“11. State Apologies and the Rehumanization of Refugee, Indigenous, and Ethnic Minority Groups” in “Resisting the Dehumanization of Refugees”
Chapter 11 State Apologies and the Rehumanization of Refugee, Indigenous, and Ethnic Minority Groups
Reza Hasmath, Benjamin Ho, and Solomon Kay-Reid
It is quite frequently the case that when nation-states apologize for their past transgressions, the outcome of the apology is to redeem the apologizer—that is, the state. In fact, research suggests that the general focus of an apology is to rehumanize the apologizer after they have committed a transgression and have temporarily been “Otherized” in the eyes of the victimized party or wider community (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002; Marrus 2007). In effect, by apologizing, the transgressor is attempting to redeem themselves while restoring their trustworthiness. This strategy is clearly exemplified in Bakan’s chapter, whereby she analyzes Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau’s apology for turning away Jewish refugees who were fleeing persecution in Europe just before and during World War II.
In some rare cases, however, state apologies are employed to rehumanize the apologized party—the refugee, Indigenous, or ethnic minority group(s). That is to say, in these instances, the apology serves to bring voice and recognition to the grievances suffered by the victimized party, even perhaps psychologically healing the aggrieved individuals or social group(s) affected. Examples of apologies that at least partially address rehumanizing the apologized group include Canada’s apologies to Chinese Canadian immigrants for the Head Tax and Indigenous groups for residential schools or South Africa’s apologies to non-white ethnic groups for apartheid. This is not to imply that such apologies served no other purpose; in most cases, they did, but they are noteworthy for their focus on the apologized party.
In contrast, other state apologies—for example, Germany’s role in the Holocaust—have primarily been about atonement for the nation-state. Similar to acts of ritual purification, the apology serves to cleanse the state and the people it represents and, in the process, rehumanize them. Moreover, in these cases, the grievances and lingering trauma of the victimized party often remain insufficiently addressed as to meaningfully benefit them socially and psychologically (Halpern and Weinstein 2004).
To best evaluate this discord between apologies aimed at rehumanizing the apologizer instead of the apologized party, this chapter bridges insights from the literature about apologies, which has focused on how apologies function, and the literature about truth and reconciliation, which has focused on rehumanization. It poses the following analytical queries: How are apologies different toward refugee, Indigenous, or ethnic minority group(s) when the goal is to rehumanize the apologized party and not the apologizer? What happens to the apologizer in such apologies? What can be learned by jointly considering the apology and truth and reconciliation literature on how to make an effective apology? This chapter will show that while the function of an apology is often to rehumanize the apologizer, paradoxically, an apology is really only effective if the intent is to rehumanize the victim, the apologized party.
Framework
The conventional and popular understanding of apologies, inclusive of state apologies, is fairly straightforward. An individual, group, or organization commits a transgression, breaching the accepted current social norms or even laws of their community; in doing so, trust is broken between the transgressor and the aggrieved party. Moreover, in some cases, the transgressor’s social standing becomes diminished in the eyes of their community, potentially to the point of being ostracized. In an effort to repair this broken trust and potentially restore their reputation for trustworthy behaviour in the present day, the transgressor will apologize for their past actions.
One way to conceptualize the efficacy of apologies is through signalling theory. Signalling theory explains how information between different parties in cases of information asymmetry is communicated (or signalled) and how that signal is interpreted (Connelly et al. 2011). In our context, a transgressor’s apology signals their fitness to be restored to the in-group. More acutely, apologies signal two things: they are an acknowledgement of shared values and norms that the transgressor violated through prior action and an implicit or explicit promise that in the future the behaviour will be different (Ho 2012; Ohtsubo et al. 2012).
Not all apologies are created equal. But what makes an effective apology, which properly signals what it is intending to the receiver, and what makes these signals costly to the apologizer? There is a significant degree of consensus in the literature regarding the bare minimum elements for an apology to be effective. As Marrus (2007, 79) suggests, there are four key elements for an apology to be deemed complete:
- 1. An acknowledgement of a wrong committed, including the harm that it caused.
- 2. An acceptance of responsibility for having committed the wrong.
- 3. An expression of regret or remorse both for the harm and for having committed the wrong.
- 4. A commitment, explicit or implicit, to reparation and when, appropriate, to non-repetition of the wrong.
