technique’s origin, transmission, and expansion into all areas of social life has been verified further since his writings by the enlargement and centralization of the industrial base and structural institutions of technological societies. These institutions are focused on efficiency, productivity, and power. Human techniques of psychosocial manipulation, as well as physical technologies for surveillance and tracking of individuals, have been developed and sharpened in the 21st century. These advances in technique greatly enhance the institutional coordination and control of those subject to their authority. Ellul explains much of what is going on in our technological society—automation, detailed division of labour, alienation, drug abuse, polarization, and fascism—all developments that seem to have intensified since his writings. Again, he is a remarkable sociologist.