Much of the literature on apologies builds upon these essential four elements. Diers-Lawson and Pang (2016), drawing up the ethics of care and atonement theory, suggest an ethical apology framework (EAF), which could be used to categorize apologies as ethical or not. The EAF includes all four of the aforementioned components of a complete apology but also proposes that for an apology to be ethical, it must be delivered early, evolve over time to reflect changes in the situation, be consistent across sources and contexts, listen to those affected, and expressly seek forgiveness.
Research in political science has emphasized the dangers that state apologies can have on the domestic political situation. According to Mihai (2013), discussing the state’s past injustices can be particularly concerning for those people who strongly identify with their nationality. These individuals are likely to object to the state apologizing, and their criticism can often undermine the effectiveness of the apology in the eyes of the victimized community, as was the case with Japan’s apologies to China and South Korea. Wohl et al.’s (2013) research helps further reinforce this. He found that in the aftermath of a state apology, the victimized community tends to expect better treatment from the dominant community. For this reason, Mihai (2013, 203) suggests that “broadening the basis of support for the apology is crucial both in terms of its democratic legitimacy—the more support for the apology, the more legitimate the apology—but also in terms of its effectiveness.” To resolve this problem, the state can demonstrate how apologizing actually has a positive impact on the national image. For instance, in the case of liberal democracies, Mihai argues, “Living up to the principles that define ‘us’ as liberal democrats implies acknowledging wrongs done to specific groups among ‘us.’ ‘We’ are the best that ‘we’ can be when ‘we’ look to our fundamental normative commitments and take responsibility for past suffering” (215).
This is similar to Blatz, Schumann, and Ross’s (2009) codification of praising the majority and the present system.
Ho (2012) provides a way to frame these guidelines for best practices through an economic taxonomy of apologies, where the apology’s efficacy is measured by the cost associated with it. That is, the costlier the signal, the more effective it is likely to be. He distinguishes among five types of apologies: tangible cost apologies, a commitment to improved conduct, a loss of status, an admission of incompetence, buck-passing apologies, and partial apologies.
Tangible cost apologies are those that either include some type of material restitution or expose the transgressor to potential material liability. These apologies can include monetary reparations to the victims of past transgressions or, in some cases, their family members. Most commonly, reparations occur in state apologies, such as those given to the living victims of residential schooling in Canada. Sometimes, monetary reparations can also comprise funds spent on community-wide social projects, such as those devoted to educating the public about a past transgression. Tangible costs can further include the potential for exposing the apologizer to legal liability in a lawsuit. In effect, the apology can be viewed as an admittance of wrongdoing and could be used by the apologizer to seek financial compensation in court.
The apologizer promising to do better in the future can serve as an extremely effective signal; implicitly, the apologizer is accepting that they will be held to a higher standard compared to those who did not apologize (Ho 2012). That is, a promise to do better ups the ante for the apologizer in the future, and if they transgress again, they can expect to be punished more, relative to those who have not apologized. This can apply not just to the apologizer’s exact transgression but to all future transgressions affecting the same group (Wohl, Hornsey, and Philpot 2011). For this reason, promises to do better can be highly risky for state institutions if they cannot guarantee that transgressions will not reoccur. This form of apology overlaps with two of the elements found in state apologies by Blatz, Schumann, and Ross (2009). That is, in praising the present system and disassociating the past injustice from the present system, there is an implication that the past transgression could not occur now and will not occur in the future.
All full apologies—differentiated from partial/weak apologies, which will be discussed next—contain some element of status loss as well. By its nature, apologizing is an admittance of fault that an action performed was incorrect. Clearly, there is a range to this behaviour; someone voluntarily lowering themselves by admitting to “being such an idiot” or statements of a similar nature represent a greater loss of status than merely apologizing (Ho 2012). Chaudhry and Loewenstein (2019) suggest there is a warmth-competence trade-off; in effect, apologies increase perceptions of warmth but decrease perceptions of competence. This loss of status can prove to be a costly signal, especially for those groups who tend to put a premium on status (Ho 2012). There is also overlap here with Mihai’s (2013) work in that state apologies can represent a loss of national status, impacting those who have strong affinities with their nationality.
Evidently, all the signals identified by Ho (2012) can be incorporated into an apology; however, it is analytically useful to delineate them. Weak apologies are those that do not contain a cost associated with them; instead, the apologizer makes excuses for the transgression. By shifting the blame onto external circumstances, the apologizer avoids the penalties associated with the previously mentioned apologies, which has obvious appeal; however, it greatly weakens the apology. Partial apologies are a type of weak apology in which empathy is expressed for the victimized party, but the transgressor does not accept responsibility. They are also less effective—for example, phrases such as “I am sorry you are upset by what I did” or “I am sorry you feel that way.” These partial apologies can come across as shifting responsibility onto the victimized party for their negative reaction to the transgressor’s action.
In the next section, these differing apology taxonomies will be used to explore a series of case studies. We divide these case studies between apologies that focused on the interests of the apologizer and those that focused on rehumanizing the apologized party.
Partial Apologies
Germany and the Holocaust
No conversation on state apologies would be complete without at least some discussion of German apologies for the Holocaust committed during the Second World War. As Marrus (2007, 88) aptly states, “One can hardly speak of the role of guilt and national obligation, and the consequent collective atonement, compensation, memorization, commemoration, reparation and healing, without thinking of the great impact of Holocaust motifs and reparative programs.” Furthermore, this process was not limited to Germany but rather occurred in nearly all territories that had some connection with the decimation of European Jews. It even extends beyond states, with churches and corporations also engaged in the process of atonement for their complicity in the Holocaust. However, qualitatively, the majority of Holocaust apologies—even among nation-states that were complicit in doing little to assist European Jewish refugees, as discussed in Bakan’s chapter—exist somewhere between those that are focused on restoring the transgressor to trustworthiness and those intending to rehumanize the apologizer. This is notably evident in examining one of the most famous apologies: Willy Brandt’s Kniefall.
On December 7, 1970, West German chancellor Willy Brandt, while visiting Warsaw, fell to his knees in front of the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, remaining completely still on the wet floor for over half a minute (Borneman 2005). This apology—known thereafter in German as Kniefall—was the first time a German leader had so explicitly admitted responsibility and guilt for Jewish and Polish suffering. It is this recognition that Germany now shared social norms with their victims, norms that the Nazis had abhorrently violated, that makes this apology about more than just restoring the state’s trustworthiness. Nevertheless, as Borneman (2005, 62) contends, this apology was primarily an act that was necessary as a “symbolic purification ritual” to transform Germany from a “criminal nation to a rehabilitated member of the international community.” Put differently, it was a necessary action to restore the state to a position of trust. Brandt’s Kniefall provides additional insights into apologies that are important to consider.
One of the unique features of Brandt’s apology is that it was entirely unspoken. Therefore, it does not comprise the aforementioned four necessary elements of a complete apology, at least not explicitly. Brandt’s apology was effective insofar as it helped restore Germany’s relations with the Nazi regime’s former victims, particularly Poland and wider Eastern Europe. Here a signalling taxonomy is informative. While Brandt’s apology was silent, it did implicitly contain the costly signal of status loss; by its very nature, kneeling reduces an individual’s status in the eyes of witnesses. Moreover, the reaction of some German conservatives at home, who questioned his patriotism and whether he should have knelt at all, signalled that Brandt paid a price for his actions. Brandt’s apology also provides evidence for the role that the individual representative can have in making an inter-group apology effective. In this case, Brandt’s apology carried a particular sense of sincerity and conviction, considering he had spent much of his life actively resisting the Nazi regime, often at substantial risk to his own safety (Borneman 2005). It is entirely possible that such an apology would have been far less effective coming from someone else. Lastly, it must be noted, however, that concerns over the reality that antisemitism is returning to Germany have become widespread, with a number of people within Germany seriously questioning the country’s culture of Holocaust remembrance and atonement (Staudenmaier 2019; Weinthal 2014).
Rehumanizing Apologies
South Africa and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
South Africa represents, perhaps, the most informative case study on the process of rehumanization, apologizing, reconciliation, and peace building in the wake of severe and prolonged injustice during apartheid (1948–94). This policy ensured that South Africa’s various ethnic groups would be dominated politically, economically, and socially by a small white population. With the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, one of the most pertinent questions was how to move forward: What was the best way to heal the grievous wounds of the past in a way that allowed for a new democratic, peaceful, multi-ethnic South Africa? The choice was made to embark on an approach of restorative justice in the form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This process invited victims who were recognized as having undergone gross human rights violations to supply statements about their experiences. The perpetrators of these acts were also able to give testimony and petition for amnesty from both criminal and civil prosecution for politically motivated crimes. It was through this process that the architects of the TRC hoped to heal the deep wounds of the past and rehumanize non-white ethnic groups who had suffered under apartheid (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002; Vora and Vora 2004). Despite these good intentions, the actual successes of the TRC are far more muddled, with examples of both deep failures and some successes.
One of the worst days of the TRC occurred when Frederik Willem de Klerk apologized to the victims of apartheid on behalf of the National Party. Speaking to the TRC (1997), de Klerk, responding to assertions expressing the contrary, insisted that he had previously apologized for apartheid and offered this statement:
Let me place once and for all a renewed apology on record. Apartheid was wrong. I apologise in my capacity as leader of the National Party to the millions of South Africans who suffered the wrenching disruption of forced removals in respect of their homes, businesses and land. Who over the years suffered the shame of being arrested for pass law offences. Who over the decades and indeed centuries suffered the indignities and humiliation of racial discrimination. Who for a long time were prevented from exercising their full democratic rights in the land of their birth. Who were unable to achieve their full potential because of job reservation. And who in any other way suffered as a result of discriminatory legislation and policies. This renewed apology is offered in a spirit of true repentance, in full knowledge of the tremendous harm that apartheid has done to millions of South Africans.
On the face of it, this apology was profound and sincere, and it should have satisfied even the most exacting of standards. However, during follow-up questioning by TRC staff and commissioners, de Klerk undermined his apology so abominably that the African National Congress issued a statement rejecting it with “contempt” (Govier and Verwoerd 2002). Throughout the entirety of the follow-up, he persistently denied any knowledge of or responsibility for the prevalence of severe mistreatment and torture committed by state agents, especially against anti-apartheid activists. While he claimed to regret the murder, torture, rape, and abduction of anti-apartheid activists, he did not apologize for them, as he believed that he, and by extension the National Party government, was not responsible. He also failed to commit to and was vague in discussing any “practical” or material amends to the victims of apartheid (Govier and Verwoerd 2002). Put another way, de Klerk was unwilling to use costly signals and instead offered a partial apology that did not take responsibility for these heinous transgressions. Additionally, unlike Brandt, whose personal story lent sincerity to his apology, de Klerk had been a member of the National Party since 1972 and had long been a strong proponent of apartheid. These factors made his apology seem insincere at best and very far from a “spirit of true repentance.” In reviewing de Klerk’s apology, Govier and Verwoerd (2002, 78) contend that “he wanted to take a position of pride (we ended apartheid), not shame (we admit responsibility for gross violations of human rights).” As such, he wanted to rehumanize himself and the National Party but did not attempt to rehumanize the victims of apartheid.
The apology from de Klerk was further undermined because his mandate to speak on behalf of the National Party was extremely dubious. As Govier and Verwoerd (2002, 78) note, “Members of the older (pretransition) party such as former South African President P. W. Botha were not present and had not authorized de Klerk to speak for them. Botha publicly criticized some of de Klerk’s statements, immediately revealing that his mandate as a spokesperson was questionable.” While serving as a particularly stark example, this reflects a common difficulty in state apologies. That is to say, inter-group apologies are complicated, since groups contain numerous autonomous agents who are capable of acting in distinct ways, even actively opposing the apology or the group receiving the apology. This can, unsurprisingly, serve to compromise the apology in the eyes of the recipient group and raise questions about how committed to reconciliation the perpetrating group truly is.
The TRC itself had noble intentions, and evidence suggests that South Africans, especially the Xhosa, found it was successful in establishing the truth of what happened, an important aspect of rehumanization. Moreover, for some individual members of the TRC, the process proved cathartic and helped provide psychological healing (Avruch 2010). Nonetheless, this was by no means a universal experience; many found that reopening the wounds of the past caused further psychological damage (Vora and Vora 2004). This was especially problematic, as there was a substantial lack of support and mental health resources available to the victims who testified, a common problem in most TRCs (Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi 2016). Furthermore, the TRC was not successful at achieving inter-group reconciliation between white and non-white ethnic groups, although interpersonal reconciliation was achieved for some people (see, e.g., Chapman 2007).
Several explanations can be offered to explain this failure. The simplest explanation is that reconciliation is hard and can take generations to occur, and as such, it is no surprise the TRC was unsuccessful at achieving it. Chapman (2007) criticizes the TRC for trying to reduce inter-group reconciliation between white and non-white ethnic groups to the interpersonal and suggests that significantly more attention needed to be paid to the institutions and regimes behind apartheid, such as the police force (eerily similar echoes can be heard in present-day multi-ethnic jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, and Australia). Critics have also noted that many of the perpetrators, similarly to de Klerk, offered weak apologies, believing they personally had committed no wrong; made excuses for what had occurred; or did not apologize at all (Avruch 2010). Nevertheless, victims were still pressed by the commission to offer forgiveness. Lastly, by embedding amnesty inside the TRC, the cost for perpetrators to apologize was significantly lowered, potentially reducing the efficacy of their apologies.
Costly signalling theory can help illuminate what Tavuchis (1991) classically terms the paradox of apologies. Apologies need to be costly in order to rehumanize the apologizer. However, an apology made with this benefit to the apologizer in mind effectively lowers the cost of the apology, making the apology less credible and thus less effective. While the function of an apology may be to rehumanize the apologizer, an apology that appears to be motivated by restoring the apologizer’s status is likely to fail. A good apology has to be focused on the victim. As a consequence, apologies with a focus on rehumanizing the apologized party may be more beneficial for the apologizer as well. We turn to examples of such apologies next.
Canada and Residential Schools
On June 11, 2008, the then Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper apologized to the victims of residential schools. Residential schooling in Canada has a long and tragic history, beginning in the early 1600s with the opening of the first boarding schools. However, it was not until the Indian Act of 1876—which made Indigenous peoples wards of the state and the Canadian federal government responsible for their education—that the system truly took effect. From 1867 to 1983, nearly one-third of all Indigenous children, approximately 150,000 in total, were taken from their families and communities and sent to these schools, which were funded by the state and presided over by the churches (Anderson 2012). These schools were devised to sever the connection of Indigenous children to their cultural identity and traditional practices, which were considered inferior to those of European settlers, and to educate them in “civilized ways.” This has become epitomized in Canadian discourse by the phrase “killing the Indian in the child.” Beyond the significant damage caused by removing children from their families and denying them access to their languages and cultural practices, students also experienced physical and sexual abuse. Claes and Clifton (1998, 24) note that “brutal and arbitrary punishment was a daily feature of school life; public beatings and humiliations, head shaving, and being kept in locked closets on bread and water for days are described.” Many of the students who graduated from these schools had trouble reintegrating into their own communities and yet continued to be victimized by the prevalent prejudicial attitudes in white Canadian society. In effect, they existed in limbo, trapped between two worlds yet fitting into neither.
The impact of this system continues to reverberate throughout Canada’s Indigenous communities, with research suggesting that it perpetuates higher rates of alcoholism, drug addiction, domestic violence, mental illness, and suicide among Indigenous people in Canada (see Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman 2014). While complaints and allegations were made, the voices of those who suffered were neither heard nor accepted at the national level until the 1990s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP; Anderson 2012). The government of the day, led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, responded to RCAP on January 7, 1998, with an announcement of an Indigenous action plan and the reading of a statement of reconciliation by Minister Jane Stewart (Nobles 2008). According to Anderson (2012, 573), many Indigenous Canadians found this response entirely insufficient: “The healing fund did not include all survivors, the statement’s language was fairly general, but perhaps most importantly, the symbolism of the event indicated the government was not taking the issue seriously enough.” In particular, Chrétien himself was not the one to offer the apology, nor did he attend the lunchtime ceremony where Stewart, a junior minister, read it out. This action can be easily understood as one that is trying to restore the state to trustworthiness rather than rehumanizing the victims. Nearly a decade later, the government of Canada, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, took a very different approach in addressing the legacy of residential schooling in Canada.
In 2006, the government announced the approval of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA), which included five components: (1) the Common Experience Payment (CEP), (2) the Independent Assessment Process (IAP), (3) a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, (4) commemoration, and (5) health and healing services. Under the CEP, the IRSSA was to provide CAD 1.9 billion (~USD 1.51 billion) to former living members of recognized residential schools; this was intended to holistically address the experiences of attending residential schooling (Crown–Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs 2019). The IAP was a claimant-based, out-of-court process that addressed specific claims of sexual abuse, serious physical abuse, and other psychologically damaging acts suffered at Indian residential schools. As of 2017, CAD 3.1 billion (~USD 2.46 billion) has been paid out through the IAP. The IRSSA also included CAD 60 million (~USD 47.57 million) in funds for a five-year-long Truth and Reconciliation Commission and CAD 145 million (~USD 114.96 million) for commemoration and healing events.
The actual apology was offered in the Canadian Parliament. Its tone and substance were directly informed by letters from Indigenous groups such as the Assembly of First Nations and through meetings with survivors of residential schools. This can be understood as an important process in giving voice to the grievances of those who suffered by directly allowing them to have influence in the tenor of the apology. Further, the Harper government “found” a loophole that allowed Indigenous leaders to directly respond to the apology in the Canadian Parliament rather than at a press conference as the government originally planned. Harper’s apology was effusive, praising the strength of Indigenous communities and apologizing profoundly for the government’s role in the residential school system as well as the damage it caused, and continues to cause, to Indigenous communities. Moreover, he directly referenced how the TRC was an “opportunity to educate all Canadians” on residential schools (Canadian Press 2008). This is important, as misconceptions about residential schools were widespread in Canadian society, and many in Canada, prior to Harper’s apology, questioned the need for Canada to apologize at all (Gray 2011). In principle, by shining a bright light on the suffering experienced by survivors of Indian residential schools and giving Indigenous peoples a platform to respond, Harper’s apology not only provided greater public awareness of the issue; it also helped build a bridge of greater empathy between Canada and Indigenous people. Put another way, the intentions of Harper’s apology and the TRC can be seen as an attempt to rehumanize Indigenous people in the eyes of Canada’s general public.
Harper’s apology contained all four of the elements Marrus (2007) identified as being necessary for a complete apology. Further, using Ho’s (2012) taxonomy, the apology contains costly signals. The tangible cost is evident, as the apology followed on the backdrop of the substantive IRSSA funding. Further, while not expressly promising to not repeat the act, Harper implicitly did so through indicative comments such as this: “There is no place in Canada for the attitudes that inspired the Indian residential schools’ system to ever again prevail” (Canadian Press 2008). Furthermore, Harper experienced some status loss through apologizing; foremost, he praised his political rival and ideological opposite Jack Layton, leader of the New Democrat Party, for having spent the last year and a half persuading him to apologize. Praising a rival leader in this manner shocked many in the Canadian media (Anderson 2012).
In theory, the TRC was intended to allow the victims of Indian residential schools to tell their truth and to illuminate to all Canadians the grievances of Indigenous peoples, with the hope that through this process, it would heal the massive traumas they experienced (James 2012). Similar to most TRCs, this was done through interpersonal storytelling, with little focus placed on how the Indian residential school system fit into the broader colonial framework or the public institutions that contributed to Indian residential schools and continue to negatively impact the lives of Indigenous people (Coulthard 2014). The TRC failed to spark meaningful debate because it did not adequately consider that the same systems originally responsible for creating the Indian residential schools continue to impact contemporary Indigenous relationships in almost every respect, including child welfare, criminal justice, health and human services, resource extraction, and sanitation (see, e.g., Coulthard 2014; James 2012).
Finally, while both Harper’s apology and the TRC may have had good intentions and may have helped rehumanize some people, both succumbed to one of the biggest pitfalls in apologizing; apologies are not a magic wand that can rectify ongoing transgressions. When going forward, promises to do better only work in the eyes of the apologized party, if, in fact, the apologizer meaningfully improves their conduct. Few Indigenous people in Canada would say this has come to pass in light of continuous and serious injustices perpetrated against them (perceived or real) by the Canadian state, Canadian institutions, and the dominant population.
These include, but are by no means limited to, a failure to fully implement the recommendations of the TRC, disproportionate rates of violence committed against Indigenous women and girls, the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in the criminal justice system, the failure of the treaty process in British Columbia, and pervasive prejudicial attitudes and actions against Indigenous peoples throughout Canada.
Canada and the Chinese Head Tax
In 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper apologized on behalf of the Canadian government to all Chinese Canadians for both the Chinese Head Tax, which lasted from 1885 to 1923, and the Chinese Exclusion Act, which was in place from 1923 to 1947. These legislations not only disrupted families and hurt Chinese Canadian immigrants economically; they also conveyed a status of ethnic undesirability (see Winter 2008). The Chinese Canadian community has actively sought an apology and material compensation since the 1980s from the Canadian state. However, a procession of Liberal- and Conservative-led governments refused to supply them. Prior to Harper’s apology, previous governments announced their intent to create a memorial fund that would apprise all Canadians of the injustice that had been perpetrated (Li 2008). However, they also stated that they had no plans to apologize. Despite being the first administration to acknowledge the injustice, many members of the Chinese Canadian community were upset by the government’s failure to actually apologize. Blatz, Schumann, and Ross (2009) hypothesize that this is a form of reactive devaluation that highlights that during negotiations, if one group offers X but withholds Y, the other group will devalue X and desire Y more. In the context of apologies, this means that if a group demands just an apology and the government provides one, they will likely be satisfied. If, however, the group demands both an apology and financial compensation but the government only offers the apology, the group will devalue the apology, as it fails to fully meet their demands.
Broadly speaking, Harper’s apology to the victims of the Head Tax and the Chinese Canadian community was extremely comprehensive and contained nine out of the ten criteria outlined by Blatz, Schumann, and Ross (2009). Furthermore, this apology was arguably about rehumanizing the Chinese Canadian community by highlighting the suffering the community experienced and praising the important role the victims of these policies played in constructing Canada, going so far as to say that the back-breaking labour Chinese immigrants provided in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway “helped to ensure the future of Canada” (Deveau 2006). Additionally, Harper stressed the invaluable role Chinese Canadians continue to play in Canada. In effect, this helped shift the narrative concerning Chinese Canadians from that of an undesirable immigrant group to a crucial and valued part of Canadian society. This apology also included a material component, with payments of CAD 20,000 (~USD 15,848) offered to the few remaining survivors of the Head Tax or their spouses and CAD 34 million (~USD 26.94 million) for recognition projects, with CAD 10 million (~USD 7.92 million) earmarked toward educating Canadians about the discrimination and hardship faced by Chinese Canadians due to wartime measures or immigration restrictions. In addition, Harper’s apology contained a commitment to improved conduct, stating that the “government will continually strive to ensure that similar unjust practices are never allowed to happen again” (Deveau 2006).
Research conducted following Harper’s apology found it was positive overall, but with some caveats. Blatz, Schumann, and Ross (2009), in their survey of both Chinese Canadians and non-Chinese Canadians, found both groups reported significant satisfaction with the apology, although Chinese Canadians evaluated it somewhat less favourably. Both groups assessed the Canadian government and Canadians of European heritage more favourably after the apology, but the apology had little effect on the participants’ perceptions of Chinese Canadians. Moreover, Chinese Canadian participants generally possessed greater skepticism toward the motivations behind the apology and were more inclined to view it as a strategy to secure Chinese Canadian votes in the subsequent election (Li 2008). Chinese Canadian participants were also more inclined to believe that negative effects ensuing from the Head Tax on the Chinese Canadian community persisted (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009). Wohl, Hornsey, and Philpot (2011, 86), in their research on inter-group apologies—including the Head Tax—found that “the historically victimized group often waits to see if the apology produces behavioural change after granting forgiveness.” In the case of Harper’s apology, they found that among Chinese Canadians, the apology increased expectations that it would “lead to conciliatory discourse and behaviours.” In a revaluation one year later, they found that “Chinese Canadians who assigned collective guilt were less likely to think that the apology had transpired into actual change.”
Discussion and Conclusion
State apologies are typically about signalling trustworthiness; they are generally about restoring the apologizer to full standing within their community. We have argued that a restoration of trustworthiness is demonstrated by an agreement that what happened was a violation, an acceptance of responsibility, an expression of regret or remorse, and an assertion that future actions will be better. Every apology discussed contained these elements to a large extent.
The initial apology from de Klerk signalled trustworthiness but was undermined by his later commentary—in particular, his reluctance to take responsibility or even admit that serious human rights violations toward non-white ethnic groups committed under apartheid were his fault. Those apologies that best signalled trustworthiness were the two provided by Prime Minister Stephen Harper to Indigenous peoples and Chinese Canadian immigrants. Not only did both apologies outline the grievous wrongs that had been committed against victimized groups by the Canadian state, but these apologies also contained promises of a better future. Canada is, of course, not alone in issuing such apologies.
The failure of these apologies can be attributed to the reluctance of the apologizing parties to pay a real cost for their past actions and an insufficient focus on the rehumanization of the victimized party. When considering apologies that are effective, the more effective apologies are those that are costly to fake. Put another way, if the apologizer is sacrificing something to the apologized party, the apologized party is more likely to believe the apologizer is being genuine. This can be further delineated in that an effective rehumanizing apology should
- 1. clearly identify the violation;
- 2. promise with clear language ways to make amends for the transgression, that it won’t happen again, and an agreement to be held to a higher standard;
- 3. identify the reason for the failure and admit that it was a failure; and
- 4. avoid partial apologies that do not take responsibility for what has occurred.
An apology that does not have a guarantee appears to lack sincerity, since the apologizer is leaving open the possibility that they will commit future transgressions.
Applying these criteria to the discussed rehumanizing case studies, a somewhat clear ranking in efficacy appears. The apology from de Klerk, while acknowledging what he perceived to be the main violations, did not acknowledge a number of other violations that the victims of apartheid were seeking an apology for. Moreover, as previously mentioned, throughout his commentary, he refused to accept responsibility for a number of violations that were not included in his original apology. In his answers to questions from the TRC, de Klerk also failed to engage with the idea of reparations, which are an important means of making things better for the victims. He further failed to expressly promise that these types of policies would not occur in the future. While he did acknowledge that the apartheid policy was a failure, he nevertheless did not discuss the prejudicial systems of belief among white South Africans that allowed it to occur. Moreover, in the follow-up questioning, de Klerk frequently engaged in partial apologies, patently demonstrating that he was unwilling to take responsibility for the human rights violations and violence that was committed by the Nationalist Party. Overall, de Klerk’s apology largely failed because it contained few of the elements that were necessary for it to succeed.
Harper’s apology to Indigenous peoples contained almost all the important elements for a successful state apology. He clearly identified what the violation was and the impact it had on residential school survivors and Indigenous communities more broadly. Moreover, he discussed steps that were being taken to heal what had happened, including the formation of the TRC. He also offered assurances that this would not happen again. However, while he did spend significant time admitting that what had occurred was a moral failure, for some, his explanations of why the policy occurred did not go far enough (see, e.g., Coulthard 2014). Although Harper acknowledged that the Indian residential school system was rooted in prejudicial logic that saw Indigenous peoples and cultures as inferior, he did not discuss how it was only one component of a broader colonial project that sought to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their lands.
The most effective apology was the one offered to the Chinese Canadian community. Harper clearly identified that the Head Tax, the Exclusion Act, and the state’s past failure to acknowledge its violations. Moreover, not only did he promise to establish an education fund to help make things better; at the end of his speech, he also stressed that this would not happen again, stating that “our deep sorrow over the racist actions of our past will nourish our unwavering commitment to build a better future for all Canadians” (Deveau 2006). Lastly, he clearly identified that this policy was a moral failure on behalf of the government and that it was rooted in a prejudicial bias against Chinese people, and he did not make excuses for these policies.
Apologizing effectively is a costly process and comes with attendant risks. Apologies can be costly when considering the loss of status for the apologizer, material restitution, and/or a promise to do better in the future. Apologies can be risky, since they can potentially lead to criticisms by other groups in society who are opposed to the offering of apologies, as in the case of Brandt’s apology. The apology can fail to achieve full reconciliation or healing, notably if the apologized party continues to suffer transgressions—as is arguably the case with Harper’s apology to Canada’s Indigenous peoples. The state’s promise to do better can also backfire, especially since public officials cannot control the policy of future governments or the attitudes of their citizens, and these groups can transgress again, which will break the trust of the victimized group.
There is also an inherent paradox to apologies. While apologies generally only work if they are costly, an effective apology that restores the transgressor to good standing effectively lowers the cost, making it easier to apologize. Put another way, if the apologizer is more trusted by the apologized party, the necessary costliness for a signal to be effective is lowered.
The lesson here is that the focus ought to be on rehumanizing the apologized refugee, Indigenous, or ethnic minority group(s), not the apologizer. Any apology too focused on the apologizer is seen as self-serving and therefore less costly and less believable. An apology focused on rehumanizing the apologized is therefore, paradoxically, more effective at rehumanizing the apologizer as well.
There is no easy apology; the apologizer will need to experience discomfort. It is by being willing to experience this discomfort that they demonstrate their worthiness and that the apology is more than just “cheap talk.” It is through their discomfort that they signal to others that they have changed, that the expectations of behaviour have changed, that the accepted norms have changed, and that the apologized deserves to be treated better and will be treated better in the future. If they are unwilling to pay the price, as it were, and instead offer a weak or partial apology, it signals a lack of sincerity and that nothing has, in fact, changed. If they focus the apology on themselves rather than the apologized refugee, Indigenous, or ethnic minority group(s), then they weaken the signal. For states that are planning to apologize, it is important to be ready to accept the cost, as offering a non-costly apology can be worse than offering no apology at all.
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